The China Vortex

The Chinese government’s watchdog for equities, the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) has issued an edict to local fund managers that they are not to issue any pessimistic reports about equities during the Olympics in Beijing.

My question is “Why bother?”

The Shanghai market has been down 50% in the first half of the year, and what started out as a subprime mortgage problem in the US has now morphed into a banking problem with more US banks at risk.

In the meantime, Pony Ma, CEO of Tencent has joined in the chorus with Alibaba’s Jack Ma to talk about hard times ahead. The Chinese government has signaled that the rise of the yuan against the dollar will slow down, with a very public discussion in the People’s Daily. The signs of economic deceleration are everywhere.

When there is so much public discussion about upcoming economic challenges in the Chinese and western media, what good could possibly come from telling local fund managers not to say anything bad which might upset the Chinese equities markets? While many western observers of China see this as a sign of an authoritarian regime, for many Chinese, it looks more like desperation. Instead of allaying fears, it makes those who are still in the market fear the worst, and think that the government is trying to suppress even worse news, which in turn will fuel the rumor mill and make the market even more volatile.

In short, this looks more like a desperation move than a well-thought policy move. Instead of helping the market, it’s likely to make things worse.

This is what happens when politics interfere in the markets.

When I talk about the west in the title, I’m referring to the western part of China.

A great deal of thought and ink and pixels have been devoted to how the recent violence in the western part of China has affected the country’s image in the runup to the Beijing 2008 Olympics. I’m not going to talk about that because I have nothing new to add to that conversation.

Instead, I’m going to talk about how those events are likely to affect Chinese government fiscal and monetary policy.

These recent events have shown that the income gap between Han Chinese and Tibetans is growing, and that there are significant numbers of Tibetan youth who do not see a bright future for themselves. They are perfect fodder for unrest. Beijing has tried to mollify things by moving significant numbers of Han Chinese into Tibetan areas to start small businesses but, for the most part, Tibetans are still deeply religious, and many prefer a nomadic lifestyle to living in cities where they cannot find work.

This is the trouble with an urbanization policy: it works fine if people are employed. If they are not employed, there are all kinds of social problems.

The biggest problem is that there is no Tibetan merchant class as there is among Han Chinese.

The central focal point of Chinese social policy is low unemployment at all costs, even if the businesses are not profitable. It is better to have people working in a loss-making enterprise than for them not to have a job at all and wandering the streets.

Part of the rationale for the violence was to scare Han Chinese out of the Tibetan regions. Many Han Chinese families may prefer to move back to their places of origin; the Chinese government may offer economic incentives for them to stay.

Faced with this situation, the Chinese government is unlikely to let the yuan rise significantly more this year. If asked to choose between which is more dangerous, social unrest in China, or increasing pressure from the European Union and the US over letting the yuan appreciate, I’m sure that the residents of Zhongnanhai would say that the former is the threat they fear the most, not the latter.

For them, it’s much more important to keep people working at their jobs in China.

Yesterday, the new national aquatics center was unveiled in Beijing. This will become the venue for the leading water events of the Beijing Olympics. After the Olympics are over, it will be converted to a shopping mall for Beijing’s masses.

Beijing is now the site for some of the most exciting architecture in the world. For many Chinese though, there is an underlying uneasiness. Is all this dramatic futuristic architecture the beginning of a new and exciting future of wealth and prosperity which Chinese have never experienced in their long history?

Or is this instead a blip of prosperity, and will the future be much less bright, and will their children and grandchildren look back and see the Beijing Olympics as the apogee of what has since become a downward trajectory? And will this architectural marvel become dirty and dusty and seedy?

China has seen prosperity before, only to have its dreams shattered. Westerners today see China as a rich, prosperous and growing power, but it has run into the wall before, and on many different points in history. The first Chinese industrial revolution, when Chinese factories started making goods for the Chinese market started at the end of the nineteenth century, with textile mills and flour processing factories spouting up in the Yangzi river delta, mostly started and financed by entrepreneurs from Shanghai and Wuxi. Then China went into political chaos in the period following the revolution which overthrew the Qing dynasty in 1911.

Another period of short-lived period of prosperity came in the early 30s, this was cut short by the Japanese invasion of China in 1937.

Then, in the period following the end of WWII, China fell into civil war between the two leading political parties, with the Nationalists losing and retreating to Taiwan. Following the establishment of the PRC, China was very poor, and then made even poorer by the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, the Chinese government essentially decided that they were tired of being poor and moved ideology off the national agenda. From now on, it would be about making money.

Even today though, with all their savings and comfort, Chinese feel that it can all change and all go away. That is why they save and sit on their cash.

Americans are the opposite. Until very recently, most Americans believed that the future would always be brighter, that although there were things that they did not understand, America was the strongest and most prosperous country in the world, and that there would always be a way. This is why theyspent their savings, and when their savings were gone, they would take loans on easy credit terms, promising to repay the loans and credit when they had income again. It led to a bigger and bigger mountain of debt. And now, Americans are much less sure about their ability to repay the loans.

This is a way of thinking which is completely foreign to Chinese, and makes no sense at all to them. For Chinese, the only real money is cash. And when money goes bad in times of high inflation, they don’t even believe in cash.

They believe in land, and if the politics becomes unstable, they go to gold.

Runaway inflation is something the Germans experienced in th 1920s, then again in the postwar period. Japan experienced it too in the postwar period. China also experienced it in the postwar period when the Nationalists had to change national currencies three times in the period up to 1949. With the runaway inflation in the cities, people had to carry their money in paper sacks to do their shopping. They would go to the markets carrying bags of money to buy their groceries, then they would use the same bags to carry their groceries back home.

When the Nationalists lost control of inflation, they lost the Chinese cities and the support of the business community. This paved the way for the establishment of the PRC in 1949. The first task for the government was then to stabilize the currency.

While China was very poor in the fifties, sixties and seventies, there was virtually no inflation.

Today in China, we are seeing the early signs of inflation again in food prices and property prices. For any Chinese government, and this government is no exception, inflation is the greatest single and most frightening enemy it faces. It may creep up slowly, but it unleashes forces which can easily spin out of control.

If a government cannot maintain the value of its currency, it cannot protect its citizens, and the people end up in the poor house. It’s that simple.

This is why the Chinese government will not easily revalue the yuan upwards, and why the government keeps such a tight control on credit.

One of the upsides for Chinese businesses investing in Africa is that although the people are poor, at least they pay cash. When times turn hard, you want to be paid in cash.

For most Chinese, you aren’t rich unless you own cash.

Credit is just a derivative and in tough times, no one wants derivatives.

In my previous post, I talked about the dark side of China’s Internet cafes. I was surprised at how quickly I got responses to the posting; there were more than six comments in less than two hours.

Now, I would like to talk about a business opportunity in China’s Internet cafes. One of the biggest problems with Internet cafes is the uneven quality of the management; most are terribly managed, some are managed pretty well. Overall, the well-managed cafes suffer from the poor image problem associated with the whole industry. In a comment following my post, Fons Tuinstra says that the numbers of people going to Internet cafes are falling sharply, citing CNNIC figures. I suspect that this is because of a combination of factors:

• Educated Chinese families don’t like them because of their bad reputation
• With laptop computer prices coming down to 7,000-8,000 yuan for a fully equipped notebook, prices are coming with the range of most urban Chinese
• With monthly DSL prices between 100-200 yuan; broadband access is now affordable

In spite of all this, the Internet cafe still has attraction as a social and recreation area for young people who are looking for places to meet which don’t cost too much.

So why hasn’t someone come in with a roll-up strategy, buying up the good Internet cafes, offering professional management and a franchise package, and turning the whole thing into a franchise like Starbucks, McDonald’s or KFC? After all, that is how Ray Kroc started with McDonald’s in the 50s in the US.

These Internet cafes should offer clean well-lit areas which are frequently cleaned, fresh food and drink, clean bathrooms and a good overall experience. Just think of what could be done if a Chinese Internet cafe experience could be as good as an Apple store! Yes, prices would be higher but it would attract a much better demographic group. And a better demographic would make for a better advertising market.

Events could be planned for the stores educating people about online buying and selling, and to demo new products and services. Game contests could be held in a much better environment than are available now.

If I were an advertiser, I would really love to reach this demographic group. They would be upwardly mobile, not like the permanent urban underclass we now see in so many Internet cafes.

In short, make the Internet cafe a place where Chinese parents would not be ashamed of letting their child go to, and a place where the child could tell his parents he is at, without having to lie or admit to shamefully.

This would help to clean up the image of an industry which badly needs to improve its image. It would even make sense for an advertising company to get into it, as the advertising opportunities in a wholesome Internet cafe franchise are huge. I can think of several companies which should seriously consider doing an Internet cafe franchise in China:

• Focus Media
• Baidu
• Tencent
• Google
• Starbucks
• McDonald’s
• KFC

And now, here’s the company I’d really like to see do a Internet cafe franchise in China because it really knows about making cool stuff and it understands lifestyle marketing. If they did it, and did it right, they would own the Chinese Internet cafe experience.

Now wouldn’t that be something! You saw it here first.

I can always wish…

This is the opinion of Paul Craig Roberts, who previous served as Assistant Secretary of Treasury during the Reagan administration, and is often quoted as the “father of Reaganomics”. (You can read the Wikipedia entry about him here.)

Recently there has been discussion about China’s threat to use the “nuclear option”, or and basically destroying the value of the US dollar as a global reserve currency by dumping more dollars on the markets than they can absorb in a short time, forcing the dollar into a free-fall.

The prevailing wisdom among US economists is that China would not make such a move, as the damage to China’s own economy would be too great. Roberts rebuts this claim saying that

American economists make a mistake in their reasoning when they assume that China needs large reserves of foreign exchange. China does not need foreign exchange reserves for the usual reasons of supporting its currency’s value and paying its trade bills. China does not allow its currency to be traded in currency markets. Indeed, there is not enough yuan available to trade. Speculators, betting on the eventual rise of the yuan’s value, are trying to capture future gains by trading ‘virtual yuan.’ The other reason is that China does not have foreign trade deficits, and does not need reserves in other currencies with which to pay its bills. Indeed, if China had creditors, the creditors would be pleased to be paid in yuan as the currency is thought to be undervalued.

In addition, he refutes the claim that China would lose US markets with such a move.

The notion that China cannot exercise its power without losing its US markets is wrong. American consumers are as dependent on imports of manufactured goods from China as they are on imported oil. In addition, the profits of US brand name companies are dependent on the sale to Americans of the products that they make in China. The US cannot, in retaliation, block the import of goods and services from China without delivering a knock-out punch to US companies and US consumers. China has many markets and can afford to lose the US market easier than the US can afford to lose the American brand names on Wal-Mart’s shelves that are made in China. Indeed, the US is even dependent on China for advanced technology products. If truth be known, so much US production has been moved to China that many items on which consumers depend are no longer produced in America.

Roberts then builds a case for China’s dumping dollars as a reaction against US pressure for revaluing the yuan, refuting claims that this is an impossible scenario.

Consider that if China were to increase the value of the yuan by 30 percent, the value of China’s dollar holdings would decline by 30 percent. It would have the same effect on China’s pocketbook as dumping dollars and Treasuries in the markets.

Consider also, that as revaluation causes the yuan to move up in relation to the dollar (the reserve currency), it also causes the yuan to move up against every other traded currency. Thus, the Chinese cannot revalue as Paulson has ordered without making Chinese goods more expensive not merely to Americans but everywhere.

Compare this result with China dumping dollars. With the yuan pegged to the dollar, China can dump dollars without altering the exchange rate between the yuan and the dollar. As the dollar falls, the yuan falls with it. Goods and services produced in China do not become more expensive to Americans, and they become cheaper elsewhere. By dumping dollars, China expands its entry into other markets and accumulates more foreign currencies from trade surpluses.

Basically, Roberts makes a strong case for the argument that the US no longer has leverage over China and global financial markets the way it used to. You can read his whole article here.

Have we reached a tipping point in American power and global influence?