China’s Misreading Of The Global Economy

August 31st, 2010

More stories come out every day about how China is favoring state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at the expense of China’s private sector. Every day there are stories about SOEs advancing and the private sector in retreat or 国进民退 as it is called in Chinese。Seemingly, the Chinese leadership has embraced the view that China was able to save its own economy in the fall of 2008 by rapidly injecting a stimulus package into the Chinese economy, which meant state-owned enterprises through its own state-owned banks. By doing this when the US government was not able to react so quickly, China was able to fire up its own economy and maintain production and employment when the rest of the world was left on life support.

It sounds good as a story, but is it really true? Certainly the Chinese government is doing some of the right things by getting foreign manufacturers to raise wages, but is the conclusion that SOEs are the right way to go for the Chinese economy the right one?

My argument is that it’s not; it’s actually a return to a corrupt version of Gosplan which the Soviet Union had in the 1980s, and led to economic stagnation.

But first, let’s talk about the Chinese government reaction to the Wall Street financial crisis of 2008. The conclusion which the leadership has drawn is that some companies should be “too big to fail” because they employ such huge numbers of people. Since the single overriding issue for the Chinese government is social harmony (low unemployment + less social incidents), then yes, SOEs do prevent this. But this comes at the price of business efficiency for the whole economy, since, for the most part, they are large inefficient behemoths. And because they receive money from the state-owned banks on a policy basis, as opposed to business criteria, they can continue to do so. The price China pays for this inefficient allocation of capital is high; it means that Chinese consumers have less money to spend on discretionary items, which means that consumer spending is kept artificially low. All because the government is subsidizing its own kind in the name of social harmony.

The greatest single misreading of the situation is that the Chinese government believes that they were able to act quickly and decisively, when in fact, it had more to do with the US’s decision to bail out the financial industry, and then presented the bill to not only today’s Americans, but future generations of Americans. Up until this crisis, the US had the reputation for practicing the most efficient form of capitalism, sometimes with harsh social results. More than Europe, the US has allowed new industries to replace older outdated industries. For the first time this time, the US stepped in to bail out the banking industry at the cost of the whole country. This time, the US government decided that the unadulterated version of capitalism was too much.

China didn’t come out better because of its stimulus package; it looked better because the US betrayed its own economic values and policies.

The right conclusion for the Chinese leadership to draw from the crisis would have been that the 2008 stimulus package was a necessary one-time fix to save China’s economy during a global crisis. But then expanding that to say state capitalism is the best form of capitalism for China’s situation is exactly the wrong conclusion.

Now Beijing has ended up with a bunch of state-owned enterprises at the trough talking about how brilliant the Chinese version of state capitalism is, while Chinese private-sector companies are starved of capital and cannot compete against larger SOEs. Not only that, but the Chinese leadership has bought the line, and is reselling it as some magic fix for turbulent economic times.

Pushed to its logical conclusion, China will end up with:

  • Large companies which are less efficient and less innovative, just when Chinese companies need to move up the value chain;
  • The most talented young Chinese will continue to emigrate because they know that China does not reward innovation and individual initiative;
  • Chinese entrepreneurs will stay in China only long enough to get experience and develop their ideas, then will emigrate because they want their child to enjoy a brighter future;
  • The rich/poor gap, already large, will worsen because of widespread power abuse;
  • The SOEs will get fatter and dumber because they enjoy a monopoly;
  • By showing that they have so much sway over government policy, they risk becoming a target for government and policy criticism, and the Chinese government will largely be seen as a shill for the SOEs;
  • Needed political reforms, such as those recently mentioned by Premier Wen Jiabao, may be pushed back even further into the future;

Judging from the debate going on in China, it looks like the supporters of state capitalism want this to become a stated policy goal. If this were to happen, it would be a betrayal of Deng Xiaoping’s economic policies, which were about putting pragmatism over ideology. Putting state capitalism on a pedestal as if it were the single answer to all of the world’s economic problems would not have been a policy which he would have approved of.

If this were to happen, it would be a tragedy for China, its people and its aspirations. And for the rest of the world.

The Elephant In The Room

December 17th, 2008

One of the big problems with the present economic crisis is that we really do not know how big the problem is. We know that our problems have been caused by the creation, then over-leveraging of debt. But we don’t know how much debt was created, then sliced into derivatives multiple times which were then sold on to financial institutions all over the world.

But no one knows how much debt, then derivatives, were created by this whole process. That is the big elephant in the room which no one wants to talk about.

That makes it a good reason for me to talk about it.

We now know that a great deal of what passed for growth in the US over the past 20 years, starting with the Reagan administration, was financed by the creation of debt. Debt, by itself, is not a bad thing. In fact, it is needed for healthy growth. Companies, and countries, frequently reach stages in their growth when they need to borrow in order to reach another level of growth. When they get return from this new level of growth, they pay back and retire the debt. That is the way debt is supposed to be used.

Now, the problem which started in the US is that there was no intention to retire the debt. This was why the US Republican party pushed “deregulation” to get votes. Without deregulation, and a necessary amount of fraud, this debt mountain would not have grown as fast as they needed it to grow. Instead, the debt was sliced to ever finer parts, and sold into the global economy. Wall Street, especially its investment banks, became a mechanism for the creation, processing and sale of ever newer varieties of debt into the global economy. As long as there was growth, the system worked fine. And this is where the problem comes in: any system which can only survive when there is “growth” and cannot withstand changes and reverses in market conditions is effectively a Ponzi scheme. “Growth” becomes a means to its own ends, and becomes a necessity. When the “growth” conditions end, the system collapses.

Which is what we are going through now.

What we are going through right now is the great unwinding or deleveraging of what has happened over the past 25 years. In simple terms, the investment bank firms, and now hedge funds, and so much of the US financial industry became addicted to leveraging. Now they cannot leverage anymore, and their business model no longer works.

This raises a very interesting question which I have not seen others ask yet. That is “If debt financing and leveraging did not happen in the US, then how big would the US and global economy be?” In dollar numbers, it would be much smaller, and financial services and outsourcing would be much less important features of the US economy. There would be more manufacturing, and China would not have grown as quickly because it would not have had such a huge US export market to sell its products to. Without such fast economic growth, it is likely that the Chinese government would have had to look at social and political reforms sooner rather than later. Faster growth would have been replaced by slower more solid and more balanced growth.

China has made this problem bigger because it insisted on keeping the yuan at a lower exchange rate in order to protect its main export market, the US, addicted to Chinese exports. As I have said earlier on this blog, China and the US are two sides of the same coin. But right now, the two sides do not enjoy the same interests. The Ponzi scheme which served both sides so well no longer exists. This means that there will be recrimination and anger as each side seeks to pin the blame on the other side.

If we are ruthlessly honest about unwinding the overleveraging, I suspect that much of the world’s growth (60-75% + compounding) since the late 70s would not exist. Obviously, that is an outcome none of the world’s governments would have an interest in.

The main problem in economics is: “What is productivity, and how do we measure it?” I do not pretend to have an answer to that very challenging question, but I suspect that most of the improvements in production over the past 30 years come from improvements in information technology. These improvements in productivity mean that it is possible to create more with less people.

The real problem now is there are too many people, and most of them are not very productive in terms of adding value to an economy.

My guess is that as the unwinding continues, people will get angrier as their standards of living fall. When this happens, governments will have to choose which is worst, deflation (caused by unwinding) or inflation. Inflation has the advantage in that it can hide the real fall in living standards by gradually debasing and eroding the value the currency, but making the general populace think that they are making more money. The downside is that inflation is notoriously difficult to control. In a worst case scenario, it turns a country into an Argentinian or Brazilian basket case, where inflation becomes a routine tool for controlling the masses. More darkly, it drives the entrepreneurial class to other countries where they can make a better living for themselves and for their children.

When it does go out of control, it becomes the most powerful and deadly destroyer of wealth there is.

And that is the current situation where we are…

In my next article, I will talk about the businesses which will do well during The Great Unwinding.

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Baidu’s Problems: The Other Side of the Equation

December 4th, 2008

Lately, there has been much discussion about Baidu’s problems re the disclosure that they were accepting payments from makers of less than consumer-friendly products for higher rankings. David Wolf has an excellent posting about how Baidu has hurt itself in the public relations battle, with some significant assistance from CCTV and Google. According to David, Google China has positioned itself to benefit from some advertisers who eschew Baidu’s former position of accepting money for high positioning, without taking a second look at some of those companies which paid for those high rankings.

On one level, Baidu is a victim of its own success. Search engines are really mapmakers: they show what’s in the neighborhood. In its early days, before Baidu became pervasive, it may have been alright to take money for businesses to show up on the map without caring too much about the reputation of the business. After all, search was a comparatively new thing, and Baidu, not yet public, wanted to grow as fast as possible, both in terms of its indexes and database, and in financial terms. But now, everyone knows what a search engine does and expects it to basically tell the truth. And if it doesn’t, they are shocked and outraged. (Whether this is real or feigned shock and outrage is another story. We’ll get into that later.) Unfortunately, Baidu’s management failed to take into account their own success, and failed to make the transition to a more open, fair, ethical and transparent model before it became a full-blown shitstorm. Making the change would have hurt the company’s earnings, something Wall St. analysts would not have taken to kindly, so they were stuck. Instead of acting proactively, they took the other path, which was waiting for something to happen to them.

And it happened.

So does this mean the beginning of the end of Baidu’s erosion as search engine market leader in China? Actually, it’s not that simple.

Ultimately, it depends on Robin Li, Baidu’s CEO, and how he chooses to handle Baidu’s salesforce, who have aggressively brought in the bacon so that Baidu would look good for its investors and Wall St. The big question for Robin Li is: “How can he rein in his salesforce just when he needs them the most?” The Baidu salesforce is the main differentiator for Baidu; it has been able to sell keywords to China’s SMEs, getting it far greater penetration than Google in the Chinese tier 2 and 3 cities and in the countryside. Can you imagine Robin calling in his salesforce and telling them to do business and background checks on customers? That would be a very good way to get your salesforce to rebel in a split-second! Can he afford such a rebellion just when global economies and markets are tanking and Chinese are cutting back on spending, and when Baidu is expanding aggressively into e-commerce and other fields?

I don’t think so.

But then, it’s a stalemate for Baidu’s salesforce too. It’s not like they can up and leave and go to Google China, taking their clients with them. Sure, Google China likes the sales numbers they generate, but they cannot accept their sales practices.

Checkmate.

That is why the only thing Baidu can do is stay quiet, and hope the crisis is soon forgotten by its SME customers, and the wider audience, and can get back to business as usual. Of course, Baidu’s challengers will do their best to keep the issue in the public spotlight as long as possible. That is what the public relations battle which is now shaping up will be all about.

Baidu’s strategy of hoping that the issue will be soon forgotten is not a good strategy, but it’s the only strategy left in the eyes of their current management. But a strategy based on hope is not really a strategy, especially when you are under attack.

It’s time for a change.

If Chinese companies were more like most publicly listed US companies, somebody would step forward and take the knife, setting the stage for widespread change in direction and a whole new team. (Except if you are one of the Big Three from Detroit or a Wall Street banker. But, for the most part, those industries are exceptions and their gravy days are over.)

And that is why Chinese companies cannot make dramatic change, just when they need it the most. And, in short, that is why Chinese companies will not become global leaders.

Time For Chinese Money to Buy Silicon Valley Startups?

March 18th, 2008

The very dramatic unwinding of Bear Stearns and the purchase of its shares at a fire sale price by JP Morgan Chase has raised some very interesting questions.

Put simply, American assets are going to have to go at fire sale prices. We’re not talking about the Japanese buying Rockefeller Center, I mean real valuable and sometimes tangible assets. Remember that? And they will be denominated in US dollars, which most American banks still take. So this means a bargain on America for buyers smart enough to move quickly and take advantage of America’s double troubles on the banking and currency levels.

The Japanese in the eighties thought that real estate prices could only go up. Sound familiar? They learned that that wasn’t true in the nineties; it’s called “The Lost Decade” in Japan. Then US mortgage lenders sold the same crock of shit to Americans in 2002-2006 while the US Fed and Treasury passively looked on. Maybe someone can explain to me why there should not be at least a “Lost Couple of Years” in the US. Anybody who is thinking about buying US real estate now before the market has hit rock bottom needs their head examined.

Tom Foremski’s Silicon Valley Watcher has a very interesting article about how the investment banking crisis will freeze Silicon Valley M&A deals. According to the article, the Bear Stearns debacle means that many of the recent startups will run out of financing, which is now done by US investment banks, and may even go belly up because they are unable to obtain funding.

This represents an excellent buying opportunity for cash-rich Chinese corporations, venture capital firms and private equity firms to buy companies which have good intellectual property and/or business/sales relationships at very good prices. It would also be a good release of all that capital floating around in China, and is mostly going into real estate and other junk investments in China which don’t offer good ROI, especially with rising inflation.

There are three ways to do this: Chinese VC and PE firms could set up shop in SV and do the due diligence and offer term sheets and see what they come up with. So far, I have not seen any Chinese firm which has the people with the kind of capability to pull this off. There is a strong cultural component in dealmaking and most Chinese who have grown up and worked in China don’t have a feel for US dealmaking.

Or, they could partner with SV VCs, set up joint funds which the Chinese would fund, and which the American partners would do the due diligence on.

The third way would be if China Investment Corp. got really smart for a change and decided to buy several of the top-tier Sand Hill venture capital firms, funded them up, put in Chinese general or limited partners and/or board members, and started hearing pitches from entrepreneurs. The current crop of SV startups will start getting really desperate in 6-12 months, and that would be the best time to offer term sheets at favorable terms for the VC firms. (I’m willing to bet that even the leading US social networking sites will be going at low prices because they have not been successful in generating meaningful ad revenue even in fat times.)

To complete the M&A/IPO cycle, the Chinese would have to have partial ownership, preferably with a board seat/s, of one investment bank.

With all the mess on Wall Street, all they have to do is wait until the time is right.

Everything comes to he who waits (and has cash when nobody else does).