The China Vortex

Several days ago, Sam Flemming of CIC, a Shanghai-based online reputation management company pointed me to a news article on Business Week called “Inside The War Against China’s Blogs”.

The article specifically highlighted a company called Daqi.com (in Chinese the name means “Big Flag” which has a certain nationalistic appeal), and cited a case in which it helped Toyota satisfy a customer who had not received his car after three months. According to the company’s CEO, her company, an Internet online reputation management company, helps its customers, mostly western multinationals, to monitor their online reputations and help put out fires with users in China.

Out of curiosity, I then entered Daqi.com into my browser address bar so that I could visit the site and learn more about the company and what they do.

What I found, and what I did not find, were very interesting.

First of all, I thought I was going to find an online reputation management company, or public relations company, or whatever buzzwords they are using now to lure in corporate business.

But I found nothing of the kind. Instead, I was confronted with what I would call a typical Chinese portal website, complete with channels for “Homepage”, “Society”, “Military”, “Strange and Curious”, “Autos”, “Digital”, “Women’s Makeup”, “Pictures”, and “Reputations” (in beta).

(I have uploaded the screenshots of the pages mentioned below to Picasa and you can access them here.)

Aha, I thought to myself, I’ll click on “Reputations” and see what I find. When I went there, I found that it was full of forums divided into the categories “Cars”, “Cameras”, “Notebooks”, “Digital Cameras”, “MP3″, and “MP4″. The page is very long, and like most Chinese pages, scrolls on quite a distance with recommended products in each product category. This page, like the rest of the website, was designed very much to lure Chinese visitors. To visit the page, you can go to http://exp.daqi.com/

My next question was whether they took advertising? The only banner advertising I saw was for Dell, which ran on the two pages I visited. But it would be foolish to think that their only revenue came from banner advertising. Looking at how the page was designed, and the way some of the products were given larger photos and highlighted, it was easy to see that some makers were paying for higher rankings for higher visibility.

But nowhere did I see anything about their online reputation management services. So I thought to myself, “Surely the person who wrote the Business Week story, Dexter Roberts, could point to a website where Daqi offered their online reputation management services, in either Chinese or English.”

I could find nothing of the kind.

Daqi claims that it regularly searches 500,000 forums daily for its corporate clients. I’m sure that it works on many sites which are not related to Daqi. However, it also raises the very uncomfortable possibility that it may actually manipulate online reputations by starting flame wars over product reputation, then charging their corporate clients money to put them out. (I’m not claiming that Daqi does, but the very fact that they run their own portal under their own company name and URI means that they have very little respect for their non-Chinese corporate clients and western journalists’ capability to conduct online research in Chinese.)

The clash of interests which arises from revenue from makers for higher rankings on their own portal site, and then revenue from non-Chinese corporate clients for “research insights” and “firefighting services” into Chinese online behavior is obvious to anyone. The temptation to use their own forums to “seed” opinions must be very great. These seeded opinions would then quickly proliferate to other sites.

There is a simple way to find out, and that is to check timestamps of postings. All forum software includes a posting timestamp, and it’s easy to check the timestamps on a subject to push it back in time to where and when a rumor started. What is harder to find out is the identity of the poster, but this can sometimes be done by checking the IP address of the poster if IP cloaking is not used. Different online identities sharing the same IP would most likely be the same poster.

I wonder how many corporate clients do this kind of checking?

I find the whole practice of hiring Chinese and paying them to post favorable comments on a per posting basis to be an unethical PR practice. According to the BW article, this is a common practice. A Beijing-based PR professional, William Moss, talks about this in more detail.

Online public relations firms will have to draw up and aggressively publicize clear guidelines on what they do, and what they don’t do when it comes to monitoring online behavior in China. Playing multiple roles as player and referee doesn’t make it in my book. I have talked about some of the skills needed in a previous posting.

This is part of the problem which actually slows down Internet growth in China. In spite of it all, there are healthy groups for product discussions.

Of course, each corporate client will have to make its own call as to what it is most comfortable with. And so will their VC backers. (I wonder if they read Chinese?)

But if someone does do an article on a Chinese company, at the very least, the URI mentioned should include, in either Chinese or English, the business they are in which is mentioned in the article.

Nobody likes bait and switch tactics, and I’m no exception.

Is that too much to ask for?

Technorati Tags: advertising, BBS, China, Chinese, cic, forums, imagethief, management, marketing, online, postings, PR, publicrelations, reputationmanagement, VCs, venturecapital

Yesterday, Twitterdom in China was on fire with the news, first published on TechCrunch, that Facebook clone Xiaonei had raised US$430M from Softbank, which is huge, even by current Web 2.0 bubble standards. Immediately on Twitter, there was almost an uproar, especially from users in Taiwan, who said that it was ridiculous that a Facebook clone would have such a high valuation. Does Oak Pacific Interactive and Softbank know something which we don’t? (My answer to that is a simple “Obviously yes”.)

But before delving into that, let’s talk about the pluses and minuses of C2C, or “copy to China”, a term which I believe was first used by Tangos Chan, publisher of China Web 2.0 review. I believe that when an entrepreneur does not have a clear idea about what he is going to do, starting with a copy of a currently popular application is a good way to go. After all, if it got funded by VCs in the US, it is highly likely that given the team’s experience, they will also be able to get funded in China.

What is important is what happens after it gets initial funding. Where many startups lose direction is that they look too closely at their competitors, and don’t look at the challenges for many users whom they want to reach. Most ask the wrong questions: They are too focused on their platform and applications, and don’t study the problems their users have in their daily lives.

There are a few simple questions startup founders need to find answers to:

• What are the most important tasks for a person in any given day? (These are always changing according to age, situation, etc.)
• Where do they encounter the most frustration?
• Can you offer a solution to this?

I have a simple way of looking at this: If the need is urgent, then you can charge a fee or subscription for it. If you can help people make more money, you can charge a fee or subscription for it. If it is a hardware solution which simplifies and clarifies life and makes the user more efficient, you can sell it (as is the case with the iPhone).

If it does not do any of the above things, but still offers some informative or entertainment value, then your most likely source of revenue is advertising.

Back to C2C. When OICQ was launched in early 1999, it was nothing except a Chinese-language clone of ICQ. It had an advantage in that there was tremendous need among Chinese for easy convenient communications across the computer and the then-new mobile phone platforms. The management saw this need, offered the services, collected fees all along the way, evolving into QQ along the way, and the company is now worth more than US$11B.

Tencent, the parent company for QQ, saw a social wave in China, copied something which worked overseas, fulfilled the need, and evolved it into something tremendously popular and successful in China. Instead of looking iinwards and worrying about their technology and UI, they looked out, and saw the opportunity in users’ needs and frustrations.

Now the company has more than 500M registered user accounts. It has achieved brand lock-in among most younger Chinese users.

That is why I say that when anyone only compares UI features, they are not thinking deep enough.

Now, the question is whether Xiaonei or any of the Chinese Facebook clones can evolve into something successful. The China of 2008 is vastly different from the China of 1999, and there are all kinds of communications solutions competing for users. The dynamics has changed to favor the user, who now has almost too may choices.

Add to that my feeling that SNS (social networking solutions) are a solution to a problem which is not that urgent for most people (hence the reliance on advertising as a revenue source instead of fee or subscription).

Of course, if depending on income was the only way to make money in this business, then I’m sure that Xiaonei would not have received such a high investment. An article in Plus8star talks about possible strategy scenarios in the move (h/t to Kaiser Kuo).

Technorati Tags: advertising, c2c, China, copy2china, encent, entertainment, facebook, fees, ICQ, income, information, iPhone, oakpacific, oakpacificinteractive, plus8star, qq, softbank, subscriptions, taiwan, techcrunch, twitter, ui, US, VC, venturecapital, web2, xiaonei

One of the things which I frequently hear from first-time visitors to China is that “It is so big!” Sometimes, I hear this even from Texans, an American state which takes pride in being bigger than almost any other state, with the exception of Alaska.

Westerners are not the only ones to fall victim to this thinking; Chinese also are enamored with these numbers. When I hear presentations, the most frequently heard numbers show 420 million mobile phone subscribers, 250 million IM subscribers, at which point the China virgins go gaga and start counting the yuan they are going to make (in their dreams) and planning their retirements (also in their dreams).

By now, I’m sure that you’ve figured out that I don’t buy into this view. Yes, China is big, but so what?

Instead, when you start looking at real revenue and earnings numbers, China is still way down there. And for many companies, both Chinese and western, it’s a difficult nut to crack.

But I don’t think that it needs to be. First of all, let’s get past the population and subscriber numbers. Yes, they are very big, and the only country which can even come close is India. All the thoughts, fantasies and conversation about projections should end there, and marketers should dig deeper to look at revenue and earnings projections, since they are the only real numbers which count.

Marketing 101 says that it isn’t the size of your market and number of units sold, it’s really all about your margins and accessories you can continue to cross-sell or up-sell to your customers after the initial sale. There is the often quoted example of “give away the razor, and sell the razor blades (where you really make the money).”

Since my field is the Internet, I frequently come across all kinds of interesting ideas where Chinese entrepreneurs are seeking funding. Let’s say that I’ve seen a lot of ideas in my lifetime, and I’m picky about what strikes my fancy. When I talk to people, I’m often looking for a “je ne sais quoi” which is different about them, or their products and services, and their ability to execute. China subscriber and user numbers don’t impress me, and make my eyes glaze over very quickly.

I’m much more impressed when people talk about revenue and earnings projections. I’m even more impressed when I find out that these numbers are not pulled out of thin air, and can relate to something the presenter/entrepreneur has worked on and delivered in the past. At this point, we cross the line from fantasy to a doable reality.

The trouble with many Chinese startups is that the founder is so focused on raising money that he forgets to even spin a good story about what he’s going to do with the money! And yet, China is such a hot place to be now that there are people with money who are willing to part with significant amounts of money without even asking for a good story about how they are going to execute!

Part of the reason so many poor ideas get funded is because the burn rate is so low in China that even if the startup fails in the initial stage, the burn can be kept so low that if/when the startup founder has to do a reboot (usually by coming up with a sensible idea), that there is still money left in the till for a repositioning and second chance. In reality though, I think that this is a bad strategy for investors. After all, if the founder/s did not come up with a good idea the first time, and it got funded, what is the incentive for him to come up with a good idea the second time around?

This is why countries like the US and Sweden and other countries continue to be competitive in the Internet startup field even though their initial startup costs and burn rate are much higher than in China. Being cheap and being good are too entirely different things, and often being cheap actually prevents you from being good because it allows, and even encourages, sloppy thinking and poor execution skills.

This is not healthy for the western investors and for the Chinese. This is a sign of a bubble, and is oddly reminiscent of that situation in the US just a few short years ago when many people thought that they could buy a house without a down payment and a job. Fortunately for China, the Internet sector is still a relatively small part of the economy, and while US and western funds may eventually come up $50 billion or so shorter in a few years, it won’t be significant enough to put a crimp in any venture capitalist’s or private equity fund manager’s retirement plans.

What is needed now, at least in the Internet startup area, are entrepreneurs who have actually had experience selling something, and actually understand the purchasing habits of Chinese consumers, and know how to provide a useful service to earn that money and are willing to put revenue projections into their pitches.

There are plenty of opportunities and China is still a big market. I can think of several things right off the bat.

But let’s stop talking population and subscribers, and start talking revenue and earnings, shall we?

Technorati Tags: alaska, burnrate, China, Chinese, earnings, economy, entrepreneurs, founders, funding, im, marketing, mobilephone, privateequity, projections, revenue, startups, sweden, texas, US, venturecapital

In the course of my work, I’m often asked, based on my experience living and working in China, “What’s wrong with China’s Internet developers?” Unfortunately, I have never attacked the problem in a systematic way and organized my thoughts, even though I should.

Today, I was visiting the Signals vs. Noise website which is maintained by 37 Signals, who are Ruby developers. David Heinemeer Hansson, who extracted the Ruby on Rails framework works there. He also publishes his own blog, Loud Thinking.

If you have an interest in technology from a technology and/or business viewpoint, you really should read the 37 Signals blog; it’s really excellent.

When I read this posting on “Secrets to Amazon’s Success” , I said to myself “That’s it; that’s exactly what’s wrong with China’s internet developers!”

If Chinese developers just followed what Amazon has done, they would be in a much better place.

Read it and tell me what you think in the comments below.

Technorati Tags: 37signals, amazon, China, Chinese, david, hansson, heinemeer, internet, ruby, rubyonrails, technology, VC, venturecapital