The China Vortex

One of my biggest complaints about western observers of China is the overly used term “China market”. In fact, there is no China market, just as there is no European market. While there is a European Union, which many Europeans complain about as some kind of bloated legislative bureaucratic monster, it would be silly for any marketer to think that there is anything like a European market on the ground. After all, what are you talking about? Are you talking about the UK, Germany, Belgium, Spain or Italy? Even within these national markets, there are vast social and cultural differences within the same country.

While China is ruled as a single nation from Beijing, the political, regional, social and cultural differences within China are just as big as in Europe. While many western observers see Beijing as authoritarian, the truth is that Beijing has to play a huge juggling act among its own provinces. Every time the center asks for something from the provinces, it has to offer the provinces something in return. In this respect, China is just like the US, Russia and other big countries. There is endless bargaining, trading and swapping of favors, most of which does not occur publicly and is not common knowledge.

These local differences even extend to Internet businesses. The two biggest and most successful companies which dominate in CPC advertising and micropayments are both based in Shenzhen, and are not in Beijing and Shanghai. They are Tencent and Xunlei. Tencent is the leader in charging for micropayment-based subscription services and is the leader with its popular instant messaging client, QQ. Tencent is publicly listed in Hong Kong, and analysts love the company’s business model. Xunlei is a leader in P2P distribution of video, and inserts ads into video content before sending them on their way through its network. Although it is still private, it is already profitable, and Google has invested in the company.

If you go to Beijing, the media landscape is dominated by Sina, Sohu and Netease, China’s leading portals. I think of these companies as being like Web 1.0 national newspapers; they are like the Wall Street Journal and New York Times in China for the Internet generation. Because media content is a politically sensitive area in China, they need to be close to the government, which is why they are in Beijing.

And Shanghai is where most of the gaming companies are. While Beijing is home to serious media and sports, Shanghai is much more entertainment oriented. In the twenties and thirties, Shanghai was the home for China’s film industry; and the talent for entertainment had strong roots in Shanghai. After 1949, many of the producers, directors and actors moved to Hong Kong, but with China’s opening up, many have returned to their old base in Shanghai.

Think about it. Why is it the case that two of the leading micropayments companies in China are based in Shenzhen? I believe that being in Shenzhen forced these two companies to be much more consumer-oriented since fewer VCs ventured there. The paucity of easy access to capital forced them to be creative. In their early days, they were able to get favorable rents, cheaper employees and lower their other costs because of favorable terms from the Shenzhen municipal government. Micropayments really started in desperation as a payment system for poor people who had no credit in a nation without a national credit-ranking system who did not have credit cards. Without money from VCs, these companies were forced to innovate, and had to come up with a solution which got money from consumers.

Getting paid by your users; what a neat idea!

In China, many smart entrepreneurs go to second- and even third-tier cities so that they can get a local municipal government to support them. This is called finding a 靠山 or literally “a mountain to lean on”. After all, every city official wants to be able to say someday: “I helped set up Tencent (or Xunlei, or whatever.)” That would look good on their resume.

I’m always mystified that western-funded companies like to set up in Beijing and Shanghai; why don’t they strike out into other Chinese cities? Most of the time, I think it’s because their management are able to enjoy a level of living which is closer to what they would enjoy in the west. The problem is that because they are more like western cities than most Chinese cities, they give a skewed and sanitized view of what China is really like.

As a result, they unwittingly hand over the advantage to smart local Chinese companies. With the huge number of Internet companies in those two cities of Shanghai and Beijing, it’s almost impossible to find any Chinese government officials who can serve the role of mountains to lean on. And when you can find them, the cost of the mountains are much higher.

Technorati Tags: advertisers, Beijing, China, Chinese, europeans, micropayments, netease, qq, shanghai, Shenzhen, sina, sohu, tencent, VCs, xunlei

In China, you know something has become big when the government starts worrying about how to regulate it. (Come to think of it, that’s the way it is with most governments, not just China’s.)

China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, has asked the Finance Department of People’s University in Beijing to come up with draft plans to regulate micropayments in China. (People’s University is traditionally the training ground for government officials.) Right now, micropayments occupy a gray area, which means that they are not technically legal or illegal. They just exist.

And they are unregulated. Right now, the Chinese government has no idea about how to regulate this market, which it obviously expects to grow substantially. Some have even grumbled that this new virtual economy will eventually grow in size to rival offline economies.

The most successful subscription micropayment based company in China is Tencent, which is based in Shenzhen and gets unofficial support from the Guangdong provincial government. (The Chinese have a saying: 天高皇帝远 which literally means “The skies are higher when the emperor is farther away.” Unfortunately for most western companies, they are not aware of and do not heed this very wise Chinese saying.) It has its own virtual currency, the QQ-Coin, which can be purchased one-way with Chinese yuan, but cannot be converted back into Chinese yuan. The company recently announced record earnings.

You get big, you get regulated.

Technorati Tags: banks, Beijing, China, Chinese, currencies, currency, markets, Shenzhen, subscriptions, tencent, virtual

Several months ago I wrote about how Apple’s opening of the iPhone SDK and its App Store would create a whole new business ecosystem for application developers for that platform. Apple offers globally accessible hosting and payment clearance in return for a 30% cut of the app’s sales price.

Now, there are early signs that the strategy is paying off for some early application developers who have developed popular apps for the iPhone and iPod touch (which uses the same SDK as the iPhone) users. Eliza Block, who developed 2 Across, a word game for the iPhone platform, has reportedly cleared in the area of $2,000 a day according to this article.

The App Store is a new updated version of the shareware movement which took hold in the early 80s with the launch of the Apple Macintosh 128K. In those days, homebrew developers would develop games, apps and productivity tools which were distributed on floppy disks. (Remember those? If you do, you’re showing your age.) More often than not, these came with a message which went something like “If you liked this app, please show your appreciation by sending a contribution to this address.” More often than not, people just used the apps without sending money, although there were a few kind and generous souls who did.

Now, Apple has become the doorkeeper for these independent developers. There is no more reliance on the kindness of strangers; Apple takes care of global distribution and payment for new apps in return for 30% of the app’s sales price. For devs, the App Store is the perfect barometer for what’s hot and what’s not.

In contrast, Facebook and others have not been able to find the magic balance point between independent developers and their own corporate needs for revenue. When Facebook opened its platform to developers, it ended up enabling app developers to spam the FB audience, driving many away from Facebook. Now, with Facebook Connect, FB is trying to find that balance point.

Chinese social media companies are no better at finding the right balance between independent devs and their own need for revenue. While there has been talk about open systems in China, all of the competing business models in fact, are not open. Apple’s system is certainly not open. it’s just that Apple is willing to share in order to grow the pie.

Apple and Steve Jobs have successfully put themselves at the juncture of technology, business and hardware, and are willing to share a larger cut in order to drive up sales of a very attractive new hardware platform. With growing earnings from hardware sales, Apple can afford to be generous with devs, and is effectively subsidizing a new business ecosystem. By making some independent developers financially successful with App Store and getting that word out, they do something none of their competition have been able to do yet.

The question for Chinese companies such as Tencent is whether they are willing to use their high corporate earnings to subsidize their own independent developers’ business ecosystem as Apple has, and share some of the revenue in order to grow the pie for everyone? Or do they still think that they can own the whole pie? Tangos Chan says that they still believe that they can own the whole pie.

But Tangos believes that this will change in the future. In the meantime, more independent devs will gravitate to developing for the iPhone platform. It’s better to open up sooner while there is still interest in their platform because opening up later means that they will have to be that much more generous in order to attract developers away from Apple’s platform.

After all, that’s where the money is. And I’m sure that Steve loves how his competitors’ moves help his platform.

What more could he ask for?

Technorati Tags: Apple, applications, apps, appstore, business, corporations, developers, distribution, ecosystem, facebook, gaming, iPhone, iPod, Macintosh, productivity, sdk, stevejobs, tencent, tools

The Chinese government’s watchdog for equities, the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) has issued an edict to local fund managers that they are not to issue any pessimistic reports about equities during the Olympics in Beijing.

My question is “Why bother?”

The Shanghai market has been down 50% in the first half of the year, and what started out as a subprime mortgage problem in the US has now morphed into a banking problem with more US banks at risk.

In the meantime, Pony Ma, CEO of Tencent has joined in the chorus with Alibaba’s Jack Ma to talk about hard times ahead. The Chinese government has signaled that the rise of the yuan against the dollar will slow down, with a very public discussion in the People’s Daily. The signs of economic deceleration are everywhere.

When there is so much public discussion about upcoming economic challenges in the Chinese and western media, what good could possibly come from telling local fund managers not to say anything bad which might upset the Chinese equities markets? While many western observers of China see this as a sign of an authoritarian regime, for many Chinese, it looks more like desperation. Instead of allaying fears, it makes those who are still in the market fear the worst, and think that the government is trying to suppress even worse news, which in turn will fuel the rumor mill and make the market even more volatile.

In short, this looks more like a desperation move than a well-thought policy move. Instead of helping the market, it’s likely to make things worse.

This is what happens when politics interfere in the markets.

Technorati Tags: alibaba, American, authoritarian, banking, banks, Beijing, China, Chinese, csrc, dollar, economics, funds, market, mortgage, olympics, politics, shanghai, subprime, tencent, yuan

Unless you have been living under a rock for the past six months, you have probably heard of Twitter. Developed with Ruby on Rails, it has now hit the big time, with many companies offering client versions of Twitter, so that you don’t have to keep the Twitter web page open to record your deepest thoughts, which you can share with your community/ies.

Technically speaking, there is not a whole lot of difference between Twitter and many other IM clients, including Tencent’s QQ, the immensely popular Chinese IM client. If there is any difference, it is that Twitter makes it possible for dispersed communities to keep track of each others’ activities. In contrast, the IM clients are mainly Web 1.0 tools which enable people to find and contact each other to meet offline. QQ, for instance, is a great enabler for that popular activity which we shall call “dating” in China.

The difference between Twitter and the Web 1.0 IM clients is not so much in the technology, as in the way people handle relationships. Put simply, the lines between offline and online relationships are blurring, and in many cases, more people spend more time online than they do offline. For this reason, their online communities are gaining value, and in a few cases, are assuming primary value, while their offline relationships become secondary.

This was not the case for most of the Web 1.0 IM clients.

From the business perspective, this means that businesses will have to pay even more attention to what is going on online, as I have mentioned in my previous post.

In China, many people do not have email addresses, instead they rely on QQ ID numbers to identify each other. Walk into any Chinese working area (including Starbucks and any other area which provides free Wifi) and chances are you will see that almost every screen has a QQ or Windows IM client window open.

And they are using it for business, not just personal gossip.

So, the ultimate test of whether Twitter becomes the American QQ is whether American’s use it for business, not just social chatting.

If that happens, the American Internet will suddenly look a lot more like the Chinese Internet.

Technorati Tags: American, business, China, client, community, dating, email, im, internet, marketing, qq, relationships, rubyonrails, Starbucks, tencent, twitter, US, wifi, windows

One of the things past experience has taught me that while it is possible to guess that some business will take off in China, it is almost impossible to tell when. The most common scenario is that for many years, a western business will devote its people and resources to making its business popular with Chinese, it will not show results. Frustrated, it will depart China with nothing to show for its hard work and investment. (This happened frequently in the eighties and nineties; now it is much more rare.)

This rule does not just apply to business; it even applies to Chinese government policy. For years, the Chinese government actively urged the Chinese people to travel more; it even increased the number of public holidays, creating the Golden Week holiday around the May Day holiday in the late 90s to get Chinese to travel more, and spend some of their savings. For years, the policy yielded no solid results.

But later it worked, and beginning this year, the May Golden Week holiday will be abolished. Put simply, it’s no longer needed. Chinese now travel freely, are willing to spend their savings, and the incentive is now no longer needed.

The same phenomenon occurred in the auto industry. For years, local Chinese automakers were unable to get Chinese to spend money on automobiles; most of their production went to taxis and to Chinese government ministries and officials. These habits changed suddenly with the SARS crisis in 2003. All of a sudden, Chinese were afraid to take public transport and started buying cars. And unlike in the west, they paid for their cars in cash.

This trend, which started in 2003, has continued to this day. Now, if a young man in China’s cities wants to get married, more and more young brides are expecting an apartment and car to go with their husband-to-be. Today, in Beijing, 1,000 new cars are being added daily to the city’s traffic woes.

This creates a phenomenon which I call the “Chinese hockey stick”. In simple terms, this means that “It is likely that a new business/service/product will take off in China, but it is hard to say when.” This can be endlessly frustrating for businesses which need to plan their expenditures on an annual or quarterly basis. When are they going to see some of their investment money come back? Country heads need to tell their head offices when the hockey stick will finally take off, and more often than not, it is very hard, if not impossible, to tell.

Part of my rationale for the Chinese hockey stick is that Chinese consumer spending patterns will track more closely to the spending habits of their Asian neighbors in South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan, than to the west, as Chinese society becomes more prosperous. If you want to understand how Chinese spending habits are likely to develop, take a close look at these places. You will learn a lot. In culture and language, these places are closer to how Chinese think, act and behave than the societies of North American and the EU.

Most frequently, the businesses which are able to time the rise of the hockey stick are local Chinese entrepreneurs. Unlike western companies which try to sell their foreign-designed products in China; these Chinese entrepreneurs stand in the wings, just waiting to swoop in at just the right moment. Unlike western corporations, these companies do not have the big budgets of western companies, but their knowledge of their countrymen’s thinking and spending habits more than compensates for this. This is why many leading Chinese Internet companies such as Tencent, Baidu and Sohu have been able to prosper, while their much larger and richer western competitors have been unable to gain traction.

With the dramatic growth of the Chinese consumer market in the past five years, you would think that western observers would learn to be quiet instead of sticking their necks out and betting against the spending power of Chinese consumers.

Apparently not.

David Wolf’s Silicon Hutong has pointed to an article by Donald dePalma in which he claims that China’s buyers account for only 1.1% of what he calls “online GDP”. Unfortunately, he does not explain his methodology as to how he gathered his numbers.

In the west, the Internet led to the creation of some whole new businesses, with Amazon and Google being the best examples. In China, many Internet companies are front-ends for established brick and mortar businesses. For many Chinese consumers, the Internet is like a shop window; when they buy, they still prefer to buy from a person in a store.

These fundamental differences in consumer spending habits make me question the value of even measuring something like “online GDP”. And as David Wolf alludes to, the eGDP is a static number; it does not capture or reflect trends. It is like trying to understand a movie storyline from a still photo.

That’s why I’ll stick with my analogy for the Chinese hockey stick, at least for the time being.

Technorati Tags: amazon, baidu, cars, China, Chinese, consumers, egdp, expenditures, google, Hongkong, internet, japan, sars, sohu, southkorea, spending, taiwan, tencent, travel

As China becomes more developed and sophisticated, more westerners are coming to China to understand the reasons for its success. I don’t believe that the Chinese success can be fully ascribed to China’s rising wealth and development; a good deal also has to deal with how western countries have screwed up in their politics and policies.

In the kingdom of the blind, the one-eyed man is king. Right now, China is the one-eyed man.

Setting this aside, there are areas where China’s growth is remarkable.

In a recent blog posting, Henry Jenkins of MIT shows how much more willing Chinese youth are to live their lives out and share their behavior with complete strangers in a manner American youth are not yet willing to. Here are some of the statistics (mostly in percentages) of what he has observed:

# Almost five times as many Chinese as American respondents said they have a parallel life online (61 percent vs. 13 percent).

# More than twice as many Chinese respondents agreed that “I have experimented with how I present myself online” (69 percent vs. 28 percent of Americans).

# More than half the Chinese sample (51 percent) said they have adopted a completely different persona in some of their online interactions, compared with only 17 percent of Americans.

# Fewer than a third of Americans (30 percent) said the Internet helps their social life, but more than three-quarters of Chinese respondents (77 percent) agreed that “The Internet helps me make friends.”

# Chinese respondents were also more likely than Americans to say they have expressed personal opinions or written about themselves online (72 percent vs. 56 percent). And they have expressed themselves more strongly online than they generally do in person (52 percent vs. 43 percent of Americans).

# Chinese respondents were almost twice as likely as Americans to agree that it’s good to be able to express honest opinions anonymously online (79 percent vs. 42 percent) and to agree that online they are free to do and say things they would not do or say offline (73 percent vs. 32 percent).

Some of the differences can be accounted for because, until recently, Chinese played relatively few games using game consoles, an area American youth have long had free access and exposure to. Instead, they play games in the Internet cafe, which offers an online and offline social experience which has not existed until very recently on the Microsoft and Sony platforms, and which has been addressed very well with Nintendo’s Wii.

These statistics do not tell us much about China on their own; I frequently insist that if one is to really understand what makes China’s Internet different it is necessary to dig deeper and look at its development at least from the application level. If one were to make even the most cursory look at users in any Internet cafe in China, one would find that most if not all, would have an instant messaging (IM) window open and are chatting with their friends while they are playing an online game. Lately I have noticed that in the Starbucks I frequent near Guomao in Beijing (Starbucks in China often offers free WiFi, compared with the US which charges users a daily subscription through its partnership with T-Mobile; go figure), many office types often have an IM window open even when they are busily working through their Excel spreadsheets.

For this reason, I particularly welcome the recent report by Plus8Star on Tencent’s QQ which started as a simple IM client and has now metamorphosized into China’s largest online company, and which has more than than 270M users in China. Basically, it has become what AOL would have become if it had been able to pull everything off with its acquisition of ICQ in 1998. In fact, the first version of QQ was called OICQ, standing for “open ICQ”; in its early days the company approached AOL seeking to become its China partner; it was brushed off. Now the company is listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange and has a market cap of US$11.4B.

The report is available in a free downloadable PDF version; the full version costs US$3,000. The greatest value of this report for those coming into China is that it provides valuable context and answers the “how” and “why” China’s Internet has developed the way it has.

Too much of the time, western observers claim that China’s Internet has changed the way it has because of Chinese government control and policy; not enough is mentioned about the business reasons why local competitors have succeeded why western companies have failed. This reports does a good job of plugging that hole in most peoples’ knowledge.

The title of the report sums it up: “Inside QQ: Learning from China’s leading online community”. An especially helpful page is page 23 of the report “Why do global giants fail in China?”. There have been billions of dollars which have been expended, and mistakes have been repeated over and over again in their quest for western dominance of the Chinese consumer market. I’m amazed that it continues to this day. This page alone is worth the price of the whole report; just read it.

If you are a business person anxious to break into the Chinese consmer market, or are just interested in learning more about the Chinese Internet, this report is a must-read.

Technorati Tags: AOL, Beijing, cafe, China, gaming, guomao, ICQ, im, instantmessaging, internet, microsoft, nintendo, qq, sony, Starbucks, tencent, wifi

In my previous post, I talked about the dark side of China’s Internet cafes. I was surprised at how quickly I got responses to the posting; there were more than six comments in less than two hours.

Now, I would like to talk about a business opportunity in China’s Internet cafes. One of the biggest problems with Internet cafes is the uneven quality of the management; most are terribly managed, some are managed pretty well. Overall, the well-managed cafes suffer from the poor image problem associated with the whole industry. In a comment following my post, Fons Tuinstra says that the numbers of people going to Internet cafes are falling sharply, citing CNNIC figures. I suspect that this is because of a combination of factors:

• Educated Chinese families don’t like them because of their bad reputation
• With laptop computer prices coming down to 7,000-8,000 yuan for a fully equipped notebook, prices are coming with the range of most urban Chinese
• With monthly DSL prices between 100-200 yuan; broadband access is now affordable

In spite of all this, the Internet cafe still has attraction as a social and recreation area for young people who are looking for places to meet which don’t cost too much.

So why hasn’t someone come in with a roll-up strategy, buying up the good Internet cafes, offering professional management and a franchise package, and turning the whole thing into a franchise like Starbucks, McDonald’s or KFC? After all, that is how Ray Kroc started with McDonald’s in the 50s in the US.

These Internet cafes should offer clean well-lit areas which are frequently cleaned, fresh food and drink, clean bathrooms and a good overall experience. Just think of what could be done if a Chinese Internet cafe experience could be as good as an Apple store! Yes, prices would be higher but it would attract a much better demographic group. And a better demographic would make for a better advertising market.

Events could be planned for the stores educating people about online buying and selling, and to demo new products and services. Game contests could be held in a much better environment than are available now.

If I were an advertiser, I would really love to reach this demographic group. They would be upwardly mobile, not like the permanent urban underclass we now see in so many Internet cafes.

In short, make the Internet cafe a place where Chinese parents would not be ashamed of letting their child go to, and a place where the child could tell his parents he is at, without having to lie or admit to shamefully.

This would help to clean up the image of an industry which badly needs to improve its image. It would even make sense for an advertising company to get into it, as the advertising opportunities in a wholesome Internet cafe franchise are huge. I can think of several companies which should seriously consider doing an Internet cafe franchise in China:

• Focus Media
• Baidu
• Tencent
• Google
• Starbucks
• McDonald’s
• KFC

And now, here’s the company I’d really like to see do a Internet cafe franchise in China because it really knows about making cool stuff and it understands lifestyle marketing. If they did it, and did it right, they would own the Chinese Internet cafe experience.

Now wouldn’t that be something! You saw it here first.

I can always wish…

Technorati Tags: advertising, Apple, baidu, business, cafes, China, Chinese, data, demographic, game, google, internet, management, market, marketing, mobile, online, tencent, US, usa, yuan

For most of my career, I have been looking for patterns to discover why some companies come out of nowhere and become big and great, and why others who have dominated the market lose market share and users to the newcomers. More often than not, the newcomers are entrepreneurs who had a vision, while the established companies were as Lou Gerstner called it in his book, “Who Says Elephants Can’d Dance?”

I have looked at startups and established companies, and if there is one word which separates the hungry newcomers from the established, shall I say it, dinosaurs, it is fear. It is not so much the emotion, but how they react to the possibility of failure. More than anything else, this strikes at the heart of what differentiates the entrepreneur from the established firms which frequently end up belonging to another age, and usually end up being swept into the dustbin of history.

Most successful Internet companies, whether they are Yahoo! or Google in the US, and Shanda, Baidu, Alibaba or Tencent in China have one common theme in their histories. At some low point in their early years, their founder/s almost gave up, and they almost sold their companies at a low price to another company. When this happened, the founder/s would seriously consider their options. Sometimes they would lay off people, cut down their costs, maybe fight with their spouses who wanted them to quit and work for IBM or Microsoft or somehow throw in the towel and give up, or sell out. Then, when things were at their lowest point, their user numbers would go up, or they would secure funding and they would turn the corner and start to grow dramatically.

It is all about fear, and overcoming fear. When you have reached a low point, there is no more fear.

“What is the worse thing that can happen to you?”

That you will lose your house? Your car? Your spouse and family? That you will die and be forgotten? Are you willing to take these risks?

When you have reached that point, there is nothing more to fear. It’s all about willingness to sacrifice today in the belief that you will succeed tomorrow. What is there to lose? Money? That has already been invested. Quitting would only be a recognition of the loss; most entrepreneurs refuse to recognize the loss. This is what makes entrepreneurs special; the best ones are truly fearless.

On an individual basis, this is called a near-death experience. If you are not sure what I mean, watch the movie Fearless (1993).

And it’s not about money. They know that money buys the trappings of success such as a big house and trophy wife or mistresses, but that they are just trappings of success. After they become successful, they frequently look back on their “good old days”. And what are their good old days? When they didn’t know whether they would make the month’s payroll, or were living in their car, or eating instant noodles because they could not afford anything better.

This is not something which can be taught in business school. And this is why the US was, and now China is, a great place for entrepreneurs. It’s easy when you are starting from zero. More than any other markets, American business investors believe in the value and experience of failure; this is where Japan and Europe cannot compete with the US and China.

And this is why is it so difficult for large companies to make the leap or cross the chasm. The only way for a successful marketmaker to bridge the gap is to give up all its revenue, all its investments and to start over again.

That has not happened yet. Microsoft has tried to do it, but they cannot sacrifice revenue; their investors won’t let them. Yahoo! was a great Web 1.0 company with great assets but has had significant challenges reinventing itself from the glory days when banner ads were king. When companies become successful, they attract people who wish to avoid risk and who want to make money to buy their big homes, drive big cars and to have their status. They are risk avoiders, not risk takers. Once a company starts to attract this kind of person, it cannot re-invent itself.

It fears failure and won’t take risks.

Entrepreneurialism is all about finding success or failure relatively quickly by putting everything on the line. What the Internet has done in the US and now in China is it has sped up the failure and success cycle, collapsing the amount of time it takes to discover what works.

In my articles I am frequently critical of large businesses which cannot adapt to new changed situations; this is because they are afraid of fear and failure. They want to be market dominators at a time when the market is changing beneath their feet. They have meetings and talk and grumble and analyze, but most of the time they are not able to do much. They acquire small companies to maintain growth, and more often than not, they destroy the spark which made those startups successful in the first place. Or the smart people who have entrepreneurial talent and are willing to take the risks see market opportunities and become entrepreneurs in their own startups themselves.

That is why successful change always comes from the bottom, not from the top. And that is why the cycle of change will continue, only faster.

UPDATE: Frank Yu pointed me to this article by the consistently good Paul Graham who says a lot of the same things.

Technorati Tags: alibaba, baidu, change, China, cycle, entrepreneur, founder, google, ibm, microsoft, money, Shanda, tencent, US, yahoo