Bold Predictions For China Tech Over Next Decade

July 19th, 2010

The past decade have seen the rise of many Chinese Internet companies which have become wildly successful, and which most in the west are only now beginning to notice. These are companies with names like C-Trip, Shanda, Tencent, Alibaba, Taobao, Baidu just to name a few.

For the consumer-facing companies who benefited from China’s rapidly growing consumer spending power, this growth was unrivaled. They rode two waves to maximum advantage: the popularity of tech among Silicon Valley venture capitalists and private equity firms, and with the Chinese government; and with the rise of China’s urban middle class. In contrast to many American firms which really did invest in significant technology, many of these companies had less in terms of technology; preferring instead to spend their investment money on hiring people and building a human salesforce. C-Trip, the popular travel site, was mainly a call center with a website when it went public; Baidu built up a network of resellers which it bought out when it went public, and Alibaba has an aggressive salesforce to work with Chinese SMEs.

Over the next ten years, there will be dramatic changes. Here are some of the trends I see:

  • Growth in the economy will slow gradually at first, then will become more dramatic. The Chinese economy’s period of rapid growth has already passed its peak.
  • Slower growth means that income gaps will widen in the society, along with opportunity gaps for individuals. From a marketing point of view, segmentation becomes more important. Qualified lead-generation businesses will become lucrative.
  • As the economy slows, targeted advertising will become more important for the Chinese Internet. Advertising-based Internet models which did not work well in China previously but worked well in the west will be re-introduced into China. Successful companies will adapt them to the realities of the China market without trying to force a western model.
  • Because of the slower economy, real technology adaption will take place in medium- , and even small-sized, firms. These will focus on working with very large datasets and data mining, and will focus on describing the topology of the Chinese Internet in a way so that other businesses can use this data.
  • Lower disk space and bandwidth costs will mean that even though Chinese companies adopt more technology, their costs will be lower.
  • From a venture capitalist’s and private equity investors point of view, the biggest cost will be the founding team. The best teams will be few and far between, and will be much sought after. Compared to Silicon Valley and the rest of the world, Chinese Internet startups will still be more likely to be led by individual entrepreneurs than by founding teams in the western mold. This is a culture thing.
  • The trend to Chinese government preference for RMB funds and local investors over US- and western-based venture capital and private equity funds will pick up pace. The more unfavorable the economic environment becomes, the more dramatic action the Chinese government will take. This will cause some tension with the US, but the Chinese government will be willing to take the hit because domestic concerns for social harmony take precedence.
  • Some western venture capital and private equity firms are studying the possibility of Chinese IPO exits. Don’t hold your breath waiting for these to happen; they are likely to be few and far between.
  • Hong Kong will gain some advantage because it policies are different from Beijing’s and like China, smart entrepreneurs will look for opportunities in the long tail instead of the large consumer market.

China’s economic development so far is based on two assumptions which will come under pressure over the next decade. The first assumption is that rapid urbanization is a good thing, since that will lead to the development of an urban middle class. The challenge over the next ten years will be how to find jobs for that urban middle class, whose living costs have gone dramatically higher, while the global macro climate has dramatically worsened? This is already showing up in the rise of the ant people, educated white collar workers who cannot make it up all the way to the top of the pyramid. For the first time in its history, the belief that education is the path to success in Chinese society will be challenged.

The second assumption will be a shortage of blue-collar factory workers, which has already begun to show up in southern China in the form of strikes and slowdowns at foreign-owned factories. As China’s working population dramatically ages over the next decade, this situation will worsen. Technology can, to some extent, ameliorate the labor shortage, but it cannot generate demand.

During the next decade, we will find out if China can become rich, on a sustained basis, before it grows old.

If the Chinese government does not succeed, then China will head into a prolonged economic slump after 2020, which will be much like Japan’s, and further adding to what is likely to become a prolonged global economic depression. In addition, the workforce which starts working after that year will have to deal with a worsening environment and dues, in the form of non-performing loans (NPLs), from spending in the high-growth years.

That is why this next decade is make-or-break for China.

Networked Authoritarianism in Perspective

June 20th, 2010

A short time ago, Rebecca MacKinnon wrote an excellent commentary on the Chinese government’s white paper on the Internet. In the government-published white paper, there was effusive praise for the Internet as a tool for social change under terms set by the party.

The important thing to understand is that the party will set the agenda of what is acceptable for Internet development, and the Internet will develop along those terms in China regardless of what others may say. From the party’s perspective, this is non-negotiable. Those who challenge this basic requirement, as did Google earlier this year, will be forced out, or will have to conform to those regulations.

The Internet white paper was the party’s way of saying:

  • Now we understand the Internet and its social ramifications
  • We do not believe it should be banned from China.
  • We believe that it should be controlled and managed in a direction which is suitable for China’s development under the leadership of the party.
  • We will not tolerate any deviance or interference, foreign or domestic, from these guidelines.

In the west, the Internet developed as a grass-roots tool of programmers and hackers, since it was based on several different technology protocols. For this reason, many in the west continue to think of the Internet as the ultimate anti-authoritarian tool. Those who look at the Internet from a political perspective and have their own agenda often emphasize this aspect of the Internet.

Before the Internet came to China, there was no unofficial media. This was why one of the first applications which took off in China was Tencent’s QQ, which was an instant messaging tool based on ICQ. Following this, games took off, led by Shanda. More recently, online video and twitter clones such as Sina’s Weibo have taken off.

It has taken some time for the party to realize that the Internet also offers an alternate, unofficial media, and is dangerous from the party perspective because it has the potential to let people spread information, and even more importantly, organize very quickly. It is this ability to organize quickly which represents the greatest threat to party rule, which is why huge amounts of funding have been directed to the online security apparatus. It is very clear that the party places special emphasis on real-time filtering of the Internet to prevent social disturbances from spreading quickly, and this is a large part of many companies’ operational costs.

From the party’s perspective, social change is necessary, and in some cases desirable, especially when it is directed at non-Chinese companies such as Foxconn and Honda. These high-profile, limited-scale events give the government negotiating leverage in dealing with non-Chinese entities, and directing social and economic policy. However, if they become widespread in society as a whole and spread out of control, there is a real danger to party authority. This is why all of these events have been small in scope, and have quickly died down after the issues were resolved.

This is a very sophisticated Chinese strategy which has the west, including individuals, investors and governments, over the barrel. On the one hand, many in the west hope that China will change and become a more open society. In fact, the party in China also knows that Chinese society must change and become more open, but it wants to set the terms and the agenda. Should investors go to China, which offers better returns than most other parts of the world, including the west? Or should they obey their consciences, and stay out of China? Looking at things now, I would say that most are more interested in their investment portfolios than their consciences.

As for those who exercise their consciences, there is another challenge. Are they for change from within the system, or do they support change from outside the system? Change from within the system means that there must be dialogue with the ruling party. History has shown us that for long stretches of time this dialogue will not bear fruit, and will be open to widespread criticism in the west, which is always demanding fast results and change in China. Or will the China critics push forward a hard line, that there can be no compromise with the party, and a new substitute must be found?

This lack of a viable substitute is what has prevented change in China. It’s easy to criticize the party on multiple issues; it’s much harder to find a better solution.

So far, I have not found anyone in the west take a clear stand on this crucial issue, except for Google, which moved its search engine operations to Hong Kong earlier this year.

“Exactly what is the attitude of the west with regard to change in China?”

This lack of open, honest dialogue on the key issue of meaningful strategy with China is what prevents many western companies from moving forward with China.

Unless western companies, the public and their governments reach some kind of consensus on what they support, and what their position on change in China is, there will always be misunderstandings and disappointments for the west in China.

How Chinese Websites Are Helping Donations For Sichuan Earthquake Victims

May 16th, 2008

There has been a strong outpouring of support in China for the victims of the Sichuan earthquake, and I thought it would help just to give those outside China and/or do not read Chinese a picture of what is going on in the online world in China.

Tianya is one of the larger BBS sites in China, and they have created a page where Tianya users and visitors can make cash contributions to support earthquake victims and help the recovery.

Tianya has given visitors five options for making cash contributions:

  1. Online payment using Taobao’s online contribution

    2. option

  2. Making an offline cash donation using a specially set-up post office account
  3. Making an offline cash donation to the Chinese Red Cross using a specially set-up account at ICBC
  4. Foreign currency donations are accepted at an account set up by Jet Li’s One Foundation
  5. Community members can also donate goods to receiving offices in Chengdu, from where they will be sent on to earthquake victims.

There is a warning to Tianya members that they should be careful about who they donate their money to, as there are fraudulent accounts which have been set up to take donations.

The page further lists corporate donations from Chinese companies for earthquake victims, with amounts listed in Chinese yuan.

Leading gaming site Shanda has also set up a donation page for online gamers. Shanda chairman Timothy Chen Tianqiao donated 1M yuan to earthquake victims, which was matched by online gamers. Shanda then added another 1M yuan, making for a total 3M yuan which, according to an announcement, has already been sent to Sichuan for disbursement.

The9, another US-listed game publisher and distributor, created a simple page to announce their donation of 1M yuan.

Giant Interactive, also listed in the US, has created a page on their Zhengtu site where players can post their best wishes to Sichuan victims. They do not ask for money/goods donations.

Perfect World, a leading online game publisher, went public last year in the US under the PWRD symbol. Their BBS for their online community has not mentioned anything with regard to the earthquake or any drives to make donations to earthquake victims.

Working the Gray Areas in China

February 14th, 2008

“If I were to wait until the Chinese government said I could do something, I’d never be able to make money.”

This is a line I have heard on many occasions from different Chinese entrepreneurs.

In China, there are many areas which are not strictly illegal, but they’re not legal either. Most of the time, these involve fields which are too new for the government to regulate. Any government is a slow-moving giant; they are not renowned for their quickness and being smart. In this business ecosystem, the advantage lies with the fast-moving entrepreneur who can identify a need and move in quickly.

By the time the government has figured out the industry and begins to regulate it, the major players are already established. This is how the online gaming industry started in China with Shanda, and how Giant Interactive became successful with its pay-for-play online gaming model.

When Americans and Europeans go to China, they go out of their way to make sure that every “i” is dotted and every “t” is crossed in all their legal arrangements with the Chinese government. Each executive is effectively protecting himself from litigation and any bad news from the Chinese government.

This is like going to church and asking the priest if you will get eternal salvation by going to church every Sunday and donating one million dollars every year.

In doing so, they are basically asking for Chinese government regulation. Now, do you think the Chinese government is going to favor a foreign competitor or local Chinese company, even one which pushed the boundaries of government regulation in China?

This is one of the great ironies in China.

It’s a little like being a parent; who do you love more, the loyal son who does everything you say but is not creative and imaginative, or the smart son who sometimes frustrates you by coming home late, but is brimming with all kinds of insights and creative ideas and dates all the smart beautiful girls?

If you asked the Chinese government, or at least watch what they do on the policy level, they like the smart and sometimes naughty son.

Unless he gets too smart for his own good, in which case they smack him down.

Chinese Face, Chinese Heart Part I

January 24th, 2008

Zhengtu gaming title

One of the frequent questions I run into in China is how western Internet companies coming into China should position themselves for growth in China.

Should they try to be western, or should they try in the shortest possible time, try to become Chinese, hiring Chinese for their local staff and management? Under what circumstances is it best to be western, and under what circumstances is it best to be Chinese? And what if a company has been in Taiwan, Hong Kong and/or the US; how should they position themselves for future growth in the Chinese market?

Their positions are made more complicated because it is now hard to find good management people they can trust locally in China; as an organization becomes larger the camaraderie and culture which forms in the management team becomes increasingly important. Over time, this builds into trust, especially if they need to deal with problems and challenges which need to be overcome on a daily basis. This comes face to face with another China reality: it simply is not easy to find people you can trust in China. Backgrounds can be fudged, headhunters want to push their candidates; the list goes on and on.

Internet businesses are especially complicated; most founders come from technology backgrounds, even today, and they have very little understanding of marketing, company positioning, and yes, national and corporate culture. Many still have dreams of serving the world from one virtual data center in Redmond, Mountain View, Beijing, Hong Kong or elsewhere, and letting more junior management deal with the soft and fuzzy stuff like “culture” and “marketing”. Even relying on ethnic Chinese management from Taiwan or Hong Kong has not really worked, as China is littered with Internet startup failures led by Taiwan and Hong Kong management teams who really did not understand the dynamics of the market in China. There have been many western executives who have said “How was I supposed to know that they didn’t understand China; they told me that they were from Hong Kong/Taiwan?”

For anyone from established business service sectors, such as banking, these ideas seem silly, even foolish. And they are. A simple reality of the Internet is that it is going to come under more national jurisdictions and regulations as it becomes a more important part of peoples’ lives. Just as it is inconceivable that banking would not be government regulated (unless you count the ongoing subprime mortgage crisis as a failure of the government’s regulatory system), it is becoming inconceivable that the Chinese, US or other governments would not want to have a say in how the Internet is run.

These established sectors know only too well how important it is to somehow find a way to live with government regulatory bodies. In China, successful new startups have almost always come from new areas which the Chinese government has not figured out regulations about and does not yet know how to regulate.

The perfect example is the online gaming industry. This industry was basically an import from South Korea, and took root in China because gaming consoles are technically illegal. (Sony PS2 and 3, Nintendo Wii and xBox360 are all freely sold; that law is seldom enforced, and all of the games sold are cracked versions.) The Chinese government’s rationale for that law was because way back in the nineties, the Chinese government saw PCs as a valuable educational tool, but considered gaming consoles to be expensive frivolous tools for kids to waste their time. At a time when the Chinese had much less buying power than they do today, it seemed like a good idea to ban gaming consoles.

This created an opportunity for Shanda, which was the first company to launch online games (almost all from South Korea) in the Chinese market. This idea caught fire with many younger Chinese and spawned the Internet cafe industry, where many younger Chinese choose to spend/waste their time and has also popularized QQ, the ultimate social networking application if there ever was one, and which for many Chinese, is the Internet.

This industry has swiftly matured, and with success has come regulation. Online gaming companies have tried to adapt, some have adapted (or tried to adapt) by moving into the online game publishing business from online game distribution. The transition from online game distribution to online game publishing has been a rocky road for companies like Shanda. The company has in the past acquired studios and titles, but many of the creative pros have left post-acquisition. A new wave of game publishers with strong titles have come up, led by Perfect World and the highly-contentious Giant Interactive.

On the regulatory and marketing fronts, the online game publishing company has become a victim of its own success: the huge amount of revenue it generates has created something the government and other regulators call a “social problem”, and it has fallen into a rut on the creative side, adding more titles in what are basically the same genre with very little to differentiate each other. The result: titles with diminishing shelf lives and ROI. People who are not addicted to games (i.e. people who have lives) have an increasingly bad view of the industry and game titles.

Unless you have some way to break out of your core audience, which is exactly what Nintendo did with the Wii. The greatest contribution of the Wii is that it has forced people to take a second look at gaming, as something other than just frivolous entertainment which wastes a lot of time and is anti-social for people who do not play games. (Heavy game players would argue that game players are social; they are just online.)

So the Nintendo Wii is halfway there; it has offered a new paradigm for games and gaming.

Now, if gaming is going to really succeed, it will have to get non-gamers to think that they are not playing a game. Then we are talking breakout.

And the game publishers (creative people) will have to learn how to get along and work with the marketing pros, and will have to understand that there is much more to marketing than press releases, press conferences, paying off the media to pick up their stories, planting stories and fake planted conversations on Chinese BBSes, etc.

To really go big, they will rely on a new class of professional and and a new kind of strike force.

We’re not there yet, and we’re not moving fast enough. But there is a way.

I believe in the value of history, but I also believe that there are times when we have to stop referencing the past for what we do in the future.

This is one of those times.

A Quick Look at 2008 and China

January 1st, 2008

Is there any way at all that 2008 will not be the year of the Chinese Olympics, and by extension, China? Will we be stuck between the rise of China narrative and the sourness to the point of completely puckering up of the US media and to a lesser extent European media re China?

I say yes.

The coverage of China by the major media has been completely unsatisfactory; it has not been informative and has instead driven their own editorial agenda. That old editorial agenda no longer works because it does not reflect the ground reality of China. It does make sense though to take a closer look at China’s development outside of just the tier one cities. Let’s hope that this begins to happen.

In the big picture though, the Chinese Olympics are not the biggest story. There are so many interesting things and opportunities happening on the Internet. I’m surprised that so many people miss them, such as the fall of Facebook even though their numbers continue to increase, and the failure of social networks to monetize their traffic because they have chosen to side with advertisers against their own user base.

Facebook is like a rocket which continues to coast upwards even though its engine has cut off; momentum is carrying it upward. But eventually gravity will win…

We are in the early stages of growth for the Internet, I believe that increasingly new Internet startups will be founded by business people, not technology people. On the PC platform, the technology is mature; it is the business models which aren’t working. Now, the smart technology people are switching their focus to the mobile Internet.

For smart business people who want to disrupt the current business models, 2008 will be a banner year. For more predictions, take a close look at the predictions of Mark Anderson and Fred Wilson. Part of the reason new and viable business models have grown relatively slowly on the Internet is because the business side has been driven by technology people who don’t understand business and how to make deals, and the business people have been thinking too much in terms of the large corporate businesses which are now being disrupted by the Internet.

It is time for a new breed of entrepreneurs who understand technology, and are not behoven to traditional businesses. In China, this has already happened in gaming with Timothy Chen Tianqiao of Shanda and Shi Yuzhu of Giant Interactive. Ironically, it has not happened as quickly in the west.

It’s time to expand the base.

On the web application side, it is getting easier and easier to develop robust applications. Twitter, a very successful social application was developed with Ruby on Rails, a full stack web application framework which was released by 37 Signals, a Chicago-based design firm.

The significance of this is that web applications can now be designed by designers who are more focused on user experience than software engineers who are focused on features (many of which are of dubious value). One thing I have noticed among many Ruby on Rails deployments: narrower focus. Instead of trying to do everything, these applications focus on doing a few tasks very well. Good examples are the online project management tools put out by 37 Signals and which I use to manage my business.

Wouldn’t it be great if these web applications were made available to a Chinese audience?

As for myself, I’m sharing my feeds on Google Reader. You can find them through Google Talk and Gmail by contacting me. You can reach me at paul dot denlinger [at] gmail dot com.

I’d like to see yours too; let’s start sharing in 2008!

The Big Hole in Chinese Productivity Apps

November 4th, 2007

When I look at web apps and ideas in China today, practically everything I see has to do with the retail consumer. Popular fields are gaming, because it proven and China has a large gaming population, not to mention the success of the major players including Shanda and The9, and music and search.

The result has been a plethora of startups in these fields. After all, they have a demonstrated and successful business model based on advertising. God knows that there are huge amounts of advertising dollars just looking for half-decent excuses to be spent in China. VCs can use these as references in their decision-making and in valuation, which is good.

But the real money is always made when a new company breaks out in a field which was considered dead or dying. Right now, I think that field in China is web productivity apps.

There is a big hole between Office (Word, Excel, Powerpoint) and the web. In the US and Europe, this area is occupied by Oracle, SAP and Salesforce. There are Chinese competitors such as Yongyou and Kingdee. Google has made some significant headway with Google Docs, but there is still a long ways to go.

So far though, none of them have passed my Internet cafe test. This means that I have not seen anyone sitting on a computer in an Internet cafe using any of their apps. They are all playing games or chatting away.

This creates a chicken and egg situation; VCs fund companies which get the eyeballs, and hold back on those productivity apps which do not get the attention, but are far more meaningful and productive. And the companies which are making productivity apps, which take far longer to develop and mature, have trouble getting funding. The investment cycle gets shorter and shorter, but it takes longer to develop meaningful apps. As a result, the productivity apps market gets starved.

Something has got to change, and I hope that it isn’t too far away… Sometime soon, people will have to start earning money to play those games.

In Business, Becoming Fearless Is What Makes You Great

October 7th, 2007

For most of my career, I have been looking for patterns to discover why some companies come out of nowhere and become big and great, and why others who have dominated the market lose market share and users to the newcomers. More often than not, the newcomers are entrepreneurs who had a vision, while the established companies were as Lou Gerstner called it in his book, “Who Says Elephants Can’d Dance?”

I have looked at startups and established companies, and if there is one word which separates the hungry newcomers from the established, shall I say it, dinosaurs, it is fear. It is not so much the emotion, but how they react to the possibility of failure. More than anything else, this strikes at the heart of what differentiates the entrepreneur from the established firms which frequently end up belonging to another age, and usually end up being swept into the dustbin of history.

Most successful Internet companies, whether they are Yahoo! or Google in the US, and Shanda, Baidu, Alibaba or Tencent in China have one common theme in their histories. At some low point in their early years, their founder/s almost gave up, and they almost sold their companies at a low price to another company. When this happened, the founder/s would seriously consider their options. Sometimes they would lay off people, cut down their costs, maybe fight with their spouses who wanted them to quit and work for IBM or Microsoft or somehow throw in the towel and give up, or sell out. Then, when things were at their lowest point, their user numbers would go up, or they would secure funding and they would turn the corner and start to grow dramatically.

It is all about fear, and overcoming fear. When you have reached a low point, there is no more fear.

“What is the worse thing that can happen to you?”

That you will lose your house? Your car? Your spouse and family? That you will die and be forgotten? Are you willing to take these risks?

When you have reached that point, there is nothing more to fear. It’s all about willingness to sacrifice today in the belief that you will succeed tomorrow. What is there to lose? Money? That has already been invested. Quitting would only be a recognition of the loss; most entrepreneurs refuse to recognize the loss. This is what makes entrepreneurs special; the best ones are truly fearless.

On an individual basis, this is called a near-death experience. If you are not sure what I mean, watch the movie Fearless (1993).

And it’s not about money. They know that money buys the trappings of success such as a big house and trophy wife or mistresses, but that they are just trappings of success. After they become successful, they frequently look back on their “good old days”. And what are their good old days? When they didn’t know whether they would make the month’s payroll, or were living in their car, or eating instant noodles because they could not afford anything better.

This is not something which can be taught in business school. And this is why the US was, and now China is, a great place for entrepreneurs. It’s easy when you are starting from zero. More than any other markets, American business investors believe in the value and experience of failure; this is where Japan and Europe cannot compete with the US and China.

And this is why is it so difficult for large companies to make the leap or cross the chasm. The only way for a successful marketmaker to bridge the gap is to give up all its revenue, all its investments and to start over again.

That has not happened yet. Microsoft has tried to do it, but they cannot sacrifice revenue; their investors won’t let them. Yahoo! was a great Web 1.0 company with great assets but has had significant challenges reinventing itself from the glory days when banner ads were king. When companies become successful, they attract people who wish to avoid risk and who want to make money to buy their big homes, drive big cars and to have their status. They are risk avoiders, not risk takers. Once a company starts to attract this kind of person, it cannot re-invent itself.

It fears failure and won’t take risks.

Entrepreneurialism is all about finding success or failure relatively quickly by putting everything on the line. What the Internet has done in the US and now in China is it has sped up the failure and success cycle, collapsing the amount of time it takes to discover what works.

In my articles I am frequently critical of large businesses which cannot adapt to new changed situations; this is because they are afraid of fear and failure. They want to be market dominators at a time when the market is changing beneath their feet. They have meetings and talk and grumble and analyze, but most of the time they are not able to do much. They acquire small companies to maintain growth, and more often than not, they destroy the spark which made those startups successful in the first place. Or the smart people who have entrepreneurial talent and are willing to take the risks see market opportunities and become entrepreneurs in their own startups themselves.

That is why successful change always comes from the bottom, not from the top. And that is why the cycle of change will continue, only faster.

UPDATE: Frank Yu pointed me to this article by the consistently good Paul Graham who says a lot of the same things.

Why Most US Market Entries Fail in China

August 17th, 2007

The consulting industry in China is flourishing. After all, it is the largest potential single market in the world, and everyone is flocking to it. New companies need information and advice about how to tackle the unique challenges of this market. For any MBA who is fluent in Chinese, or who has grown up in China, and is familiar with the tools of the trade, such as financial modeling, business negotiations and company valuations, China represents an “iron rice bowl” which will make their careers for years to come.

Or is it? My experience is that there are errors which are repeated over and over again. It gets like being condemned to watch a single Broadway show, over and over again, where the only things which change are the sets and the actors; the lines are the same.

I have covered one of the major fallacies in a previous posting, Getting Past the China Market Hype, which covered their initial reasons for entering China. This posting will cover some of the reasons for failing post-entry.

Since most of my experience has been with technology/media/startups from the US, I am naturally biased towards those companies in my evaluation. There have been many success stories from the financial sectors, engineering and consumer goods. These areas, unlike hi-tech, have had decades, and in some cases even more than a century of experience, building their China presence, and understanding the challenges involved. They have the money, and have built up a knowledge base of experience which they can draw from, and because of the large scale of their businesses, even if they cannot draw from in-house experience, they know how and where to get it when needed.

Some of the US technology companies which have come to China and have failed to succeed in the Chinese market are eBay, which basically had to hand over its operations in China after running into the strong local player, Taobao.com, in the auction field. Yahoo! had to basically pay a China partner, Alibaba.com, US1B to take over its China operations. More recently, Google, the US search advertising firm, has had to fight an uphill battle against the largest Chinese search firm, Baidu.com. Online gaming is a new area which does not exist in nearly as large a form as the US, with Shanda being the granddaddy in China, while newer players such as Perfect World (PWRD) have sprung up with new and different business models, and successfully going public on the Nasdaq. In instant messaging, Tencent’s QQ has been able to rack up 600M registered users, and unlike any US IM clients, become profitable.

Because most US startups come from technology backgrounds, they tend to believe that their business is scalable. The word “scalability” is in itself, an engineering term, which means that an architecture can go from 1 user to one billion (or infinite) users, or across national borders and into different languages and markets, without any major architectural hiccups. For this reason, they tend to play down distribution and cultural differences in their most initial stages. Most of the time, they have people on staff or in management who know something about the local market; more often than not, they are not in senior decision-making roles.

Then, when they get to China, they try to do what they did in the US, and quickly discover that the rules in China are very different. Whereas labor is very expensive in the US, with each hire drawing the attention of different company committees, in China it is one of the single cheapest expenses. (Except for senior and executive management, where highly qualified individuals cost just as much, if not more, than in the US.)

The most common failing comes in the area of product management, when the US insists on controlling the product development and launch schedule, with local product launches coming only after the US is ready. In smaller markets, that’s fine, but in fast-moving large markets, especially one as large as China’s, it’s a killer. (Even in fast-moving small markets it’s a dubious strategy; in South Korea, Google has been consistently beaten by Naver, a highly successful Korean company.)

This puts the China office in a continuous battle with the US headquarters for resources; the Chinese local competitor has no such restrictions on what it can do, and the Chinese company surges ahead in capturing market share, and eventually, revenue. The American company then organizes what can best be called a “strategic withdrawal”, as did eBay.

In more mature industries where there is some kind of brand equity, product lines are already fairly mature, and headquarters makes resources available to country managers as needed. Because of the fast-changing nature and relative immaturity of hi-tech, this has not yet happened.

When the American companies fail, the blame is usually assigned to some form of Chinese government protectionism, and favoritism to the local companies. Of course, this explanation is more palatable to Congress members seeking re-election and US TV talk-show hosts, but more often than not, it is a vast over-simplification of a complicated issue.

Getting Past The “China Market” Hype

August 13th, 2007

If there is one thing which never ceases to amaze me, it’s the sheer number of overseas investors seeking entry to China, who have a hard time seeing past the most basic facts and figures about the size of the Chinese market.

Most of these firms are American, which are, generally speaking, more addicted to numeric data than their European and Japanese counterparts. Some statements they frequently quote are:

Looking at China’s economic statistics in these terms, it is very easy for executives who have little or no experience selling products outside their own home markets to think that the potential of the Chinese market is something which will fund their own retirement nest eggs.

The great danger is that more often than not, they are unable to see past these initial assumptions about the Chinese market on the board and senior management level. In fact, as many learn to their own dismay, the Chinese market is complicated, filled with traps to capture uninformed executives who fail to grasp the difficult realities of China’s markets.

Let’s take a look at some of these wrong assumptions, followed by the facts:

  • “The size of the Chinese consumer market is huge.” (True, but for the most part, there is no single national market and no way to distribute nationally; you need to negotiate deals city by city and province by province. Every city and every province wants its own unique distribution deal in order to have uniqueness in the marketplace. The main problem is not high costs, but the amount of time it takes to roll out. While the customer numbers may be huge, revenue per customer/user are usually in fact very low in the beginning for most sectors compared to other more developed markets.)
  • “If I partner with a company with national distribution, then my job will be easier.” (True, but the companies which take on partners are usually the ones who are in trouble. Many of these are state-owned enterprises which lack business marketing skills, and are trying to translate their monopoly charters into revenue with the foreign partner’s help.)
  • “Our product is so good that it will market itself”. (If you believe your own PR in this regard, your company deserves to fail.)

For the most part, the most successful companies in China’s emergent consumer market economy are firms like Suning (in consumer electronics), Shanda (in online gaming and entertainment) and Suntech (in solar energy).

What do these companies have in common? They are new, and while they did have some government backing and connections in their very early stages, they have now transformed themselves into privately-owned businesses with their own management team and CEO. For the most part, these companies are very centrally managed by their founder/entrepreneur. Unless a foreign company is able to present a very strong case for partnering with them, they will prefer to build and distribute on their own. Why should they share their profits and revenues with another company, and help to build another brand which may become a future competitor? After all, that’s how they became dominant in their own sectors; they’re not about to make the same mistake themselves.

As China’s economy becomes more market-oriented, China’s state-owned enterprises are struggling to define their roles in this new economy. It is not enough to have a government-granted monopoly charter; they need to become profitable. This pressure for profit usually comes from the Chinese government’s State Council, which is China’s cabinet.

Their preferred solution is to set up a joint venture with a foreign company, which injects startup capital since the Chinese government, as a matter of policy, does not inject capital into joint ventures, instead offering other fuzzy stuff like “markets” and “connections” into the joint venture.

Most of these joint ventures fail because the two sides fail to do the hard work to insure that there is a complete alignment of interests and accountability for their investment in the JV. Most of the time, I blame the foreign partner’s inability to see past the market hype and think and discuss the whole project through with the Chinese government partner and clearly defining which partner has responsibility to perform what needs to be done.

The endless procession of foreign companies who come to China and throw good business sense to the winds without performing proper due diligence in order to secure a footing in the “China market” never ceases to amaze me. Why is it they seemingly only do this in China? Do they think that the Chinese will throw them out of the country for asking good legitimate business questions?

Chinese SOEs are in particular need of modern management skills, especially in the areas of marketing, sales and cost accounting. Foreign JV partners would in fact be helping the Chinese companies reform by holding them accountable to reach specific business goals. The SOEs have strong connections and resources in a potentially large market.

It is only when both sides are honest about their goals and expectations that they can succeed.