The China Vortex

JP Morgan Chase has just purchased Bear Stearns at $2 a share, an investment bank which was valued at $150 a year last year. Equity and capital markets are poised for a volatile week. The US Fed is set to make another rate cut, a desperation move, on Tuesday. This is likely to push the US dollar into free-fall, and set the stage for inflation in the US and later worldwide. More and more companies and individuals will choose to distance themselves from the US dollar.

Some time ago, I talked about why globalization, at least in its current form, would fail. Globalization has been oversold, especially in the US, where it was seen as leading to some growing kumbaya world where everyone just got along. That is not happening, and will not happen.

There is a strange resemblance between the way globalization was sold and the way real-estate was sold up until last year in the US. Up until 2007, Americans were told that real-estate prices would never go down, they only leveled off in bad times. When the bad times passed, then real-estate prices would climb again. Globalization was sold the same way.

It didn’t matter if American factories were relocated to China because Americans would find something else to do which would add greater value-added. Guess what? Americans haven’t found where that new value-added is, which in turn is leading to higher unemployment, and a generally angry population. We will see how their anger is channeled when the November elections come up.

In the meantime, Chinese government policy, through its VAT policy, encourages local governments to set up factories which waste energy to make products with very little value-added which Americans have bought on credit. Calling this real growth is just a fantasy, to use polite language.

This is why inflation is already flowing through the Chinese economy, first with food prices, and is now working its way through the system. It is likely that the situation will become much worse, and will soon hit the Shanghai and Shenzhen bourses.

The _real_ globalization where value is _really_ created is about enabling people to work productively in different regions with little or no damage to the environment, and enabling them to use their skills in a productive manner without having to travel great distances which previously took a lot of time. But that is not simple to explain, is it?

The business valuation models for these new productivity tools do not yet exist. Ironically, the valuation models for hocus-pocus subprime-mortgages did exist. It’s just that they got turned upside-down in a short time.

So what have all the risk consultants been measuring lately? I’d say that they’ve been out to lunch. That’s why, in these times, the Chinese approach to measuring risk makes more sense.

Technorati Tags: bearstearns, consulting, globalization, inflation, jpmorganchase, productivity, risk, subprimemortgage

When I read the first few paragraphs, I thought it might be a joke.

It read: “Oxford university’s latest professor is a top Chinese expert on mathematical finance who aims to understand how markets are affected by traders’ gambling and irrational risk-taking.” This was followed by: A new chair has been created for Xunyu Zhou at Oxford’s Nomura Centre for Mathematical Finance. Prof Zhou started his career at Fudan University, Shanghai, and he has spent the past 14 years at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Prof Zhou has recently developed mathematical models of financial trading in uncertain environments. At Oxford he aims to focus on the way psychology and emotion affect decision-making and risk control. “It is fascinating to see how mathematical theory can bridge the gulf between finance and social science,” he says.

But when I saw that it was on the technology page of the Financial Times, I took a double-take, and assumed that it might be serious, or at the very least, half-serious.

Given my recent interest in blogging about risk and how it is viewed fundamentally differently by US and Chinese businessmen, I thought that it would be good to bring this matter to the attention of my readers.

Prof. Zhou’s background in Shanghai is a good place to study risk. After all, it is home to the Shanghai stock exchanges, which are well-known for their, ahem, volatility. Anyone who has even the most passing understanding the Shanghainese know that the chosen avocation for Shanghainese over 50 is to talk about the stock market, especially what’s going up and down in the market. Fifty nine years of “socialism” has not been able to change that. By the way, technical analysis is big among Shanghainese; even cleaning ladies understand it and follow it. Then there are all the technical heads of TV, and now Internet served video, where you can get any technical analysis of any share traded in Shanghai.

If you want to start any conversation with any Shanghainese, all you have to do is say something like “Let me tell you why you should sell all your holdings in (fill in any SHA traded share here) NOW!”, regardless of whether you know what you are talking about or not. As a matter of fact, I know of some non-Shanghainese who use this methodology as a pickup line; it never fails.

So I was kind of wondering if I really needed to go to Oxford to get all that.

Of course, if Oxford really wanted to get serious about studying risk in China, then they should go to Macau. Maybe the Venetian would sponsor a chair for that?

Technorati Tags: business, China, fudan, Hongkong, internet, macau, mathematics, oxford, risk, shanghai, shares, stocks, TV, video

Yesterday, the new national aquatics center was unveiled in Beijing. This will become the venue for the leading water events of the Beijing Olympics. After the Olympics are over, it will be converted to a shopping mall for Beijing’s masses.

Beijing is now the site for some of the most exciting architecture in the world. For many Chinese though, there is an underlying uneasiness. Is all this dramatic futuristic architecture the beginning of a new and exciting future of wealth and prosperity which Chinese have never experienced in their long history?

Or is this instead a blip of prosperity, and will the future be much less bright, and will their children and grandchildren look back and see the Beijing Olympics as the apogee of what has since become a downward trajectory? And will this architectural marvel become dirty and dusty and seedy?

China has seen prosperity before, only to have its dreams shattered. Westerners today see China as a rich, prosperous and growing power, but it has run into the wall before, and on many different points in history. The first Chinese industrial revolution, when Chinese factories started making goods for the Chinese market started at the end of the nineteenth century, with textile mills and flour processing factories spouting up in the Yangzi river delta, mostly started and financed by entrepreneurs from Shanghai and Wuxi. Then China went into political chaos in the period following the revolution which overthrew the Qing dynasty in 1911.

Another period of short-lived period of prosperity came in the early 30s, this was cut short by the Japanese invasion of China in 1937.

Then, in the period following the end of WWII, China fell into civil war between the two leading political parties, with the Nationalists losing and retreating to Taiwan. Following the establishment of the PRC, China was very poor, and then made even poorer by the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, the Chinese government essentially decided that they were tired of being poor and moved ideology off the national agenda. From now on, it would be about making money.

Even today though, with all their savings and comfort, Chinese feel that it can all change and all go away. That is why they save and sit on their cash.

Americans are the opposite. Until very recently, most Americans believed that the future would always be brighter, that although there were things that they did not understand, America was the strongest and most prosperous country in the world, and that there would always be a way. This is why theyspent their savings, and when their savings were gone, they would take loans on easy credit terms, promising to repay the loans and credit when they had income again. It led to a bigger and bigger mountain of debt. And now, Americans are much less sure about their ability to repay the loans.

This is a way of thinking which is completely foreign to Chinese, and makes no sense at all to them. For Chinese, the only real money is cash. And when money goes bad in times of high inflation, they don’t even believe in cash.

They believe in land, and if the politics becomes unstable, they go to gold.

Runaway inflation is something the Germans experienced in th 1920s, then again in the postwar period. Japan experienced it too in the postwar period. China also experienced it in the postwar period when the Nationalists had to change national currencies three times in the period up to 1949. With the runaway inflation in the cities, people had to carry their money in paper sacks to do their shopping. They would go to the markets carrying bags of money to buy their groceries, then they would use the same bags to carry their groceries back home.

When the Nationalists lost control of inflation, they lost the Chinese cities and the support of the business community. This paved the way for the establishment of the PRC in 1949. The first task for the government was then to stabilize the currency.

While China was very poor in the fifties, sixties and seventies, there was virtually no inflation.

Today in China, we are seeing the early signs of inflation again in food prices and property prices. For any Chinese government, and this government is no exception, inflation is the greatest single and most frightening enemy it faces. It may creep up slowly, but it unleashes forces which can easily spin out of control.

If a government cannot maintain the value of its currency, it cannot protect its citizens, and the people end up in the poor house. It’s that simple.

This is why the Chinese government will not easily revalue the yuan upwards, and why the government keeps such a tight control on credit.

One of the upsides for Chinese businesses investing in Africa is that although the people are poor, at least they pay cash. When times turn hard, you want to be paid in cash.

For most Chinese, you aren’t rich unless you own cash.

Credit is just a derivative and in tough times, no one wants derivatives.

Technorati Tags: architecture, Beijing, China, credit, currency, derivatives, germany, inflation, japan, loans, risk, watercube, yuan

Chris Masse’s excellent MidasOracle.org, which focuses mainly on prediction markets, has a posting called Journalism Failures - Big Time.

The Midas Oracle article links to an article by Risk magazine nominating Societe Generale as the equity derivatives house of the year.

(You better check out the link soon before the magazine’s management takes it down.)

In case you haven’t heard, Societe Generale has been having some problems lately. We’re talking about US$7B losses because of a rogue trader, which even with the dollar falling, is not chump change.

I couldn’t invent this kind of shit even if I wanted to, and I’m a pretty creative guy.

Now if this is the kind of advice the western risk experts dish out, kind of makes you wonder, doesn’t it?

I’d say that the Chinese way of the CEO making all the risky calls himself according to his or his mistress’s mood at the moment is more reliable, and maybe, even more scientific…

The emperor has no clothes.

Technorati Tags: banking, business, China, Chinese, consulting, markets, prediction, risk, societegenerale, trader, trading

In the west, there is a whole industry called “risk consultancy”. Basically, this industry is built around informing large- and medium-sized corporations about risk. Originally, this was built around business risk and would answer questions like “How safe is it to invest $500M in an industrial diamond mine in the Congo (formerly Zaire)?” The consulting firm would then send practice consultants to the target country, where they would study sunk costs (including bribes which were never written about in the report, regulations, who was related to the president, political opposition, major competing firms, etc.) Most of these questions were positioned as questions which any board would ask the CEOs before they would greenlight an investment.

Underlying all this is the belief, at least in west and among western corporations that “risk” is something which can be quantified and measured objectively.

One of the big topics in the west now is China’s investments in Africa. What is fascinating about China’s investments in Africa is that while the amounts of money and people who go to Africa are huge, China really doesn’t have risk consultancies, and Chinese really have not yet started thinking in terms of quantifying risk in the ways western corporations have.

So how have the Chinese judged risk so far, and will the present method change over time to something more akin to the western way of thinking? When it comes to Chinese investments in Africa, many of the early-stage investments were a part of Chinese foreign policy aimed at securing raw materials for manufacturing, and more importantly, energy sources. The typical model has been to find a country, build a new palace for the president and a new sports stadium to win over the people. This would help state-owned construction firms to gain a footing in the country, which were then quickly followed by Chinese logistics firms and wholesale distribution firms which would sell products to the local African population.

Viewing the local African population as customers were one area where Chinese viewed Africa fundamentally differently from the west. While Beijing, Shanghai and the Chinese tier one and tier two cities are relatively modern, it is very easy to forget that when it comes to pervasive poverty, China is only 10-20 years removed from the levels of African poverty. Basically, Chinese companies know how to sell to poor people because they had lots of practice in China.

When you are working from a low cost basis, there really is not a whole lot of need to measure risk because the only way to go is up. Remember, in China labor is still very cheap compared to the west, and the Chinese government is always interested in keeping people employed in the interests of social stability. On the other hand, when you have large risks but your investments are backed by the Chinese government, there is not a need to measure them either. But things get complicated when you are in the middle, and are a mid-sized Chinese company (US50M-1B) which is private and are looking at Africa, as many are now.

Right now, the path many are taking is to send executives, management and staff wholesale to Africa, and basically telling them to figure things out on the ground. This is the Chinese version of “Let’s throw spaghetti at the wall and see what sticks” approach. But what happens when you don’t really have the protection of the Chinese government and local Chinese embassy, and the Africans start complaining that Chinese companies aren’t creating enough local jobs for local Africans? Obviously, these are the sorts of questions which are very complicated, since they include a social factor, in addition to the corporate and economic equation.

Will the Chinese companies turn to the western risk consultancies? Not likely. First of all, they are too expensive by Chinese standards; Chinese management is still very price-sensitive and is not likely to be willing to spend the large amounts which these companies charge. Also, they are not likely to entrust this kind of sensitive information to an outside firm which may recirculate some of the data for a competitor. Most Chinese companies are very tightly held, and risk is whatever the CEO thinks it is at that moment in time.

For western corporations which work from a high-cost basis, risk consulting is an item on “research” for executives, even though it may easily run into the millions of dollars.

For the Chinese, that’s way too much…

Technorati Tags: africa, China, consulting, corporations, culture, investment, management, risk, western