Not Changing Fast Enough (Part I)

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This week’s Economist has a lead article and section on “The New Colonialists” which covers China’s expansion and search for natural resources on a global scale.

For many Chinese, being equated with colonialism is a bad thing, because Chinese have historically seen themselves as victims of colonialism, having had Hong Kong taken away by the British, and the Unequal Treaties with the leading European powers in the 19th century. When the Chinese see themselves portrayed as new colonialists, they go into hedgehog mode, curling up and sometimes fighting back against their western critics who are criticized for not understanding or being sympathetic to the Chinese point of view.

This kind of attitude is not helpful for the western critics, and is not helpful for the Chinese. The issues are real, and they are too serious to be trivialized, and for people to get into nationalistic shouting matches. The effects are huge, as they will affect the overall health of the planet.

Over the past thirty years, China has adopted an open economic development policy to raise the standard of living of the Chinese people. This policy has been enormously successful, unleashing the traditional Chinese ethics of curiosity about technology, thriftiness and hard work to elevate their standard of living dramatically. Today, China has the second largest economy in the world, trailing only the US, which is now currently undergoing a dramatic readjustment following the growing subprime mortgage debacle.

The party has been forcefully pushing a policy of development, and more significantly, urbanization of China, and plans to move more and more Chinese into cities. Throughout its long history, China has traditionally been a country mostly made up of farmers, engineers and small business people. The plan is for many of the farmers to become cityslickers, eating at restaurants, taking subways, and working in office towers.

The trouble with having so many big cities is that they are huge consumers of energy, which is why China now has to go overseas to satisfy this huge demand. Securing energy resources also means getting entangled in the affairs of many countries which are frankly, not very well-run. This in turn means that the country’s foreign policy has to feed its energy needs.

This is how America’s foreign policy and domestic energy policy got so screwed up. In Washington DC and across the nation, there is a strong and influential pro-Israel lobby, while the country depends on many middle-eastern countries which are hostile to Israel for its energy needs. These contradictions are unresolvable, and have resulted in the rise of middle-eastern terrorism and eventually in the 9/11 attacks.

Seeing these problems, it would seem to make sense that the Chinese leadership would find a new model for China’s economic development which did not depend so much on an outdated 19th century European mercantilist model for economic development in the 21st century.

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Why Most US Market Entries Fail in China

The consulting industry in China is flourishing. After all, it is the largest potential single market in the world, and everyone is flocking to it. New companies need information and advice about how to tackle the unique challenges of this market. For any MBA who is fluent in Chinese, or who has grown up in China, and is familiar with the tools of the trade, such as financial modeling, business negotiations and company valuations, China represents an “iron rice bowl” which will make their careers for years to come.

Or is it? My experience is that there are errors which are repeated over and over again. It gets like being condemned to watch a single Broadway show, over and over again, where the only things which change are the sets and the actors; the lines are the same.

I have covered one of the major fallacies in a previous posting, Getting Past the China Market Hype, which covered their initial reasons for entering China. This posting will cover some of the reasons for failing post-entry.

Since most of my experience has been with technology/media/startups from the US, I am naturally biased towards those companies in my evaluation. There have been many success stories from the financial sectors, engineering and consumer goods. These areas, unlike hi-tech, have had decades, and in some cases even more than a century of experience, building their China presence, and understanding the challenges involved. They have the money, and have built up a knowledge base of experience which they can draw from, and because of the large scale of their businesses, even if they cannot draw from in-house experience, they know how and where to get it when needed.

Some of the US technology companies which have come to China and have failed to succeed in the Chinese market are eBay, which basically had to hand over its operations in China after running into the strong local player, Taobao.com, in the auction field. Yahoo! had to basically pay a China partner, Alibaba.com, US1B to take over its China operations. More recently, Google, the US search advertising firm, has had to fight an uphill battle against the largest Chinese search firm, Baidu.com. Online gaming is a new area which does not exist in nearly as large a form as the US, with Shanda being the granddaddy in China, while newer players such as Perfect World (PWRD) have sprung up with new and different business models, and successfully going public on the Nasdaq. In instant messaging, Tencent’s QQ has been able to rack up 600M registered users, and unlike any US IM clients, become profitable.

Because most US startups come from technology backgrounds, they tend to believe that their business is scalable. The word “scalability” is in itself, an engineering term, which means that an architecture can go from 1 user to one billion (or infinite) users, or across national borders and into different languages and markets, without any major architectural hiccups. For this reason, they tend to play down distribution and cultural differences in their most initial stages. Most of the time, they have people on staff or in management who know something about the local market; more often than not, they are not in senior decision-making roles.

Then, when they get to China, they try to do what they did in the US, and quickly discover that the rules in China are very different. Whereas labor is very expensive in the US, with each hire drawing the attention of different company committees, in China it is one of the single cheapest expenses. (Except for senior and executive management, where highly qualified individuals cost just as much, if not more, than in the US.)

The most common failing comes in the area of product management, when the US insists on controlling the product development and launch schedule, with local product launches coming only after the US is ready. In smaller markets, that’s fine, but in fast-moving large markets, especially one as large as China’s, it’s a killer. (Even in fast-moving small markets it’s a dubious strategy; in South Korea, Google has been consistently beaten by Naver, a highly successful Korean company.)

This puts the China office in a continuous battle with the US headquarters for resources; the Chinese local competitor has no such restrictions on what it can do, and the Chinese company surges ahead in capturing market share, and eventually, revenue. The American company then organizes what can best be called a “strategic withdrawal”, as did eBay.

In more mature industries where there is some kind of brand equity, product lines are already fairly mature, and headquarters makes resources available to country managers as needed. Because of the fast-changing nature and relative immaturity of hi-tech, this has not yet happened.

When the American companies fail, the blame is usually assigned to some form of Chinese government protectionism, and favoritism to the local companies. Of course, this explanation is more palatable to Congress members seeking re-election and US TV talk-show hosts, but more often than not, it is a vast over-simplification of a complicated issue.

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Chinese Language Requirements, the HSK, and Senior Positions in China

Until very recently, Chinese language qualifications were not considered a deal-breaker for senior positions in China. For the most part, US and European employers assumed that a person of Chinese extraction had some degree of fluency in Chinese, and could communicate with other Chinese in China.

This all changed when Goldman Sach’s proposed appointment for China co-head, Richard Ong, was disqualified from his proposed position because he failed to pass the language requirements for the position which were passed by the China Banking Regulatory Commission. Ong was a Malaysian Chinese who had been mostly educated in English in the west.

The test which Ong failed to pass was the HSK or Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi. The test is given in three levels: basic, intermediate and advanced. The most basic level of Chinese language fluency is level 1; the most advanced is level 11. Those who reach level 11 Chinese language fluency are deemed to be able to work in a Chinese-language work environment. The HSK is the only government-sanctioned test given to non-Chinese whose results are recognized by the Chinese government.

HSK Chinese Language Proficiency Test

Previously, the HSK was considered important only for those who were interested in the Chinese language for research and academic purposes; now, it is quickly evolving into an important job requirement qualification for those who want to work in China.

The test information and registration website includes full information about the process and tests, with test dates and places. Registration for the tests can be done online, as well as payment. All the candidate then needs to do is print out his form and photo, and present himself on the date of the test.

Test preparation books and materials are widely available in foreign-language bookstores in China, as well as in online stores.

As China becomes more important and influential on the international business scene, the need for senior executives who are fluent in written, spoken and in reading Chinese will become more important. Now, because of CBRC regulations, the sectors most affected are the sensitive financial sector; it is likely that as western companies become educated about the difference between being ethnically Chinese and fluent in Mandarin, they will ask for HSK test scores to get a handle on the Chinese language fluency of their staff and management, and prospective candidates. It is likely that it will soon evolve into a requirement for those in marketing in China, and in operations. Already, among executive search firms, there is a serious shortage of senior-level staff and management positions where candidates with Chinese-language fluency and overseas work experience are sought. For those who are serious about working in China, it would be wise to take the HSK and have their scores ready for their meeting with the human resources department.

Among China consultants, the HSK has already become a hot topic for discussion.

For those who are interested in learning more from others, and in sharing their knowledge, there is a discussion group for the HSK on Facebook.

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