The China Vortex

If there is one thing which most western companies coming into China miss out on is the idea of “trial spots”, or as they are called in Chinese 试点。

So what is it? Basically, it’s a city, place, province or region which is used to try out something experimental which has not been tried before. When China first opened up, Shenzhen was a trial spot for opening up the economy to foreign manufacturing investment. When the experiment succeeded, it was pushed out to the other parts of China. Shanghai and Beijing were opened as tier one cities to foreign companies and employers, mostly in the service sector. When these experiments worked, the opening up gradually started. In most cases, the trial spots were selected by the central, provincial or municipal governments.

Now, there is another little secret. Large SOEs (state-owned enterprises) also often have their own trial spots. Most of the time, these are used to put some of the rising senior-level managers in to try new management practices. They are usually given a city, and a long leash, and are encouraged to try new ways of management. Often these managers are people who have made it to a certain level in a state-owned enterprise, but will not or cannot rise higher because they are somewhat non-conformist, and shall we say, less interested in politics. (Remember that in SOEs, the party also has a say in the selection of candidates for senior positions.)

Frequently, the Chinese way of handling these non-conformists is to give them a “trial spot” where they can experiment in a city or provincial division on their own. If something goes wrong with their experiment, then the damage is limited to their immediate market. If, on the other hand, the experiment was successful and includes practices which can be used on a larger scale, then that person may be promoted to a higher position with greater responsibility. This is how the current leadership of China has been groomed, just to cite an example.

The interesting thing is that many western companies, even consultants, are completely unaware of these practices. They look at their choice of investment areas in western terms, which usually means that which is clear, and out there, in the open.

They don’t study the people.

Instead, they should ask where the different “trial spots” are, and the backgrounds of the people they are dealing with. The right questions to ask for SOEs are:

• “How did this person get to this position?”
• “What is he trying to do?”
• “How is he different?”
• “What do his employees think of him?”
• “What are his goals and his definition of success?”

If it sounds like questions an intelligence agency would ask when examining the new leadership of a country, then it does because it is just like that. I call this “due diligence with Chinese characteristics”.

And how do you get this information? I find the best way is walk in and ask (In Chinese, of course. Speak English and you only get the official line.)

For the most part, you will never find these people in Beijing or Shanghai unless they have been very successful. These are two highly conformist politically-charged cities, and the only way they make it to these cities is if they are in very senior positions, and their views have been vindicated.

Generally speaking, Chinese, even including the party, are more tolerant of non-conformists. Just don’t look for them in Beijing and Shanghai. Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China’s reforms, was for many years considered a non-conformist and was punished repeatedly for his views. Eventually, his policies became the mainstream.

So, how will the recent economic problems affect things? Basically, we are going through the collapse of an old world order, and nothing new to replace it has come up yet. The Chinese government, the party and Chinese SOEs will be looking for answers on what comes next to restore order, growth and stability. After all, this is what Chinese social stability depends on.

For Chinese government and party officials, it will be a good time to be something of a maverick. But these mavericks will only survive and prosper if they can come up with the right answers to some very tough questions.

With all the chaos on world’s markets, it is easy to overlook developments in China. The biggest piece of Chinese domestic news is the decision to give limited rights to land use to China’s farmers. This decision came out of the Third Plenary Session of the 17th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (三中全会), which is now convening in Beijing.

The overall thrust of this meeting is to focus on the development of rural China, which has not fared so well as the east coast cities. If the cities continue to develop, and the countryside continues to stay poor, you have the recipe for social unrest on a large scale.

The salient points about China’s development are that China has about 1/3 the arable land of the developed economies for farming, and about 500M live in cities, while 800M continue to be rural Chinese. National development plans (many of which were formulated under Jiang Zemin, who came from Shanghai) called for the urbanization of China.

China’s first 30 years of reforms required the development of the eastern coast to attract foreign capital, and to make the companies and the westerners who came to China feel comfortable. Only when they had reached some level of comfort, and were attracted by the market potential would the capital follow. They became comfortable and the capital and trade followed.

And now the westerners living in Beijing, Shanghai and the west expect the Chinese with their nearly US2T in foreign reserves to bail out the western economies? Let me tell you why it won’t happen.

• Successive Chinese regimes have always lost power when they coddled the urban elite and ignored the needs of the countryside. This was how Mao rallied the Communists, surrounded the cities (the strategy was called “using the villages to surround the cities” or “乡村包围城市”), then threw out Chiang Kai-shek in 1949. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao know this, and know that they need to swivel around and develop the countryside so that the wealth gap can be narrowed.
• The Chinese government will focus on developing a new size of town, which in Chinese is called the 城镇 or village town. This will be mainly a distribution, education and trading center for farmers and their families in the immediate vicinity. Population will be 250-500K.
• For the next 15-30 years, the cities will stagnate in growth. People will not lose their homes the way they do in the US since China does not have foreclosure laws, but their salaries will not go up. Many of the wishes new university grads entering the workforce hoped they had will just become dreams. Somehow they will have to learn to live in this new drastically changed environment.
• The Chinese government is already talking about the development of rural infrastructure including rural insurance, microlending, etc.
• Many young Chinese who would have scoffed at the idea of working in the countryside will now go there, simply because job opportunities in the east coast cities will be limited. This, in turn, will help to clean out the party apparatus in the countryside, which has been seen as generally corrupt.
• Western companies will not benefit too much from this next stage of development because they do not, for the most part, understand how to sell to the bottom 2/3 of the Chinese pyramid. Most only know how to sell to the top 1/3 in the cities. Companies which will prosper are those who sell to the “local local economy”, or bottom 2/3, as Jack Perkowski calls it, as opposed to the “local foreign economy”. The local foreign economy is city-based on China’s east coast; the local local economy is mainly rural and inland.
• The companies which will survive and prosper are the swift pivoters who can quickly learn how to sell to the “local local economy”. This means that they made some money in export manufacturing, but now switch to sell domestically to Chinese consumers in the new inland towns and cities. Not many companies can do this, but those that do will do well. Most will be entirely new businesses, and local Chinese brands will have an advantage.
• This next stage of development will require a lot of money. Those foreign exchange reserves of US2T will be needed by China. Now, if you ruled China and you had the choice of 1) lending the money to the west, which has just acted about as irresponsibly as anyone can imagine or 2) investing the money in China to narrow the wealth gap between rich and poor, city and countryside and keeping your regime in power for more than a half century, what would you do? I think that it’s a pretty easy choice.

China may now have the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves, but that is not what makes a country a superpower. The recent tainted milk scandal has shown that it is still lacking controls in many key areas, and it is far short of being a developed nation. Instead, China is a developing nation with rich reserves it needs for its own development.

In order to become a developed nation with a developed economy, it needs to spend that money on building its own infrastructure and narrowing the wealth gap between the developed cities on China’s east coast and the inland countryside. Any Chinese regime which acts otherwise would be making a very risky decision, and would be putting the future of its own rule in jeopardy.

China can manage without export markets, but it cannot survive if its own countryside is in turmoil.

There has been a lot of concern about the tainted milk scandal in China, and with each passing day, the scope of the scandal gets bigger. How did this happen, why was it covered up, and what needs to be done about it?

My answer is simple: this is the kind of thing which happens when the bureaucracy becomes politicized, and government appointments are made for political instead of professional reasons.

For more than 2,000 years, when China was ruled by an imperial bureaucracy, China had a complex system of imperial exams to insure that anyone who passed could enter the government bureaucracy. This bureaucracy was largely apolitical, except for the most senior appointments in the imperial court or on the provincial level. Most were just professional officials, and would serve their masters, whoever they were.

With the overthrow of the Qing dynasty, and with the foundation of new China in 1949, the party organization affected all levels of the bureaucracy. Endless political movements until 1978 politicized the whole society, not just the bureaucracy. Appointments were made for political reasons instead of professional capabilities. Sometimes, professional qualifications were completely ignored.

The tainted milk scandal is an example of what happens when political considerations override business, health and even ethical concerns. This is what happens when government officials are judged by how much investment they attract and how many jobs they create. Then there is a natural tendency to cover up any information which draws a conflicting picture. What should be a health and ethical issue instead becomes a political issue.

The problem now in China is that there is a severe shortage of people who are apolitical professionals, not politicians. How do they fit in, even survive, in a completely politicized bureaucracy? Does the government have the energy and will to depoliticize the bureaucracy, and create a professional bureaucracy which will fulfill the needs of modern Chinese society?

That is the question for the next stage of Chinese reforms.

Today I picked up a copy of the October 29 issue of the Chinese language biweekly, Caijing. Caijing is roughly equivalent to The Economist in US and European financial circles, and I like to think of it as the magazine for the thinking Chinese business person.

Most western journalists, especially American journalists, when it comes to covering China, start from the point “So what does it have to do with me?” With this as a starting point, it is all too easy to fall into the “You can make billions in China” or “The Chinese are going to take everything away from us” schools of thought, both of which are very far away from the truth.

The simple truth is that the west, and Americans, are not that important. I would say that more than 90% of the things which happen in China have no US/western angle; the Chinese make their decisions mostly based only on internal social and political considerations.

Just like in the US.

Caijing’s influence extends far beyond anything The Economist aspires to; it offers many insights into various topics which most other publications do not dare touch. In many cases, I believe that is floats trial balloons for policy issues. For this reason, I make it a point to pick up a copy when I have time; it offers all kinds of insights and debates many policy issues in its columns. (It may come as a surprise to many who don’t read Chinese that there are increasingly vigorous debates on many policy issues in China. There are, and you would be surprised by how open many of the subjects are.)

The October 29 issue is really excellent; it has opinions and summaries of the 17th Party Congress, which just ended in October. The party congress, held once every five years, sets the policy agenda for the next period. For this reason, it is something which is closely watched by most Chinese, and those who seek a deeper understanding of how the Chinese and the Chinese government see their changing roles.

Because many western observers of China come with their own agenda, I found this issue’s articles particularly interesting. I plan to write on some of the issues raised in the articles shortly, so if you are interested too, remember to come back.