The China Vortex

China is a nation of entrepreneurs, and according to statistics, has 85 million businesses compared to the US’s 25 million. Considering that China has about four times the population of the US, the proportion is about right. These numbers reveal that China is in fact, not a socialist nation, but is instead one which has a very capitalist heart. Or as the Chinese government would say, has “market characteristics”.

There are many Chinese university graduates who when choosing a job, prefer to go to a western company over a Chinese company. For many, American companies are the most preferred. Why is this?

For many of them, it is because that they will get good training, learn management, and work within large organizations about how to get a job done. They get a chance to work with people from many different cultures and countries.

These are significant advantages which most Chinese companies, which have not yet gone global, are not yet able to offer. But I believe that there is another perhaps more important reason.

That is, they know that they will be judged more on performance and merit than on personal relationships with the founder and/or CEO. When it comes to relationships, Chinese founders and CEOs are still very reluctant to trust people outside their own inner circle, and it is very difficult, if not impossible, for anyone outside to make it into this inner circle, no matter how good they are. I’m convinced that this attitude has put a natural ceiling or limit on how successful Chinese companies will be in globalizing. When people discover that no matter how smart they are or how hard they work, that they will not make it into the inner circle, they will either move to a company where they know that they are respected, or they will start their own company.

In contrast, Americans and American companies have a different approach. They put value on developing management talent, especially local management talent in a major market like China. They identify rising stars and put them on a management training track soon. Most importantly, they promote them without regard to who they know or are related to.

Most Chinese companies do not do this. This gives American companies human talent scaleability when going global which Chinese companies do not have. Successful American and western companies which have gone global tend to be meritocracies, while Chinese companies are still stuck at the plutocracy stage.

In his book Managing the Dragon, Jack Perkowski stresses how his company ASIMCO is a Chinese company. Technically and legally it is. The important thing is that he was pragmatic about bringing in the best people in their fields as senior and executive management, without regard to who they were related to. This is a very American characteristic, and in China, it works. Ironically, if there is an outsider advantage in China, this is it.

The Chinese government and the management of most Chinese companies have figured this out, but have not been able to apply this lesson to their own organizations yet. This is one of those things which cannot be solved by a government order or administrative guidelines, which the Chinese government likes to use to solve complex problems.

If Chinese companies successfully resolve this problem, there will be no limit to their growth.

Technorati Tags: America, China, companies, global, human, management, talent, training, US

Several days ago, Sam Flemming of CIC, a Shanghai-based online reputation management company pointed me to a news article on Business Week called “Inside The War Against China’s Blogs”.

The article specifically highlighted a company called Daqi.com (in Chinese the name means “Big Flag” which has a certain nationalistic appeal), and cited a case in which it helped Toyota satisfy a customer who had not received his car after three months. According to the company’s CEO, her company, an Internet online reputation management company, helps its customers, mostly western multinationals, to monitor their online reputations and help put out fires with users in China.

Out of curiosity, I then entered Daqi.com into my browser address bar so that I could visit the site and learn more about the company and what they do.

What I found, and what I did not find, were very interesting.

First of all, I thought I was going to find an online reputation management company, or public relations company, or whatever buzzwords they are using now to lure in corporate business.

But I found nothing of the kind. Instead, I was confronted with what I would call a typical Chinese portal website, complete with channels for “Homepage”, “Society”, “Military”, “Strange and Curious”, “Autos”, “Digital”, “Women’s Makeup”, “Pictures”, and “Reputations” (in beta).

(I have uploaded the screenshots of the pages mentioned below to Picasa and you can access them here.)

Aha, I thought to myself, I’ll click on “Reputations” and see what I find. When I went there, I found that it was full of forums divided into the categories “Cars”, “Cameras”, “Notebooks”, “Digital Cameras”, “MP3″, and “MP4″. The page is very long, and like most Chinese pages, scrolls on quite a distance with recommended products in each product category. This page, like the rest of the website, was designed very much to lure Chinese visitors. To visit the page, you can go to http://exp.daqi.com/

My next question was whether they took advertising? The only banner advertising I saw was for Dell, which ran on the two pages I visited. But it would be foolish to think that their only revenue came from banner advertising. Looking at how the page was designed, and the way some of the products were given larger photos and highlighted, it was easy to see that some makers were paying for higher rankings for higher visibility.

But nowhere did I see anything about their online reputation management services. So I thought to myself, “Surely the person who wrote the Business Week story, Dexter Roberts, could point to a website where Daqi offered their online reputation management services, in either Chinese or English.”

I could find nothing of the kind.

Daqi claims that it regularly searches 500,000 forums daily for its corporate clients. I’m sure that it works on many sites which are not related to Daqi. However, it also raises the very uncomfortable possibility that it may actually manipulate online reputations by starting flame wars over product reputation, then charging their corporate clients money to put them out. (I’m not claiming that Daqi does, but the very fact that they run their own portal under their own company name and URI means that they have very little respect for their non-Chinese corporate clients and western journalists’ capability to conduct online research in Chinese.)

The clash of interests which arises from revenue from makers for higher rankings on their own portal site, and then revenue from non-Chinese corporate clients for “research insights” and “firefighting services” into Chinese online behavior is obvious to anyone. The temptation to use their own forums to “seed” opinions must be very great. These seeded opinions would then quickly proliferate to other sites.

There is a simple way to find out, and that is to check timestamps of postings. All forum software includes a posting timestamp, and it’s easy to check the timestamps on a subject to push it back in time to where and when a rumor started. What is harder to find out is the identity of the poster, but this can sometimes be done by checking the IP address of the poster if IP cloaking is not used. Different online identities sharing the same IP would most likely be the same poster.

I wonder how many corporate clients do this kind of checking?

I find the whole practice of hiring Chinese and paying them to post favorable comments on a per posting basis to be an unethical PR practice. According to the BW article, this is a common practice. A Beijing-based PR professional, William Moss, talks about this in more detail.

Online public relations firms will have to draw up and aggressively publicize clear guidelines on what they do, and what they don’t do when it comes to monitoring online behavior in China. Playing multiple roles as player and referee doesn’t make it in my book. I have talked about some of the skills needed in a previous posting.

This is part of the problem which actually slows down Internet growth in China. In spite of it all, there are healthy groups for product discussions.

Of course, each corporate client will have to make its own call as to what it is most comfortable with. And so will their VC backers. (I wonder if they read Chinese?)

But if someone does do an article on a Chinese company, at the very least, the URI mentioned should include, in either Chinese or English, the business they are in which is mentioned in the article.

Nobody likes bait and switch tactics, and I’m no exception.

Is that too much to ask for?

Technorati Tags: advertising, BBS, China, Chinese, cic, forums, imagethief, management, marketing, online, postings, PR, publicrelations, reputationmanagement, VCs, venturecapital

More frequently now, US-based (mostly Silicon Valley) tech and business professionals are contacting me, asking how to find work in China. The business people usually want to get paid US salary to stay in the US and do some BD work for a US or Chinese company. The technology people usually want to find work in China.

For the most part, it’s very hard to find work which requires that you stay in the US paid at US salary. I have never heard of a Chinese company hiring someone on the recommendation of a senior recruiter without first meeting senior and executive management over a period of time. I know of one VP in a gaming company who came back to China, was hired and worked in China for nearly a year, and was then sent to open up their new US west coast office. Of course, a job like this requires working with a very Chinese company, which means that you need to know Chinese. And you need to prove yourself in the home office before you will be sent to the US. So, it is not easy…

For technology pros with 10+ years’ experience, my advice is that they take a few months off to come to China, and network as much as possible. Paul Graham puts it very well in this article about web startups. Beijing is a very vibrant startup hub and its tech grads from Tsinghua University offer the cream of the crop; generally speaking people are very friendly and open about what they are doing.

Shanghai is a more western style city, and the mentalities of the people are very different from Beijing. A rough analogy would be to say that Beijing is like Silicon Valley + Washington DC, and Shanghai is like Los Angeles or New York when it comes to mainstream media.

If you are a tech pro with 10+ years working in Silicon Valley, you really should be thinking more in terms of startup than about joining a company as an employee. There is an upfront sacrifice in terms of time, but in the end you will be happier, and at least you will own a piece of a company. If you are younger, you can afford to make a few mistakes in your early startups; if you are older, you want to choose more carefully. The good thing about doing a startup is that even if it fails, you are likely to make excellent acquaintances which will help you in the future.

One reader of my previous article Is It Possible For A Western-Managed Company to Succeed In China? mentioned that I made it sound very hard for a westerner to succeed in China. Well, yes and no.

Over the weekend, I came across an interesting announcement on Danwei from Praxis Language, the parent company of Chinesepod, an online Chinese-language learning program. The company is based in Shanghai and is headed by Ken Carroll. I met Ken in 2005 at the first Chinese blogger conference, which was held in November of that year in Shanghai. I have never used Chinesepod, but I have heard many favorable comments about it from westerners who want to learn Chinese.

The announcement, which is on Ken’s blog, mentioned that the Chinese government agency in charge of the government-operated Confucius Institutes, had approached his company about partnering to create an online presence for their institutes and helping to teach Chinese to non-Chinese using the Internet.

Think about it. The Chinese government partners with a non-Chinese headed company in Shanghai which knows something about language teaching online to help them promote the teaching of Chinese online around the world.

So, if you are good in your field, of course there are opportunities for western-owned startups in China.

Technorati Tags: Beijing, business, China, Chinese, chinesepod, confucius, confuciusinstitute, management, paulgraham, praxis, shanghai, technology

One of the most popular cliches in the west about China is that Chinese are generally good and reasonable people, but when it comes to nationalism, they are unreasonable. On the political level, national sovereignty is not negotiable, and when it comes to business, you need to realize that nationalism is a wildcard, and can throw a monkey-wrench into your best-laid plans. Put into this context, the 2008 Beijing Olympics is all about righting past wrongs, and showing that China is now an equal, maybe even a leader, in the world stage.

Like all bad cliches, this cliche contains a kernel of truth.

In my previous article, I mentioned why it’s so important for any business to be successful in China, decisions must be made locally by local management; it cannot be micromanaged from the US or anywhere else. Established business sectors such as finance, banking, retail, and fast moving consumer goods (FMCG), all understand this very basic rule of international business.

In the venture capital field in China, there has been a large influx of companies and partnerships which have opened offices and partnerships in Beijing and Shanghai. These companies understand that good investment decisions must, for the most part, be made in China where the local partners can understand the business environment, the competition and perform the due diligence to make the right decisions. Smart decisions cannot be made outside China.

And even that is not necessarily enough. Now more companies are going into the Chinese tier 2 and 3 cities and they are realizing that Beijing and Shanghai have more in common with New York, London or Tokyo than with other Chinese cities.

So why do so many US technology companies continue to try to second-guess and micromanage their China local management?

This is a mystery to me, and I continue to be befuddled by it. How can intelligent people continue to make and repeat over and over again mistakes which others have made before?

And then, when the Chinese local management complains that they are not empowered, sometimes they dismiss it as the Chinese “going nationalistic”. Never mind that the people questioning the Chinese management in the US do not speak, read or write Chinese; never mind that the people coming into China spend only a few days on the ground in China and think that they have China “all figured out”, yet they continue to do this over and over again.

Does this make sense? Any sense at all? And should there be any surprise that leading US companies including Yahoo!, eBay and AOL have failed in China?

And yet, these people control the budget and resource allocation for China. Should there be any surprise at all that US Internet companies have not been able to be successful in China?

What value do these people contribute to the success of the business in China? I can’t see any. Then when the company fails, it isn’t because headquarters slowed down the decision loop; it’s because of “poor performance by local management”!

They have set up Chinese local management to be the fall guy even before they started!

If this thinking were only confined to Internet companies and startups in China, it would be bad, but in the overall economic picture, it wouldn’t be that important.

The problem for the west is that it isn’t.

It has affected the west’s popularity in Africa because China offers aid without strings attached. In the mainstream media in the west, this is depicted as a cynical attempt by the Chinese to curry favor with regimes which behave badly.

But could there be more to it than meets the eye?

Could it be that the Africans don’t like to have someone dictate loan and development terms from Washington DC, London or Paris, and setting performance benchmarks for them without understanding the context of development in their own countries and region?

And could it be that the real reason for the popularity of the Chinese is that for better or for worse, they have gone local, setting up their own businesses and factories in Africa instead of trying to dictate terms from Beijing?

Definitely this is something worth pondering…

Technorati Tags: africa, AOL, beijingolympics, business, China, ebay, economics, economy, internet, london, management, paris, US, washington, west, yahoo

For many westerners and western companies, it’s hard to figure out why some Chinese have gone to the US for their graduate degrees, worked at name technology companies such as Intel and Microsoft, then come back to China, their homeland, start their own businesses, and fall flat on their faces.

How is this possible? They had everything going for them; they had the best education the US had to offer, worked in a great company, were smart and entrepreneurial, know the language, have connections, and they failed.

More often than not, these people have been away from China for a long time. Over time, they have become used to the American way of life, and while they keep up with what is going on in China, their knowledge and understanding of the country has gone stale. Gradually, they are more at home in America than in China. They jump on the China bandwagon because it is in the media all the time, and they hope to strike it rich.

Then they return to China and discover a country which is not the China which they grew up in. Compared to when they left, the role of the government is much smaller, the country has become more market-oriented in most sectors, and they may have lost many of their former connections. Worst of all, they look at the country through American-tinted glasses and use American society as a point of reference, something which does not work in China at all.

For any business or individual to succeed in China, you must understand China on Chinese terms.

This failure to understand China on Chinese terms is, in my opinion, why so many western Internet companies have failed in China. Moreover, the constant need of local management to report to headquarters outside of China, and to report every purchase they make, and more often, to explain what they are doing, puts a fatal hindrance on the decision-making process because the management is constantly tied up in knots educating someone in headquarters about China.

This makes for another very important point: No successful company in China can be successfully run from outside China; the key decisions and decision-makers must live, breathe, work and sweat in China every single day to make it work.

The single most important bad decision western companies make in China is to force the local China management to consult with headquarters about every matter; this makes the local management look weak in the eyes of their own staff. After all, what is the point in staying with a company if they do not have the power to make decisions even if they are sitting in the corner office?

It all comes down to how empowered people are to make their own decisions, and to be held responsible and accountable for them.

It makes much more sense for them to break out and start their own company, often taking the idea the western company had, but was not able to implement in China because they were constrained by headquarters’ indecision. In the Internet sector, where change is happening so fast, it makes no sense to sue and countersue; that would only make the lawyers happy and not solve the basic issues.

This just scratches the surface of why being Chinese is no guarantee of success in today’s China. Put simply, the society has changed too much too fast, and unless outsiders live here and deal with local Chinese who have never been outside China and speak only Chinese on a daily basis, they will fail.

In business, success cannot be guaranteed, but failure can…

Technorati Tags: business, China, Chinese, entrepreneurs, intel, language, local, management, marketing, media, microsoft, US, western

China’s increasingly important global role means that more and more businesses are coming to China. While there has been a significant presence among multinationals for nearly 30 years, now companies are coming in at earlier stages. Now some startups are even choosing to start in China instead of Silicon Valley.

This trend has been encouraged by venture capitalists, who now give a premium valuation to companies based in China.

This raises a very interesting question: “Is it possible for a western-managed business to succeed in China?”

First of all, a few qualifications. While there are many western multinationals in China, most of them have heavily localized their staff and management. The general trend in these companies is to localize staff and management as quickly as possible without sacrificing necessary management skills in the process. So, for the most part, while they are western companies, they are largely Chinese-managed.

Since most of my work is with startups, I’ll drill down in this field. Now the trend is for more American startups to start in China, even though they may not see China as their main market. In the gaming field, for example, China has a huge pool of people with talent and experience in the gaming field. This means that there is a pool of people with talent in programming and art, and understand gaming culture. The areas where the local Chinese population are weak is in product management. Chinese tend to gravitate to managing other people; there is a serious attraction to being able to say that a manager manages x number of people. Product management is more about managing resources, and coaxing cooperation from different stakeholders in the organization. Naturally, this requires more in the area of soft skills. And soft skills are an area where most technical people feel less comfortable with, and generally do not do as well in.

And unlike in the US, product management people in China are generally expected to be much more technical. So there is a difference here.

Hence the shortage of good product management people.

Naturally, this gives an advantage to startups which have experienced product management people. One mainly western-managed startup in Beijing which is strong in this area is ECitySky.

What about other kinds of companies, and what about the market for talent?

It all depends on what you are trying to do, and what audience you are trying to reach.

One tendency in the Internet field is that as the technology tools become more mature, the technology plays second fiddle to product marketing and marketing. Since the Internet has had just as long a history in China as it has in the west, it is getting harder for an experienced technology person to differentiate himself purely on technical skills alone. Increasingly he has to bring soft skills to the table, especially team management skills, to the table to be seriously considered. This means that for most technical people in China, the opportunities are becoming fewer, especially when you consider their significantly higher costs.

On the management and marketing side, it becomes more important to know how to communicate with your main audience in China. If the audience you are trying to reach is mainland Chinese, this means you must be keenly aware of social trends, the different social groups in Chinese society, government policy, what the different groups are thinking about, and the dynamics affecting the different groups.

The only way to get a deep feel and grasp is to know the language on a native level, including speaking reading and writing Mandarin Chinese. Basically, you need to become local. Assistants, translators and PR agencies will only get you so far because they cannot provide the social context to digest and understand the raw data to make good business decisions.

And then, even if you have a native command of Mandarin, that is no guarantee of success. I sum it up this way:

• If you don’t know Chinese (spoken, reading and written) and have not lived long in China, you don’t even know what are the right questions to ask.
• If you speak, read and write Mandarin on a native level, but do not socialize with mainland Chinese except on special occasions, you may know what you don’t know. More importantly, the most capable and intelligent mainland Chinese will not join the startup, instead choosing to start their own startup, often competing with the company they just left. (I’m thinking of many American-born Chinese, Taiwan and Hong Kong Chinese-managed companies which claim to be Chinese, but do not include mainland Chinese who have grown up in China in their management ranks. For the most part, they do not trust mainland Chinese and in private meetings, it is not unusual to hear them complain about things in China. In my opinion, they are doomed from the start.)
• If you have a startup which breathes, by which I mean that management does not have an inner circle dominated by any regional group or background, and freely allows people into senior and executive management based on their creativity, communication skills and ability to execute, then your startup will have the greatest chance of success. This is because a startup depends on moving quickly, and rapidly adapting to changes and competition in the marketplace.

So, in my opinion, when you get past the government regulatory issues, which are slanted to favor Chinese-owned companies in some sectors (especially media, where foreign companies are not allowed), it really is not any harder in China than many other parts of the world.

The biggest barrier for many startups is to get the management right so that it does breathe. Management needs to set the right tone from day one.

The best management hires the best people, empowers them, and let’s them go. At that point, it’s no longer a western- or Chinese-managed company; it’s just well-managed.

Get that right and China’s your oyster.

Technorati Tags: , Beijing, China, Chinese, entrepreneurs, internet, language, management, Mandarin, marketing, product, siliconvalley, skills, staff, startups, talent, technology

In the west, there is a whole industry called “risk consultancy”. Basically, this industry is built around informing large- and medium-sized corporations about risk. Originally, this was built around business risk and would answer questions like “How safe is it to invest $500M in an industrial diamond mine in the Congo (formerly Zaire)?” The consulting firm would then send practice consultants to the target country, where they would study sunk costs (including bribes which were never written about in the report, regulations, who was related to the president, political opposition, major competing firms, etc.) Most of these questions were positioned as questions which any board would ask the CEOs before they would greenlight an investment.

Underlying all this is the belief, at least in west and among western corporations that “risk” is something which can be quantified and measured objectively.

One of the big topics in the west now is China’s investments in Africa. What is fascinating about China’s investments in Africa is that while the amounts of money and people who go to Africa are huge, China really doesn’t have risk consultancies, and Chinese really have not yet started thinking in terms of quantifying risk in the ways western corporations have.

So how have the Chinese judged risk so far, and will the present method change over time to something more akin to the western way of thinking? When it comes to Chinese investments in Africa, many of the early-stage investments were a part of Chinese foreign policy aimed at securing raw materials for manufacturing, and more importantly, energy sources. The typical model has been to find a country, build a new palace for the president and a new sports stadium to win over the people. This would help state-owned construction firms to gain a footing in the country, which were then quickly followed by Chinese logistics firms and wholesale distribution firms which would sell products to the local African population.

Viewing the local African population as customers were one area where Chinese viewed Africa fundamentally differently from the west. While Beijing, Shanghai and the Chinese tier one and tier two cities are relatively modern, it is very easy to forget that when it comes to pervasive poverty, China is only 10-20 years removed from the levels of African poverty. Basically, Chinese companies know how to sell to poor people because they had lots of practice in China.

When you are working from a low cost basis, there really is not a whole lot of need to measure risk because the only way to go is up. Remember, in China labor is still very cheap compared to the west, and the Chinese government is always interested in keeping people employed in the interests of social stability. On the other hand, when you have large risks but your investments are backed by the Chinese government, there is not a need to measure them either. But things get complicated when you are in the middle, and are a mid-sized Chinese company (US50M-1B) which is private and are looking at Africa, as many are now.

Right now, the path many are taking is to send executives, management and staff wholesale to Africa, and basically telling them to figure things out on the ground. This is the Chinese version of “Let’s throw spaghetti at the wall and see what sticks” approach. But what happens when you don’t really have the protection of the Chinese government and local Chinese embassy, and the Africans start complaining that Chinese companies aren’t creating enough local jobs for local Africans? Obviously, these are the sorts of questions which are very complicated, since they include a social factor, in addition to the corporate and economic equation.

Will the Chinese companies turn to the western risk consultancies? Not likely. First of all, they are too expensive by Chinese standards; Chinese management is still very price-sensitive and is not likely to be willing to spend the large amounts which these companies charge. Also, they are not likely to entrust this kind of sensitive information to an outside firm which may recirculate some of the data for a competitor. Most Chinese companies are very tightly held, and risk is whatever the CEO thinks it is at that moment in time.

For western corporations which work from a high-cost basis, risk consulting is an item on “research” for executives, even though it may easily run into the millions of dollars.

For the Chinese, that’s way too much…

Technorati Tags: africa, China, consulting, corporations, culture, investment, management, risk, western

One of the frequent questions I run into in China is how western Internet companies coming into China should position themselves for growth in China.

Should they try to be western, or should they try in the shortest possible time, try to become Chinese, hiring Chinese for their local staff and management? Under what circumstances is it best to be western, and under what circumstances is it best to be Chinese? And what if a company has been in Taiwan, Hong Kong and/or the US; how should they position themselves for future growth in the Chinese market?

Their positions are made more complicated because it is now hard to find good management people they can trust locally in China; as an organization becomes larger the camaraderie and culture which forms in the management team becomes increasingly important. Over time, this builds into trust, especially if they need to deal with problems and challenges which need to be overcome on a daily basis. This comes face to face with another China reality: it simply is not easy to find people you can trust in China. Backgrounds can be fudged, headhunters want to push their candidates; the list goes on and on.

Internet businesses are especially complicated; most founders come from technology backgrounds, even today, and they have very little understanding of marketing, company positioning, and yes, national and corporate culture. Many still have dreams of serving the world from one virtual data center in Redmond, Mountain View, Beijing, Hong Kong or elsewhere, and letting more junior management deal with the soft and fuzzy stuff like “culture” and “marketing”. Even relying on ethnic Chinese management from Taiwan or Hong Kong has not really worked, as China is littered with Internet startup failures led by Taiwan and Hong Kong management teams who really did not understand the dynamics of the market in China. There have been many western executives who have said “How was I supposed to know that they didn’t understand China; they told me that they were from Hong Kong/Taiwan?”

For anyone from established business service sectors, such as banking, these ideas seem silly, even foolish. And they are. A simple reality of the Internet is that it is going to come under more national jurisdictions and regulations as it becomes a more important part of peoples’ lives. Just as it is inconceivable that banking would not be government regulated (unless you count the ongoing subprime mortgage crisis as a failure of the government’s regulatory system), it is becoming inconceivable that the Chinese, US or other governments would not want to have a say in how the Internet is run.

These established sectors know only too well how important it is to somehow find a way to live with government regulatory bodies. In China, successful new startups have almost always come from new areas which the Chinese government has not figured out regulations about and does not yet know how to regulate.

The perfect example is the online gaming industry. This industry was basically an import from South Korea, and took root in China because gaming consoles are technically illegal. (Sony PS2 and 3, Nintendo Wii and xBox360 are all freely sold; that law is seldom enforced, and all of the games sold are cracked versions.) The Chinese government’s rationale for that law was because way back in the nineties, the Chinese government saw PCs as a valuable educational tool, but considered gaming consoles to be expensive frivolous tools for kids to waste their time. At a time when the Chinese had much less buying power than they do today, it seemed like a good idea to ban gaming consoles.

This created an opportunity for Shanda, which was the first company to launch online games (almost all from South Korea) in the Chinese market. This idea caught fire with many younger Chinese and spawned the Internet cafe industry, where many younger Chinese choose to spend/waste their time and has also popularized QQ, the ultimate social networking application if there ever was one, and which for many Chinese, is the Internet.

This industry has swiftly matured, and with success has come regulation. Online gaming companies have tried to adapt, some have adapted (or tried to adapt) by moving into the online game publishing business from online game distribution. The transition from online game distribution to online game publishing has been a rocky road for companies like Shanda. The company has in the past acquired studios and titles, but many of the creative pros have left post-acquisition. A new wave of game publishers with strong titles have come up, led by Perfect World and the highly-contentious Giant Interactive.

On the regulatory and marketing fronts, the online game publishing company has become a victim of its own success: the huge amount of revenue it generates has created something the government and other regulators call a “social problem”, and it has fallen into a rut on the creative side, adding more titles in what are basically the same genre with very little to differentiate each other. The result: titles with diminishing shelf lives and ROI. People who are not addicted to games (i.e. people who have lives) have an increasingly bad view of the industry and game titles.

Unless you have some way to break out of your core audience, which is exactly what Nintendo did with the Wii. The greatest contribution of the Wii is that it has forced people to take a second look at gaming, as something other than just frivolous entertainment which wastes a lot of time and is anti-social for people who do not play games. (Heavy game players would argue that game players are social; they are just online.)

So the Nintendo Wii is halfway there; it has offered a new paradigm for games and gaming.

Now, if gaming is going to really succeed, it will have to get non-gamers to think that they are not playing a game. Then we are talking breakout.

And the game publishers (creative people) will have to learn how to get along and work with the marketing pros, and will have to understand that there is much more to marketing than press releases, press conferences, paying off the media to pick up their stories, planting stories and fake planted conversations on Chinese BBSes, etc.

To really go big, they will rely on a new class of professional and and a new kind of strike force.

We’re not there yet, and we’re not moving fast enough. But there is a way.

I believe in the value of history, but I also believe that there are times when we have to stop referencing the past for what we do in the future.

This is one of those times.

Technorati Tags: , banking, BBS, cafe, China, Chinese, culture, distribution, gaming, government, Hongkong, internet, management, marketing, microsoft, online, publishing, regulation, service, Shanda, sony, taiwan, western, xbox

There has been a lot of talk lately about valuing social networks and Facebook's management knows that, which is why they try to track everyones' activities across the Internet with Facebook Beacon.

There has been a lot of discussion if/how/when/who Facebook will acquire a social network company in China. As usual, I will jump out to offer my often contrarian views on social networking.

Let me put it this way, I don’t think that there is a way to value social networks, even though this is what advertisers would very much like to see happen. And the reason that social networks cannot be valued in a top-down/corporate/advertising way is because they are entirely subjective and dynamic according to each individual at any given moment in time.

That’s why it makes much more sense for each individual to assign a value for _access_ to his network, and anyone who wants to access it has to pay an access fee. If you don’t like the access fee, then don’t pay. If you like the fee, pay, and you will get access.

It’s that simple. Nobody owns the network except me. Not Facebook, LinkedIn, Google or anyone else. I own my relationships, just as you own your relationships. They only exist on Facebook insomuch as I’m active on Facebook now, but that is no guarantee that I will be there tomorrow.

That is why it doesn’t matter if Facebook owns all my data; if I no longer go there, it’s dead, out-of-date data. My data is only valuable as long as I’m active there.

I talked about the idea before, let me fill it out some more.

Here is my problem with Facebook’s Beacon:

1. If Facebook wants to track my activities across the Internet, they should explicity ask me first, and give me an opt-out option.
2. If I say “Yes”, they should ask me how much I want to be paid for access to my network activities on a 24-hour basis
3. I go in and set my fee for 24 hour access beginning immediately and click submit.
4. Facebook’s servers churn and return “yes” or “no”. If “yes”, they will be directed to my payment gateway. After confirmation, Facebook will say something like “Thank you for giving Facebook access to your network activities for 24 hours. After 24 hours, the cookie installed in your browser will automatically expire. (More blahblahblah from corporate and legal departments.)

In this model, each user has control over his/her activities, and is paid for access to their data by each social network.

Now wouldn’t this be a much better world than the current free-for-all where everybody is playing “Let’s screw the users and see how much we can get for free?” The current valuations on social networks are based on not paying users for access to their data.

How would you value social networks if they had to pay users for access to their data?

And since the Internet is all about pushing power to the edge, then why shouldn’t users have the power to earn money from having their activities and relationships tracked?

It would be great to hear what Seth Godin, Dare Obasanjo, Dave Winer and Robert Scoble have to say about the idea.

UPDATE: It’s been three hours since I posted this article, and I wanted to see if Facebook had imported this article into Facebook Notes so that I could tell my Facebook friends about it. (I have set Facebook to automatically import my posts here.)

Guess what? Facebook has not imported this article. Now what have I done to get that kind of treatment? I seem to have some recollection about “empowering users” and all that stuff.

Charming. Did their PR and marketing people go to the “Khmer Rouge Charm School of How to Win Friends and Influence People”. I guess I should be so grateful to Facebook and their management where they can watch all our moves and try to monetize it without passing anything down to us dumb users who haven’t figured out the shill yet.

I’m a great believer that if you fail, you should fail fast. In this respect, Mark Zuckerberg and his flaks have done a great job in record time. Mark, what are your chances now that you will hit that 15B valuation?

Scott Karp has written a great piece “Facebook’s Crisis Demonstrates That People Matter More Than Technology”. Be sure to read it.

Technorati Tags: , advertising, beacon, China, corporate, dareobasanjo, davewiner, facebook, management, robertscoble

When an ailing computer company which has lost a lot of its shine teams up with one of the leading ad agency groups, WPP, to form a new marketing agency called DaVinci to spend $4.5B in marketing money, I am, naturally, more than a little skeptical.

Consolidating adspend under one roof makes sense sometimes; it made sense for IBM in the nineties when it chose my former employer, Ogilvy, also a part of WPP, to handle all its accounts. IBM was able to consolidate its image, and Lou Gerstner, then IBM’s CEO was able to make a dramatic turnaround and a nice exit for himself.

More than 10 years later though, the challenge for Dell is more complex. Dell is a company which has surpassed at squeezing costs out of the system, making cheap computers for the office masses. The problem now for Dell is that it is getting challenged on this front by Lenovo, the Chinese computer manufacturing giant and Acer, the Taiwan company which has made a dramatic comeback after a near-death experience. And then there is the US giant, HP, which is doing some very interesting stuff.

When it comes to buzz, Apple sets the bar. After switching to Intel architecture, then using the iPod as a platform to generate buzz for the iPhone globally, Apple is on a roll. Dell has been left in the dust. Add to that recent customer complaints about quality, and Dell is not in a good situation.

So can DaVinci turn things around for Dell?

My initial reaction is that it doesn’t go far enough; it is made up of Dell and WPP people, and can serve as a buffer to any agency conflicts. But the problems which afflict Dell run much deeper than just quality problems.

They are management and perception problems.

One of the big problems marketing people run into is how to turn a product which is a stinker into something which people want to buy. The Internet has made the challenge even greater, because anyone who has the time, motivation and interest can find anything about a product.

It doesn’t matter how you spin a turd, when it stops spinning, it’s still a turd.

The problem is that once a company starts thinking that it’s all about an agency, or it’s all about the creative, the ground is set to place the marketing people and agency as the fall guys, when actually the problem is with bad management decisions. Then as the management panics because of falling share price, bad buzz, and everything else, their decisions get increasingly short-sighted and the options get worse and worse. When the management starts thinking in these terms, the company is basically in a death spiral; it’s all ends when it hits the ground and bursts into flames.

The problem with Dell is that they are very good at cutting costs, but they have not shown customers how they can ADD value. So naturally, Dell attracts the customers which are at the bottom of the value chain. Dell’s management has effectively commoditized their own product line. This is never a wise thing to do. If your own products have effectively become commodities, how do you position them against anything else?

The answer is you can’t.

Cutting internal manufacturing and component costs is something every computer maker should do internally, but you never want to make it the message you tell your customers and IT departments.

For the past several months, I have been debating what I should get for my next computer. It has been a match between the Santa Rosa Macbook Pro and the HP 2710p. The 2710p is a Tablet PC and has received some excellent reviews. It was the only PC I have been seriously considering.

Why? Because I have never owned a Tablet PC, and it looked like it had reached the right balance of functionality and design. Other HP lines, Dell and the other PC makers never entered the equation.

HP obviously likes the 2710p a lot, they have made it the centerpiece of a TV ad campaign in Asia.

That is why I say that the integration of Dell and WPP do not go deep enough. Instead of trying to flog a lot of commodity products which the market has tired of, instead they should think of how to come up with new products and a product line which actually make a person excited. We’re not talking about marketing anymore; we’re talking design marketing, the kind of stuff Apple excels at.

They should start with one product, then take it to a product line, then expand it, then kill all the boring stuff. Just like Apple did with the iPod, which expanded into the iPhone line.

Of course, in order to do all that, you need to be a dictator like Steve Jobs. The question is whether Michael Dell can be that kind of dictator, even if his own name is on the line.

Technorati Tags: 2710p, advertising, dell, hp, iPhone, iPod, macbookpro, management, marketing, michaeldell, stevejobs, wpp