The China Vortex

One of the things past experience has taught me that while it is possible to guess that some business will take off in China, it is almost impossible to tell when. The most common scenario is that for many years, a western business will devote its people and resources to making its business popular with Chinese, it will not show results. Frustrated, it will depart China with nothing to show for its hard work and investment. (This happened frequently in the eighties and nineties; now it is much more rare.)

This rule does not just apply to business; it even applies to Chinese government policy. For years, the Chinese government actively urged the Chinese people to travel more; it even increased the number of public holidays, creating the Golden Week holiday around the May Day holiday in the late 90s to get Chinese to travel more, and spend some of their savings. For years, the policy yielded no solid results.

But later it worked, and beginning this year, the May Golden Week holiday will be abolished. Put simply, it’s no longer needed. Chinese now travel freely, are willing to spend their savings, and the incentive is now no longer needed.

The same phenomenon occurred in the auto industry. For years, local Chinese automakers were unable to get Chinese to spend money on automobiles; most of their production went to taxis and to Chinese government ministries and officials. These habits changed suddenly with the SARS crisis in 2003. All of a sudden, Chinese were afraid to take public transport and started buying cars. And unlike in the west, they paid for their cars in cash.

This trend, which started in 2003, has continued to this day. Now, if a young man in China’s cities wants to get married, more and more young brides are expecting an apartment and car to go with their husband-to-be. Today, in Beijing, 1,000 new cars are being added daily to the city’s traffic woes.

This creates a phenomenon which I call the “Chinese hockey stick”. In simple terms, this means that “It is likely that a new business/service/product will take off in China, but it is hard to say when.” This can be endlessly frustrating for businesses which need to plan their expenditures on an annual or quarterly basis. When are they going to see some of their investment money come back? Country heads need to tell their head offices when the hockey stick will finally take off, and more often than not, it is very hard, if not impossible, to tell.

Part of my rationale for the Chinese hockey stick is that Chinese consumer spending patterns will track more closely to the spending habits of their Asian neighbors in South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan, than to the west, as Chinese society becomes more prosperous. If you want to understand how Chinese spending habits are likely to develop, take a close look at these places. You will learn a lot. In culture and language, these places are closer to how Chinese think, act and behave than the societies of North American and the EU.

Most frequently, the businesses which are able to time the rise of the hockey stick are local Chinese entrepreneurs. Unlike western companies which try to sell their foreign-designed products in China; these Chinese entrepreneurs stand in the wings, just waiting to swoop in at just the right moment. Unlike western corporations, these companies do not have the big budgets of western companies, but their knowledge of their countrymen’s thinking and spending habits more than compensates for this. This is why many leading Chinese Internet companies such as Tencent, Baidu and Sohu have been able to prosper, while their much larger and richer western competitors have been unable to gain traction.

With the dramatic growth of the Chinese consumer market in the past five years, you would think that western observers would learn to be quiet instead of sticking their necks out and betting against the spending power of Chinese consumers.

Apparently not.

David Wolf’s Silicon Hutong has pointed to an article by Donald dePalma in which he claims that China’s buyers account for only 1.1% of what he calls “online GDP”. Unfortunately, he does not explain his methodology as to how he gathered his numbers.

In the west, the Internet led to the creation of some whole new businesses, with Amazon and Google being the best examples. In China, many Internet companies are front-ends for established brick and mortar businesses. For many Chinese consumers, the Internet is like a shop window; when they buy, they still prefer to buy from a person in a store.

These fundamental differences in consumer spending habits make me question the value of even measuring something like “online GDP”. And as David Wolf alludes to, the eGDP is a static number; it does not capture or reflect trends. It is like trying to understand a movie storyline from a still photo.

That’s why I’ll stick with my analogy for the Chinese hockey stick, at least for the time being.

Technorati Tags: amazon, baidu, cars, China, Chinese, consumers, egdp, expenditures, google, Hongkong, internet, japan, sars, sohu, southkorea, spending, taiwan, tencent, travel

Yesterday, the new national aquatics center was unveiled in Beijing. This will become the venue for the leading water events of the Beijing Olympics. After the Olympics are over, it will be converted to a shopping mall for Beijing’s masses.

Beijing is now the site for some of the most exciting architecture in the world. For many Chinese though, there is an underlying uneasiness. Is all this dramatic futuristic architecture the beginning of a new and exciting future of wealth and prosperity which Chinese have never experienced in their long history?

Or is this instead a blip of prosperity, and will the future be much less bright, and will their children and grandchildren look back and see the Beijing Olympics as the apogee of what has since become a downward trajectory? And will this architectural marvel become dirty and dusty and seedy?

China has seen prosperity before, only to have its dreams shattered. Westerners today see China as a rich, prosperous and growing power, but it has run into the wall before, and on many different points in history. The first Chinese industrial revolution, when Chinese factories started making goods for the Chinese market started at the end of the nineteenth century, with textile mills and flour processing factories spouting up in the Yangzi river delta, mostly started and financed by entrepreneurs from Shanghai and Wuxi. Then China went into political chaos in the period following the revolution which overthrew the Qing dynasty in 1911.

Another period of short-lived period of prosperity came in the early 30s, this was cut short by the Japanese invasion of China in 1937.

Then, in the period following the end of WWII, China fell into civil war between the two leading political parties, with the Nationalists losing and retreating to Taiwan. Following the establishment of the PRC, China was very poor, and then made even poorer by the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, the Chinese government essentially decided that they were tired of being poor and moved ideology off the national agenda. From now on, it would be about making money.

Even today though, with all their savings and comfort, Chinese feel that it can all change and all go away. That is why they save and sit on their cash.

Americans are the opposite. Until very recently, most Americans believed that the future would always be brighter, that although there were things that they did not understand, America was the strongest and most prosperous country in the world, and that there would always be a way. This is why theyspent their savings, and when their savings were gone, they would take loans on easy credit terms, promising to repay the loans and credit when they had income again. It led to a bigger and bigger mountain of debt. And now, Americans are much less sure about their ability to repay the loans.

This is a way of thinking which is completely foreign to Chinese, and makes no sense at all to them. For Chinese, the only real money is cash. And when money goes bad in times of high inflation, they don’t even believe in cash.

They believe in land, and if the politics becomes unstable, they go to gold.

Runaway inflation is something the Germans experienced in th 1920s, then again in the postwar period. Japan experienced it too in the postwar period. China also experienced it in the postwar period when the Nationalists had to change national currencies three times in the period up to 1949. With the runaway inflation in the cities, people had to carry their money in paper sacks to do their shopping. They would go to the markets carrying bags of money to buy their groceries, then they would use the same bags to carry their groceries back home.

When the Nationalists lost control of inflation, they lost the Chinese cities and the support of the business community. This paved the way for the establishment of the PRC in 1949. The first task for the government was then to stabilize the currency.

While China was very poor in the fifties, sixties and seventies, there was virtually no inflation.

Today in China, we are seeing the early signs of inflation again in food prices and property prices. For any Chinese government, and this government is no exception, inflation is the greatest single and most frightening enemy it faces. It may creep up slowly, but it unleashes forces which can easily spin out of control.

If a government cannot maintain the value of its currency, it cannot protect its citizens, and the people end up in the poor house. It’s that simple.

This is why the Chinese government will not easily revalue the yuan upwards, and why the government keeps such a tight control on credit.

One of the upsides for Chinese businesses investing in Africa is that although the people are poor, at least they pay cash. When times turn hard, you want to be paid in cash.

For most Chinese, you aren’t rich unless you own cash.

Credit is just a derivative and in tough times, no one wants derivatives.

Technorati Tags: architecture, Beijing, China, credit, currency, derivatives, germany, inflation, japan, loans, risk, watercube, yuan

Last night (Sept. 3) I attended the Mobile Users Panel held by Mobile Monday in Beijing. This event was held at the Radisson Hotel. This event was the evening part of the Wireless Developer Forum sponsored by Sony Ericsson and Nokia.

I always like to listen to how users use new technology products and services. There are a lot of very smart technology and business people who, at the beginning of a project, have all kinds of ideas of what they are going to build into the next killer app. Then, when they test the product on a focus group, they are always humbled by the experience. I call this phenomena “the revenge of the user”.

Mobile Monday assembled a four-person panel: one 25 year-old research student (technology) from Chongqing and who had lived in Beijing for the past seven years; one 18-year old high-school student who called himself Rico, and appeared anxious to test his fairly good English on the audience; one 25 year-old female math teacher in high school and one 30+ tech startup guy. Because the 25 year-old researcher and the startup founder knew more about technology, I tended to discount their views, and was much more interested in how the 18 year-old high school student (Rico) and the 25 year-old female math teacher used their mobile phones.

Benjamin Joffe, CEO and founder of Plus8star, presented the questions, and a female co-host did the English-Chinese translation work.

The 25 year-old researcher spent about 150 yuan on service charges per month, and was a subscriber to China Mobile’s M-Zone service package, which is targeted at youth. He made about 10 calls daily, and received 20-30 SMS messages daily.

Rico also subscribed to the M-Zone package, which offered 800 SMS messages monthly. He would send about 40 SMS messages daily, which would suggest that even 800 SMS messages a month is not enough for him. He used a Samsung phone; previously he had used Nokia phones. Although he was only 18, this was already his 10th phone, which seemed to cause a gasp in the audience, and Benjamin Joffe did a double-take when he heard this.

The 25 year-old female teacher also used the China Mobile M-Zone service, but also used PHS service at home because of the low monthly charges. Her use was much lighter than Rico.

When it came to services used, Rico said that he had once used China Unicom, but the monthly charges had gone up to 300 yuan a month, and he had cancelled. The rate he seemed most comfortable was in the region of 150 yuan monthly.

Aside from the 25 year-old researcher, all had more than one phone and one SIM card.

Benjamin Joffe asked all of them if they knew about 3G. Rico said that he didn’t know the details, but that he thought that it meant there would be higher quality services at lower prices. All said that they occasionally played casual mobile games and never expected to pay for them. This would suggest that entertainment on the mobile platform is headed for an advertising model.

It became most interesting when Benjamin asked what single feature they would like their next phones to have. The answer from both the female teacher and Rico were maps. Rico suggested that he would also like GPS so that he could find his way around. The female teacher recounted how she got lost meeting her class one day on a day trip, and how helpful it would have been to her to have a mapping service; she said that it would have prevented her from being some 10 minutes late to meet her class.

Maps and mapping are still sensitive government-regulated issues in China, and it will be interesting to see how the different regulatory ministries will reach consensus on how to offer these services.

My conclusions are:

• It will be very difficult to monetize mobile content in the next 2-3 years because of government regulatory hurdles and a generally challenging environment.
• While China is a very big market in the mobile and Internet space, users are still very price-sensitive. Most teenage urban users would cap their monthly subscriptions at 150 yuan, and 300 yuan would be a ceiling for most salaried people. (Rico was spending his parent’s money; and I assumed that working people would be willing to spend up to 300 yuan of their own income on monthly mobile services.)
• Just because someone likes a service a lot does not mean that they are willing to pay for it, so please remove those rose-tinted glasses and stop fantasizing about the “China market” is my advice to those entering the Chinese market.
• Mapping and GPS on mobile phones are the killer app, but are currently regulated by different Chinese government ministries. Currently, there are still no standard published APIs for accessing an online mapping service. A lot of horse trading will happen before everything gets sorted out on the government level. When that is done, advertisers will have to figure out how to monetize maps and GPS services, which involves yet another round of horse trading.
• The times when telcos and their partners were fantasizing about people spending kajillions of dollars, yuan and yen on mobile services will be hit hard by the expanding credit crisis. I expect users worldwide to put fairly solid ceilings on their discretionary spending, at least in the US. In China, the government may further slow down credit expansion since they have already seen what fast credit expansion has done in the markets of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, where there are swathes of the local populations which have become victims of their monthly credit card payments.
• The ultimate measure of how much users spend on mobile services is ARPU (average revenue per user). While China is much larger than Japan in population and market size, the amount of revenue generated by the telcos in the two countries are about the same. It’s going to be a long long time before the average Chinese user spends nearly the same amount on mobile services as the current Japanese user does.

Technorati Tags: averagerevenueperuser, China, chinamobile, japan, mapping, maps, mobilemonday, mobilemondaybeijing, mobilephone, plus8star, sms