The China Vortex

What do you call it when people pay nearly double current sales price to buy a product which is basically crippled of its most important function, and the maker has spent zero marketing dollars to sell the product?

I’d call that pretty powerful buzz marketing.

According to this USA Today story, some Chinese are willing to part with 8800 yuan to own an iPhone which doesn’t have working phone capabilities in China, because Apple has not yet signed a partnership agreement with a carrier. (Presumably, Apple would part with China’s leading mobile service provider, China Mobile, to launch iPhone service in China.)

Any way you look at it, Apple’s iPhone has had a successful launch in the US. Apple has taken its legendary experience in hardware/software design and integration and applied it to a whole new product, the mobile phone, bringing good design sense and functionality to a product which has confounded most users for years. On the marketing side, Steve Jobs has put the reality distortion field into overdrive, convincing many Americans who have never used smartphones before to part with their money. A few analysts have gone so far as to predict that Apple will replace Microsoft in the mobile space, becoming the leading player for a new category combining hardware and software design and integration in mobile computing. A report which came out on Sept. 4 has claimed that iPhone sales in the US in July have already beaten smartphone sales.

In China, mobile phones are very popular and are more than just communications devices. Often, with the Chinese concern for social rank, they are indicators of social status. On the business side, this translates into frequent replacements of handsets among China’s rising urban middle class as users want to have the latest devices. Mainly for this reason, handset makers have placed most of their research and development in China, to lower costs and to be close to trends for their single largest market.

But could Nokia, Motorola, Samsung and LG have missed something Steve Jobs and Apple saw, an opportunity which Jobs’ gang could not pass up? And could the high rate of handset sales belie not only a desire to have the latest mobile device, but be an indicator that Chinese users were not satisfied with any of the handsets made by any of the major hardware makers?

Moreover, could this represent an opportunity for Apple, which has never had major market presence in China for its computer business, but has made limited inroads with its iPod business? And is this a major opportunity for iPhone in a major emerging market?

First of all, let’s take a look at what Apple has done differently. In typical Steve Jobs style, Apple has played God, giving buyers a complete final sealed package and solution, including software (a version of OS X) by Apple, and a hardware design by Jonathan Ive, Apple’s superdesigner who has been largely responsible for the elegance factor in Apple’s products. To the consternation of a new generation of software developers, Apple has provided only very limited support and documentation for designers of third-party applications for the iPhone. But even with this very limited support, something interesting has happened: the developers have organized themselves to develop new apps for the iPhone.

When was the last time you heard of a large group of developers organizing themselves to develop and extend apps for new Nokia, Motorola, Samsung and LG phones? And for nothing?

While Apple and Steve Jobs try to create consumer reverence somewhere along the lines of Moses coming down from Mount Sinai with the Ten Commandments, the fact is that the first iteration of Apple’s products still are far from perfect. But the products always gets better. This reveals something about Steve Jobs which he strives to keep from the market: he listens and acts on intelligent customer input.

Uniquely among major hardware/software companies, Apple does not use focus groups. Designers design for Steve Jobs: designs and features Steve Jobs likes are kept; designs and features he dislikes are tossed away. There are no focus groups by marketing groups for senior management to use as crutches for their decisions.

If you look at it closely, what is happening with all the buzz for the iPhone is a mirror copy of what happened when the iPhone was announced on Jan. 7 at Macworld in San Francisco. The six month waiting period created a huge amount of pent-up demand and free buzz for the iPhone in the US, which translated into record sales for the product when it was launched on June 29.

Now, it’s happening even in China.

Genius. Pure genius.

Technorati Tags: Apple, business, China, chinamobile, Chinese, developers, interest, iPhone, iPod, management, marketing, microsoft, research, software

Until very recently, Chinese language qualifications were not considered a deal-breaker for senior positions in China. For the most part, US and European employers assumed that a person of Chinese extraction had some degree of fluency in Chinese, and could communicate with other Chinese in China.

This all changed when Goldman Sach’s proposed appointment for China co-head, Richard Ong, was disqualified from his proposed position because he failed to pass the language requirements for the position which were passed by the China Banking Regulatory Commission. Ong was a Malaysian Chinese who had been mostly educated in English in the west.

The test which Ong failed to pass was the HSK or Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi. The test is given in three levels: basic, intermediate and advanced. The most basic level of Chinese language fluency is level 1; the most advanced is level 11. Those who reach level 11 Chinese language fluency are deemed to be able to work in a Chinese-language work environment. The HSK is the only government-sanctioned test given to non-Chinese whose results are recognized by the Chinese government.

Previously, the HSK was considered important only for those who were interested in the Chinese language for research and academic purposes; now, it is quickly evolving into an important job requirement qualification for those who want to work in China.

The test information and registration website includes full information about the process and tests, with test dates and places. Registration for the tests can be done online, as well as payment. All the candidate then needs to do is print out his form and photo, and present himself on the date of the test.

Test preparation books and materials are widely available in foreign-language bookstores in China, as well as in online stores.

As China becomes more important and influential on the international business scene, the need for senior executives who are fluent in written, spoken and in reading Chinese will become more important. Now, because of CBRC regulations, the sectors most affected are the sensitive financial sector; it is likely that as western companies become educated about the difference between being ethnically Chinese and fluent in Mandarin, they will ask for HSK test scores to get a handle on the Chinese language fluency of their staff and management, and prospective candidates. It is likely that it will soon evolve into a requirement for those in marketing in China, and in operations. Already, among executive search firms, there is a serious shortage of senior-level staff and management positions where candidates with Chinese-language fluency and overseas work experience are sought. For those who are serious about working in China, it would be wise to take the HSK and have their scores ready for their meeting with the human resources department.

Among China consultants, the HSK has already become a hot topic for discussion.

For those who are interested in learning more from others, and in sharing their knowledge, there is a discussion group for the HSK on Facebook.

Technorati Tags: business, career, China, Chinese, fluency, goldman, HR, human, information, interest, job, language, management, market, marketing, ong, online, preparation, qualifications, requirement, research, resources, richard, sachs, US

If there is one thing which never ceases to amaze me, it’s the sheer number of overseas investors seeking entry to China, who have a hard time seeing past the most basic facts and figures about the size of the Chinese market.

Most of these firms are American, which are, generally speaking, more addicted to numeric data than their European and Japanese counterparts. Some statements they frequently quote are:

• The number of mobile phone subscribers in China is now greater than the US;
• China is now the world’s second largest auto market, trailing only the US;
• China’s demand for oil imports has far-reaching influence far outside its borders;

Looking at China’s economic statistics in these terms, it is very easy for executives who have little or no experience selling products outside their own home markets to think that the potential of the Chinese market is something which will fund their own retirement nest eggs.

The great danger is that more often than not, they are unable to see past these initial assumptions about the Chinese market on the board and senior management level. In fact, as many learn to their own dismay, the Chinese market is complicated, filled with traps to capture uninformed executives who fail to grasp the difficult realities of China’s markets.

Let’s take a look at some of these wrong assumptions, followed by the facts:

• “The size of the Chinese consumer market is huge.” (True, but for the most part, there is no single national market and no way to distribute nationally; you need to negotiate deals city by city and province by province. Every city and every province wants its own unique distribution deal in order to have uniqueness in the marketplace. The main problem is not high costs, but the amount of time it takes to roll out. While the customer numbers may be huge, revenue per customer/user are usually in fact very low in the beginning for most sectors compared to other more developed markets.)
• “If I partner with a company with national distribution, then my job will be easier.” (True, but the companies which take on partners are usually the ones who are in trouble. Many of these are state-owned enterprises which lack business marketing skills, and are trying to translate their monopoly charters into revenue with the foreign partner’s help.)
• “Our product is so good that it will market itself”. (If you believe your own PR in this regard, your company deserves to fail.)

For the most part, the most successful companies in China’s emergent consumer market economy are firms like Suning (in consumer electronics), Shanda (in online gaming and entertainment) and Suntech (in solar energy).

What do these companies have in common? They are new, and while they did have some government backing and connections in their very early stages, they have now transformed themselves into privately-owned businesses with their own management team and CEO. For the most part, these companies are very centrally managed by their founder/entrepreneur. Unless a foreign company is able to present a very strong case for partnering with them, they will prefer to build and distribute on their own. Why should they share their profits and revenues with another company, and help to build another brand which may become a future competitor? After all, that’s how they became dominant in their own sectors; they’re not about to make the same mistake themselves.

As China’s economy becomes more market-oriented, China’s state-owned enterprises are struggling to define their roles in this new economy. It is not enough to have a government-granted monopoly charter; they need to become profitable. This pressure for profit usually comes from the Chinese government’s State Council, which is China’s cabinet.

Their preferred solution is to set up a joint venture with a foreign company, which injects startup capital since the Chinese government, as a matter of policy, does not inject capital into joint ventures, instead offering other fuzzy stuff like “markets” and “connections” into the joint venture.

Most of these joint ventures fail because the two sides fail to do the hard work to insure that there is a complete alignment of interests and accountability for their investment in the JV. Most of the time, I blame the foreign partner’s inability to see past the market hype and think and discuss the whole project through with the Chinese government partner and clearly defining which partner has responsibility to perform what needs to be done.

The endless procession of foreign companies who come to China and throw good business sense to the winds without performing proper due diligence in order to secure a footing in the “China market” never ceases to amaze me. Why is it they seemingly only do this in China? Do they think that the Chinese will throw them out of the country for asking good legitimate business questions?

Chinese SOEs are in particular need of modern management skills, especially in the areas of marketing, sales and cost accounting. Foreign JV partners would in fact be helping the Chinese companies reform by holding them accountable to reach specific business goals. The SOEs have strong connections and resources in a potentially large market.

It is only when both sides are honest about their goals and expectations that they can succeed.

Technorati Tags: autos, board, business, China, Chinese, data, diligence, due, economic, economy, facts, global, interest, investment, investors, joint-venture, management, market, oil, phones, Shanda, SOE, Suning, Suntech, US

This is the opinion of Paul Craig Roberts, who previous served as Assistant Secretary of Treasury during the Reagan administration, and is often quoted as the “father of Reaganomics”. (You can read the Wikipedia entry about him here.)

Recently there has been discussion about China’s threat to use the “nuclear option”, or and basically destroying the value of the US dollar as a global reserve currency by dumping more dollars on the markets than they can absorb in a short time, forcing the dollar into a free-fall.

The prevailing wisdom among US economists is that China would not make such a move, as the damage to China’s own economy would be too great. Roberts rebuts this claim saying that

American economists make a mistake in their reasoning when they assume that China needs large reserves of foreign exchange. China does not need foreign exchange reserves for the usual reasons of supporting its currency’s value and paying its trade bills. China does not allow its currency to be traded in currency markets. Indeed, there is not enough yuan available to trade. Speculators, betting on the eventual rise of the yuan’s value, are trying to capture future gains by trading ‘virtual yuan.’ The other reason is that China does not have foreign trade deficits, and does not need reserves in other currencies with which to pay its bills. Indeed, if China had creditors, the creditors would be pleased to be paid in yuan as the currency is thought to be undervalued.

In addition, he refutes the claim that China would lose US markets with such a move.

The notion that China cannot exercise its power without losing its US markets is wrong. American consumers are as dependent on imports of manufactured goods from China as they are on imported oil. In addition, the profits of US brand name companies are dependent on the sale to Americans of the products that they make in China. The US cannot, in retaliation, block the import of goods and services from China without delivering a knock-out punch to US companies and US consumers. China has many markets and can afford to lose the US market easier than the US can afford to lose the American brand names on Wal-Mart’s shelves that are made in China. Indeed, the US is even dependent on China for advanced technology products. If truth be known, so much US production has been moved to China that many items on which consumers depend are no longer produced in America.

Roberts then builds a case for China’s dumping dollars as a reaction against US pressure for revaluing the yuan, refuting claims that this is an impossible scenario.

Consider that if China were to increase the value of the yuan by 30 percent, the value of China’s dollar holdings would decline by 30 percent. It would have the same effect on China’s pocketbook as dumping dollars and Treasuries in the markets.

Consider also, that as revaluation causes the yuan to move up in relation to the dollar (the reserve currency), it also causes the yuan to move up against every other traded currency. Thus, the Chinese cannot revalue as Paulson has ordered without making Chinese goods more expensive not merely to Americans but everywhere.

Compare this result with China dumping dollars. With the yuan pegged to the dollar, China can dump dollars without altering the exchange rate between the yuan and the dollar. As the dollar falls, the yuan falls with it. Goods and services produced in China do not become more expensive to Americans, and they become cheaper elsewhere. By dumping dollars, China expands its entry into other markets and accumulates more foreign currencies from trade surpluses.

Basically, Roberts makes a strong case for the argument that the US no longer has leverage over China and global financial markets the way it used to. You can read his whole article here.

Have we reached a tipping point in American power and global influence?

Technorati Tags: Beijing, China, Chinese, deficit, dollar, economic, economy, Fed, global, information, interest, rates, research, trade, US, yuan