What Tibet and Carrefour Can Teach Us About the Chinese Internet

May 9th, 2008

When the western media and some outside observers talk about “Angry China”, they really miss out on the real story, and even the real questions which need to be asked. For instance, how do very large groups of people, who at least on the surface, have nothing to do with each other, organize in large numbers so quickly in a society which many westerners see as authoritarian? Are they government-led or influenced, or do they do it themselves? How do they come to believe some of the wild rumors which come up, such as for instance, the belief that Carrefour sends a portion of its earnings to support the Dalai Lama and Tibet independence, and are seemingly oblivious to the fact that any large company would like to keep as much of its earnings for itself?

There is a very simple answer to all this: a large part of the organization is done on the Internet in China, specifically on BBSes. While the BBS (bulletin board system) is something outdated and antiquated in the US Internet, it has been a very important part of the Chinese Internet, and I would argue, it is growing and becoming more influential. For the Chinese government, it is a headache because in spite of Chinese government regulations, it is largely unregulated. For western corporations it is a good place to gather information but is useless for advertising, but for many Chinese it is the most important part of the Internet (along with online gaming and their IM client, which is most likely to be QQ or MSN Instant Messenger depending on their age and demographics).

Don’t believe me? Go to your nearest Chinese Internet cafe and watch what people are doing.

Most westerners who come into the China Internet market have no idea of its power and influence, and instead think that the Chinese Internet is largely the same as the US market, but it isn’t. The Chinese government doesn’t really like BBSes because it really is free (as in free speech), and is the breeding ground for all kinds of weird stuff. And while it is important for gathering buzz on products (as CIC, based in Shanghai, does) for corporations, nobody has really been able to monetize it. And, western journalists fail to monitor it, which is why they miss on so many big stories, and end up giving credit to some sinister Chinese government policies. ( I guess it’s kind of flattering for the Chinese government to be given credit for something when most Chinese know that it isn’t that powerful.)

Isn’t it amazing that such a huge and important part of free speech in China has been entirely missed? Fortunately, Tom Melcher’s new blog Live from Beijing! has a very good introductory article to BBSes (h/t to Andrew Lih). I got something of an introduction to the BBS in 1998, shortly after Sina was formed from the merger of SRS and Sinanet. One of the first web applications created by Wang Zhidong was a simple BBS which he demoed to me in the summer of that year. It really took off in popularity with the US’s accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in April 1999 when millions of angry Chinese hit the Sina news forum. Please don’t think of the Strong Nation forum on the People’s Daily site as being at all representative of Chinese BBSes; it is official and closely monitored for content. The interesting BBSes are all unofficial or semi-official.

Most of the angry Chinese in China, or fenqing, are organized on the BBSes, where they gather and shoot the breeze. These people have time on their hands, and play games, spend time in QQ, and gossip on the BBSes of their choice at the moment. They spend almost no time on what we would call the official Internet, except going to get news on Sina, Sohu and Netease. It is very hard to reach them with advertising.

Now, let’s talk about their persona. For the most part, they:

  • They distrust the official media and do not buy magazines, and get as much information as they can from unofficial sources, such as BBSes. They only go to the official media for some sports information and major news information.
  • They trust unofficial news more than news which comes from official sources.
  • They are the perfect audience for spreading rumors, because they can be quickly organized by anonymous leaders, or “honeybees” as Tom Melcher calls them in his article.
  • When organized, they can be huge, in the millions, and they can move like a swarm.

In simple terms, the characteristics of this unofficial crowd are:

  • Chinese official government influence is very limited
  • They are mostly self-organized
  • The numbers are in the millions
  • They move extremely fast
  • They disappear just as fast as they appeared
  • They are almost always anonymous and do not use their real names, preferring instead to use their own handles

In simple terms, they are an issue-focused flash mob. For corporations, they are:

  • Not susceptible to traditional PR methods since you are dealing with an anonymous group
  • Very tightly focused around one issue
  • Move much faster than corporations and their decision-making apparatus is diversified,
  • Do not trust/ believe in information from any government, including Chinese

My estimate is that more than 60% of non-IM traffic in China is to these unofficial BBSes, and that number is growing.

When it comes to advertising, most adspend hits that remaining 40% of the official and semi-official Internet, without reaching where many people are. CIC acts as the eyes and ears of corporations, but corporations have not been able to do anything yet with that information and are still reliant on mainstream advertising approaches for both online and offline which are largely out of date. This is the background for my article on why agencies need a new approach to online marketing in China.

So, BBSes are the real social media marketing tool, and as usual, the Chinese are ahead of everyone else, but just haven’t figured out that part themselves. While the west talks about social media and Web 2.0, China has had a version of it for the past ten years. It may not be pretty, but it works.

It’s just that vast majority of outsiders haven’t figured it out yet.

Where China Falls Short

May 1st, 2008

China’s economic growth over the past several years has excited many members of the international community, who see it as an alternative to the US’s and west’s leadership of the world order for the past two centuries. There has been a deep underlying distrust of the west, but it was brought to the fore by the Bush administration’s single-minded focus on the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and what to many, have seemed like trumped-up reasons for the invasion.

This, along with China’s dramatic economic growth, has opened up a great opportunity for China to offer an alternative vision of economic and social development. But China has fallen short with the recent fuss over the torch relay, and the actions of the fenqing (angry youth). In a very short period of time, a great deal of the goodwill China has earned has dissipated.

This situation has forced many supporters of the reform and opening-up of China into a lose-lose situation. If they support the Chinese position, they become seen as Chinese toadies, and if they criticize certain aspects of what has happened during the Olympic torch relay, they become dismissed by the Chinese, especially fenqing, as western toadies. Intelligent people should not be forced into making choices like this which are not real choices, and further polarize the two sides. People should be able to make constructive criticism without being forced to make bad choices and being pigeon-holed into one group or the other.

I, for one, believe that there is validity to the Chinese criticisms of the way China and the Chinese have been shown in the western media. There are biases; some are based on ignorance and some may be based on malice. But anger and heavy-handedness are not the right way to correct these perceptions; instead they validate the views and fears of China’s worst critics.

But this is not purely a public relations exercise. If China was a smaller and less influential country, maybe that would work. What China needs is to offer an alternative vision to the western model of development. This model must include dialogue, institutions and rules without a pre-conceived agenda which are pre-packaged for others, who must buy into it. Basically, a new framework needs to be created for Chinese engagement and dialogue on a global scale.

One of the criticisms of western hegemony is that it has offered a pre-packaged vision which in reality, offers pre-packaged western interests at its core. Joseph Stiglitz talked about this in his book Making Globalization Work.

So what is China’s vision? Is it just anger for western wrongdoing and the way it is depicted in the western-controlled media? How much goodwill will venting anger get China? There needs to be a better more thought-out way which offers more constructive results.

More people need to be included, and it should not just be government to government. It should be open where all can offer their views, and be listened to. Differing opinions should be debated and allowed to co-exist. Out of this, some kind of rationale for China’s rise has to come out, and this vision needs to be consistent with the rest of the world, as well as the Chinese people.

China is now a real power in every way. Real powers listen to and debate different views. If they don’t like certain views, they can offer a point by point rebuttal, or they can debate those views, but there is no need to get angry.

New times bring new challenges, and new challenges call for new thinking.