The China Vortex

Over the past year, the tone of coverage of many China-related topics in the US has improved. For the most part, writers covering China have tried to look past the generally-accepted stereotypes, and have tried to get a deeper understanding of what is going on in China.

But occasionally something finds its way through the cracks.

This article is really exemplary; it seems like the writer has taken all the stereotypes about Apple and China, and thrown them all together in one basket. Judging from the tone of the article, and what he professes to be truth, it seems like he has never set foot in China. Otherwise, how could be believe some of the things he writes?

Let’s take a look at some of the choice statements:

Apple has less than 8 percent market share in China for media players, and far less than 1 percent of either PC or cell phone market share.

Yes, so? I wonder if the writer has walked into any cafe in Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen, and looked around? Or has he taken any of the subways in any of those three cities and looked around for the signature white earbuds? The question should not be the percentage market share. It should be the trend, and whether it is tracking up or down.

Apple’s second biggest hit in China, the iPhone, isn’t authorized. One Chinese analyst estimates that some 1 million Apple iPhones are currently operating on just one Chinese carrier — China Mobile — with a smaller number on other carriers. Most Apple “Authorized Resellers” in China sell black-market iPhones, and many even offer illegal cracking services — a process that reportedly takes less time than activating an iPhone 3G in California.

Apple makes money off of every iPhone sold, whether it is through authorized or unauthorized channels. Sure, Apple would like to have a carrier agreement in China, but having a group of fans, even though it is relatively small percentage-wise, which is very enthusiastic about Apple products, is a good thing. Besides, there are a lot of people in China who pay even more for more expensive feature-packed mobile phones in China. In fact, the iPhone is not the most expensive phone in the market. Ask Nokia.

Apple succeeds because customers love the products and the brand. But in China, brands mean little to most potential customers, and hardware even less. Chinese consumers prize value above all.

This quote is a true gem and qualifies as one of the most ignorant sweeping statements about China for 2008, even though we are only halfway through the year. Obviously the writer has not been to China and walked in the downtown of any major city. Here is an article about the runup to the recent opening of the Sanlitun store in Beijing and another story about Chinese youth camping out in front of the Beijing Apple store, where they were behaving just like American Apple fans.
I guess that’s why there are no Mercedes Benzes, BMWs, and Chinese women don’t care about the labels they wear? Maybe he thinks that they still wear Mao suits?

The rest of the world’s love of the Apple brand has enabled Apple to get favorable terms with carriers around the world. But this hasn’t helped much in China. Apple initially demanded a big two-digit percentage of carriers’ wireless revenue as a condition for granting its coveted exclusivity deal, according to reports (one company says Apple demanded 30%). The Chinese carriers were apparently unimpressed by the value of Apple’s brand compared with the value to Apple of access to Chinese consumers. They appear to have forced Apple to drop its demand for any share of wireless revenues.

The reason Apple has not been able to get an agreement with China Mobile is because they are both big companies with very big egos who want to control everything. I would say that Apple and the carriers have trouble reaching an agreement because they are so much alike, and don’t believe in compromise.

One-party rule in China actually affects product quality. One example is that Apple will probably be required to disable the iPhone’s Wi-Fi feature in order to comply with the Communist Party’s strict Internet control and censorship rules.

The relationship between one-party rule and product quality is an arguable point. But if it is that simple, then why are ALL of Apple’s products made in China? As for the disabling of Wi-Fi on phones sold in China, that is a China Mobile requirement, not a State Council requirement. (If you think that the rulers of China don’t have better things to worry about than whether mobile phones in China have Wi-Fi functionality, you don’t know anything about the country and how it’s ruled.) Besides, with the recent re-arrangement of the Chinese telcos, it’s not as if China Mobile is able to control Wi-Fi as much as it would like.

China is number one in intellectual property theft

Apple’s whole business model is based on creating value through exquisite design, superior branding and the sale of creative intellectual property (IP) — then defending its rights against the IP thieves, pirates and counterfeiters.

How will this formula succeed if China doesn’t enforce intellectual property laws?

The music piracy rate in China is between 90 and 99 percent, depending on whom you ask. China is the global epicenter of intellectual property theft in general, and of Apple IP theft in particular — especially iPhones and iPods.

Fake iPhones, and phones that steal Apple branding; illegal iPhone unlocking services; trade in illegal movie and music files; all appear to be tolerated and even government-protected activities in China.

Oh yes, how can we talk about China without IP violations? Seriously though, this is an issue. The best way to fight IP though, is for a country to get more prosperous. As people become wealthier, they are more willing to spend money on software, music, etc. In China, it is also very important to explain the importance of IP to various government ministries, and even be flexible about how much you charge Chinese consumers. Many Chinese think that they should not have to pay as much for music as US consumers because they have a lower income and standard of living. Does that fit into any American companies’ equations? Up until four years ago, Microsoft had a very high level of illegally installed Windows licenses in China, and constantly lobbied with the US Congress to “punish” China. When Microsoft China changed tactics and chose to engage Chinese ministries, educate them, and lower the license fees (as China’s standard of living increased), first the ministries, then the schools, then the people started buying original software from Microsoft. Now Microsoft gets more revenue from China, and the relationship with the government is much less confrontational. Piracy of Microsoft software still exists, but again it’s about the trend, which is improving.

Steve Jobs is an exemplary business and marketing genius. But when it comes to learning about other markets, he is lazy. He would like nothing better than to set prices for all media products sold through iTunes himself, and he would like it to be the same all over the world. China is a major kink in his vision.

How many times has Bill Gates been to China? How many times has Steve Jobs been to China?

I rest my case.

One of the things past experience has taught me that while it is possible to guess that some business will take off in China, it is almost impossible to tell when. The most common scenario is that for many years, a western business will devote its people and resources to making its business popular with Chinese, it will not show results. Frustrated, it will depart China with nothing to show for its hard work and investment. (This happened frequently in the eighties and nineties; now it is much more rare.)

This rule does not just apply to business; it even applies to Chinese government policy. For years, the Chinese government actively urged the Chinese people to travel more; it even increased the number of public holidays, creating the Golden Week holiday around the May Day holiday in the late 90s to get Chinese to travel more, and spend some of their savings. For years, the policy yielded no solid results.

But later it worked, and beginning this year, the May Golden Week holiday will be abolished. Put simply, it’s no longer needed. Chinese now travel freely, are willing to spend their savings, and the incentive is now no longer needed.

The same phenomenon occurred in the auto industry. For years, local Chinese automakers were unable to get Chinese to spend money on automobiles; most of their production went to taxis and to Chinese government ministries and officials. These habits changed suddenly with the SARS crisis in 2003. All of a sudden, Chinese were afraid to take public transport and started buying cars. And unlike in the west, they paid for their cars in cash.

This trend, which started in 2003, has continued to this day. Now, if a young man in China’s cities wants to get married, more and more young brides are expecting an apartment and car to go with their husband-to-be. Today, in Beijing, 1,000 new cars are being added daily to the city’s traffic woes.

This creates a phenomenon which I call the “Chinese hockey stick”. In simple terms, this means that “It is likely that a new business/service/product will take off in China, but it is hard to say when.” This can be endlessly frustrating for businesses which need to plan their expenditures on an annual or quarterly basis. When are they going to see some of their investment money come back? Country heads need to tell their head offices when the hockey stick will finally take off, and more often than not, it is very hard, if not impossible, to tell.

Part of my rationale for the Chinese hockey stick is that Chinese consumer spending patterns will track more closely to the spending habits of their Asian neighbors in South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan, than to the west, as Chinese society becomes more prosperous. If you want to understand how Chinese spending habits are likely to develop, take a close look at these places. You will learn a lot. In culture and language, these places are closer to how Chinese think, act and behave than the societies of North American and the EU.

Most frequently, the businesses which are able to time the rise of the hockey stick are local Chinese entrepreneurs. Unlike western companies which try to sell their foreign-designed products in China; these Chinese entrepreneurs stand in the wings, just waiting to swoop in at just the right moment. Unlike western corporations, these companies do not have the big budgets of western companies, but their knowledge of their countrymen’s thinking and spending habits more than compensates for this. This is why many leading Chinese Internet companies such as Tencent, Baidu and Sohu have been able to prosper, while their much larger and richer western competitors have been unable to gain traction.

With the dramatic growth of the Chinese consumer market in the past five years, you would think that western observers would learn to be quiet instead of sticking their necks out and betting against the spending power of Chinese consumers.

Apparently not.

David Wolf’s Silicon Hutong has pointed to an article by Donald dePalma in which he claims that China’s buyers account for only 1.1% of what he calls “online GDP”. Unfortunately, he does not explain his methodology as to how he gathered his numbers.

In the west, the Internet led to the creation of some whole new businesses, with Amazon and Google being the best examples. In China, many Internet companies are front-ends for established brick and mortar businesses. For many Chinese consumers, the Internet is like a shop window; when they buy, they still prefer to buy from a person in a store.

These fundamental differences in consumer spending habits make me question the value of even measuring something like “online GDP”. And as David Wolf alludes to, the eGDP is a static number; it does not capture or reflect trends. It is like trying to understand a movie storyline from a still photo.

That’s why I’ll stick with my analogy for the Chinese hockey stick, at least for the time being.