Apple and China: The American Media Ignorance Continues

July 26th, 2008

Over the past year, the tone of coverage of many China-related topics in the US has improved. For the most part, writers covering China have tried to look past the generally-accepted stereotypes, and have tried to get a deeper understanding of what is going on in China.

But occasionally something finds its way through the cracks.

This article is really exemplary; it seems like the writer has taken all the stereotypes about Apple and China, and thrown them all together in one basket. Judging from the tone of the article, and what he professes to be truth, it seems like he has never set foot in China. Otherwise, how could be believe some of the things he writes?

Let’s take a look at some of the choice statements:

Apple has less than 8 percent market share in China for media players, and far less than 1 percent of either PC or cell phone market share.

Yes, so? I wonder if the writer has walked into any cafe in Shanghai, Beijing and Shenzhen, and looked around? Or has he taken any of the subways in any of those three cities and looked around for the signature white earbuds? The question should not be the percentage market share. It should be the trend, and whether it is tracking up or down.

Apple’s second biggest hit in China, the iPhone, isn’t authorized. One Chinese analyst estimates that some 1 million Apple iPhones are currently operating on just one Chinese carrier — China Mobile — with a smaller number on other carriers. Most Apple “Authorized Resellers” in China sell black-market iPhones, and many even offer illegal cracking services — a process that reportedly takes less time than activating an iPhone 3G in California.

Apple makes money off of every iPhone sold, whether it is through authorized or unauthorized channels. Sure, Apple would like to have a carrier agreement in China, but having a group of fans, even though it is relatively small percentage-wise, which is very enthusiastic about Apple products, is a good thing. Besides, there are a lot of people in China who pay even more for more expensive feature-packed mobile phones in China. In fact, the iPhone is not the most expensive phone in the market. Ask Nokia.

Apple succeeds because customers love the products and the brand. But in China, brands mean little to most potential customers, and hardware even less. Chinese consumers prize value above all.

This quote is a true gem and qualifies as one of the most ignorant sweeping statements about China for 2008, even though we are only halfway through the year. Obviously the writer has not been to China and walked in the downtown of any major city. Here is an article about the runup to the recent opening of the Sanlitun store in Beijing and another story about Chinese youth camping out in front of the Beijing Apple store, where they were behaving just like American Apple fans.
I guess that’s why there are no Mercedes Benzes, BMWs, and Chinese women don’t care about the labels they wear? Maybe he thinks that they still wear Mao suits?

The rest of the world’s love of the Apple brand has enabled Apple to get favorable terms with carriers around the world. But this hasn’t helped much in China. Apple initially demanded a big two-digit percentage of carriers’ wireless revenue as a condition for granting its coveted exclusivity deal, according to reports (one company says Apple demanded 30%). The Chinese carriers were apparently unimpressed by the value of Apple’s brand compared with the value to Apple of access to Chinese consumers. They appear to have forced Apple to drop its demand for any share of wireless revenues.

The reason Apple has not been able to get an agreement with China Mobile is because they are both big companies with very big egos who want to control everything. I would say that Apple and the carriers have trouble reaching an agreement because they are so much alike, and don’t believe in compromise.

One-party rule in China actually affects product quality. One example is that Apple will probably be required to disable the iPhone’s Wi-Fi feature in order to comply with the Communist Party’s strict Internet control and censorship rules.

The relationship between one-party rule and product quality is an arguable point. But if it is that simple, then why are ALL of Apple’s products made in China? As for the disabling of Wi-Fi on phones sold in China, that is a China Mobile requirement, not a State Council requirement. (If you think that the rulers of China don’t have better things to worry about than whether mobile phones in China have Wi-Fi functionality, you don’t know anything about the country and how it’s ruled.) Besides, with the recent re-arrangement of the Chinese telcos, it’s not as if China Mobile is able to control Wi-Fi as much as it would like.

China is number one in intellectual property theft

Apple’s whole business model is based on creating value through exquisite design, superior branding and the sale of creative intellectual property (IP) — then defending its rights against the IP thieves, pirates and counterfeiters.

How will this formula succeed if China doesn’t enforce intellectual property laws?

The music piracy rate in China is between 90 and 99 percent, depending on whom you ask. China is the global epicenter of intellectual property theft in general, and of Apple IP theft in particular — especially iPhones and iPods.

Fake iPhones, and phones that steal Apple branding; illegal iPhone unlocking services; trade in illegal movie and music files; all appear to be tolerated and even government-protected activities in China.

Oh yes, how can we talk about China without IP violations? Seriously though, this is an issue. The best way to fight IP though, is for a country to get more prosperous. As people become wealthier, they are more willing to spend money on software, music, etc. In China, it is also very important to explain the importance of IP to various government ministries, and even be flexible about how much you charge Chinese consumers. Many Chinese think that they should not have to pay as much for music as US consumers because they have a lower income and standard of living. Does that fit into any American companies’ equations? Up until four years ago, Microsoft had a very high level of illegally installed Windows licenses in China, and constantly lobbied with the US Congress to “punish” China. When Microsoft China changed tactics and chose to engage Chinese ministries, educate them, and lower the license fees (as China’s standard of living increased), first the ministries, then the schools, then the people started buying original software from Microsoft. Now Microsoft gets more revenue from China, and the relationship with the government is much less confrontational. Piracy of Microsoft software still exists, but again it’s about the trend, which is improving.

Steve Jobs is an exemplary business and marketing genius. But when it comes to learning about other markets, he is lazy. He would like nothing better than to set prices for all media products sold through iTunes himself, and he would like it to be the same all over the world. China is a major kink in his vision.

How many times has Bill Gates been to China? How many times has Steve Jobs been to China?

I rest my case.

Understanding China’s Youth Through Tencent’s QQ: A New Must-Read Report

January 26th, 2008

qq.gif

As China becomes more developed and sophisticated, more westerners are coming to China to understand the reasons for its success. I don’t believe that the Chinese success can be fully ascribed to China’s rising wealth and development; a good deal also has to deal with how western countries have screwed up in their politics and policies.

In the kingdom of the blind, the one-eyed man is king. Right now, China is the one-eyed man.

Setting this aside, there are areas where China’s growth is remarkable.

In a recent blog posting, Henry Jenkins of MIT shows how much more willing Chinese youth are to live their lives out and share their behavior with complete strangers in a manner American youth are not yet willing to. Here are some of the statistics (mostly in percentages) of what he has observed:

# Almost five times as many Chinese as American respondents said they have a parallel life online (61 percent vs. 13 percent).

# More than twice as many Chinese respondents agreed that “I have experimented with how I present myself online” (69 percent vs. 28 percent of Americans).

# More than half the Chinese sample (51 percent) said they have adopted a completely different persona in some of their online interactions, compared with only 17 percent of Americans.

# Fewer than a third of Americans (30 percent) said the Internet helps their social life, but more than three-quarters of Chinese respondents (77 percent) agreed that “The Internet helps me make friends.”

# Chinese respondents were also more likely than Americans to say they have expressed personal opinions or written about themselves online (72 percent vs. 56 percent). And they have expressed themselves more strongly online than they generally do in person (52 percent vs. 43 percent of Americans).

# Chinese respondents were almost twice as likely as Americans to agree that it’s good to be able to express honest opinions anonymously online (79 percent vs. 42 percent) and to agree that online they are free to do and say things they would not do or say offline (73 percent vs. 32 percent).

Some of the differences can be accounted for because, until recently, Chinese played relatively few games using game consoles, an area American youth have long had free access and exposure to. Instead, they play games in the Internet cafe, which offers an online and offline social experience which has not existed until very recently on the Microsoft and Sony platforms, and which has been addressed very well with Nintendo’s Wii.

These statistics do not tell us much about China on their own; I frequently insist that if one is to really understand what makes China’s Internet different it is necessary to dig deeper and look at its development at least from the application level. If one were to make even the most cursory look at users in any Internet cafe in China, one would find that most if not all, would have an instant messaging (IM) window open and are chatting with their friends while they are playing an online game. Lately I have noticed that in the Starbucks I frequent near Guomao in Beijing (Starbucks in China often offers free WiFi, compared with the US which charges users a daily subscription through its partnership with T-Mobile; go figure), many office types often have an IM window open even when they are busily working through their Excel spreadsheets.

For this reason, I particularly welcome the recent report by Plus8Star on Tencent’s QQ which started as a simple IM client and has now metamorphosized into China’s largest online company, and which has more than than 270M users in China. Basically, it has become what AOL would have become if it had been able to pull everything off with its acquisition of ICQ in 1998. In fact, the first version of QQ was called OICQ, standing for “open ICQ”; in its early days the company approached AOL seeking to become its China partner; it was brushed off. Now the company is listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange and has a market cap of US$11.4B.

The report is available in a free downloadable PDF version; the full version costs US$3,000. The greatest value of this report for those coming into China is that it provides valuable context and answers the “how” and “why” China’s Internet has developed the way it has.

Too much of the time, western observers claim that China’s Internet has changed the way it has because of Chinese government control and policy; not enough is mentioned about the business reasons why local competitors have succeeded why western companies have failed. This reports does a good job of plugging that hole in most peoples’ knowledge.

The title of the report sums it up: “Inside QQ: Learning from China’s leading online community”. An especially helpful page is page 23 of the report “Why do global giants fail in China?”. There have been billions of dollars which have been expended, and mistakes have been repeated over and over again in their quest for western dominance of the Chinese consumer market. I’m amazed that it continues to this day. This page alone is worth the price of the whole report; just read it.

If you are a business person anxious to break into the Chinese consmer market, or are just interested in learning more about the Chinese Internet, this report is a must-read.

Chinese Face, Chinese Heart Part I

January 24th, 2008

Zhengtu gaming title

One of the frequent questions I run into in China is how western Internet companies coming into China should position themselves for growth in China.

Should they try to be western, or should they try in the shortest possible time, try to become Chinese, hiring Chinese for their local staff and management? Under what circumstances is it best to be western, and under what circumstances is it best to be Chinese? And what if a company has been in Taiwan, Hong Kong and/or the US; how should they position themselves for future growth in the Chinese market?

Their positions are made more complicated because it is now hard to find good management people they can trust locally in China; as an organization becomes larger the camaraderie and culture which forms in the management team becomes increasingly important. Over time, this builds into trust, especially if they need to deal with problems and challenges which need to be overcome on a daily basis. This comes face to face with another China reality: it simply is not easy to find people you can trust in China. Backgrounds can be fudged, headhunters want to push their candidates; the list goes on and on.

Internet businesses are especially complicated; most founders come from technology backgrounds, even today, and they have very little understanding of marketing, company positioning, and yes, national and corporate culture. Many still have dreams of serving the world from one virtual data center in Redmond, Mountain View, Beijing, Hong Kong or elsewhere, and letting more junior management deal with the soft and fuzzy stuff like “culture” and “marketing”. Even relying on ethnic Chinese management from Taiwan or Hong Kong has not really worked, as China is littered with Internet startup failures led by Taiwan and Hong Kong management teams who really did not understand the dynamics of the market in China. There have been many western executives who have said “How was I supposed to know that they didn’t understand China; they told me that they were from Hong Kong/Taiwan?”

For anyone from established business service sectors, such as banking, these ideas seem silly, even foolish. And they are. A simple reality of the Internet is that it is going to come under more national jurisdictions and regulations as it becomes a more important part of peoples’ lives. Just as it is inconceivable that banking would not be government regulated (unless you count the ongoing subprime mortgage crisis as a failure of the government’s regulatory system), it is becoming inconceivable that the Chinese, US or other governments would not want to have a say in how the Internet is run.

These established sectors know only too well how important it is to somehow find a way to live with government regulatory bodies. In China, successful new startups have almost always come from new areas which the Chinese government has not figured out regulations about and does not yet know how to regulate.

The perfect example is the online gaming industry. This industry was basically an import from South Korea, and took root in China because gaming consoles are technically illegal. (Sony PS2 and 3, Nintendo Wii and xBox360 are all freely sold; that law is seldom enforced, and all of the games sold are cracked versions.) The Chinese government’s rationale for that law was because way back in the nineties, the Chinese government saw PCs as a valuable educational tool, but considered gaming consoles to be expensive frivolous tools for kids to waste their time. At a time when the Chinese had much less buying power than they do today, it seemed like a good idea to ban gaming consoles.

This created an opportunity for Shanda, which was the first company to launch online games (almost all from South Korea) in the Chinese market. This idea caught fire with many younger Chinese and spawned the Internet cafe industry, where many younger Chinese choose to spend/waste their time and has also popularized QQ, the ultimate social networking application if there ever was one, and which for many Chinese, is the Internet.

This industry has swiftly matured, and with success has come regulation. Online gaming companies have tried to adapt, some have adapted (or tried to adapt) by moving into the online game publishing business from online game distribution. The transition from online game distribution to online game publishing has been a rocky road for companies like Shanda. The company has in the past acquired studios and titles, but many of the creative pros have left post-acquisition. A new wave of game publishers with strong titles have come up, led by Perfect World and the highly-contentious Giant Interactive.

On the regulatory and marketing fronts, the online game publishing company has become a victim of its own success: the huge amount of revenue it generates has created something the government and other regulators call a “social problem”, and it has fallen into a rut on the creative side, adding more titles in what are basically the same genre with very little to differentiate each other. The result: titles with diminishing shelf lives and ROI. People who are not addicted to games (i.e. people who have lives) have an increasingly bad view of the industry and game titles.

Unless you have some way to break out of your core audience, which is exactly what Nintendo did with the Wii. The greatest contribution of the Wii is that it has forced people to take a second look at gaming, as something other than just frivolous entertainment which wastes a lot of time and is anti-social for people who do not play games. (Heavy game players would argue that game players are social; they are just online.)

So the Nintendo Wii is halfway there; it has offered a new paradigm for games and gaming.

Now, if gaming is going to really succeed, it will have to get non-gamers to think that they are not playing a game. Then we are talking breakout.

And the game publishers (creative people) will have to learn how to get along and work with the marketing pros, and will have to understand that there is much more to marketing than press releases, press conferences, paying off the media to pick up their stories, planting stories and fake planted conversations on Chinese BBSes, etc.

To really go big, they will rely on a new class of professional and and a new kind of strike force.

We’re not there yet, and we’re not moving fast enough. But there is a way.

I believe in the value of history, but I also believe that there are times when we have to stop referencing the past for what we do in the future.

This is one of those times.