Advertising, Real-Name and Other Opportunities in China

July 14th, 2010

Several weeks ago, I wrote an article on China’s digital advertising industry for Forbes.com The China Tracker. Now that China’s online advertising expenditure is growing, I’d like to talk more about challenges, and what I see as good opportunities in the field.

The past few years in China have seen some investment in China in combined lead-gen/traffic websites in China. I won’t name any names, but if you know this space, then I’m sure you know a few players. Basically, combined lead-gen/traffic is not viable on the long-term because there is an inherent conflict in combining lead-gen and traffic together. Either you are in lead-gen, in which you sell your leads to other sites which then try to monetize them, or you are in the traffic business, and you sell your traffic to firms which try to segment that traffic for their campaigns.

You don’t do both under one roof.

I see advertisers and publishers getting smart about this very soon, and figuring out the inherent conflict, which will cause problems for the companies which are doing this, and I expect them to change to either traffic only or lead-gen only very soon.

This will lead to healthier market development, and will help digital advertising expenditure to grow as a whole, as the industry will then grow more healthily.

Many of the advertising plays in China have been laggards, as games have always generated more revenue. Growth is now slowing among game publishers, and the number of new game players is also slowing; this is a reflection of China’s aging demographics. The growth has moved from MMORPG games to casual games, which don’t eat up time and attention the same way MMORPG games do. With the growth of mobile phones, especially the Android and iPhone platforms, you can expect more mobile casual game popularity. Some of the MMORPG game publishers will move to these platforms; others will not. I expect their success to be mixed.

Blizzard and the Chinese government have all been trying to push real-name registration, for their own set of reasons. I predict that this year more people will begin using their real names on the Internet, not out of government registration threats and rules, but because they are building a following, and are becoming well-known, and even generating income from Internet referrals. This already happens for some people, but as the society becomes more digital, it is being pushed down further into society.

This will create a bifurcation of those who use multiple identities and remain anonymous, and those who use real names. Some people will become famous as leaders in their fields and will use their real names; in this respect, they will become like experts on South Korea’s leading search engine Naver.com. In this respect, I expect the Internet in China to develop along and follow South Korean lines. On the one hand, this will make the Chinese government more comfortable with its development, and it will also increase the accountability of the information.

I see the next five years in China as a kind of cleaning-up period, where content quality and reputation need to be re-examined. Let’s be honest, there is an awful lot of content on the Chinese Internet, and a lot of it is crap. Much of the content is just copied from other sites with no value added. Brands are going to advertise in China because of the importance of the market, but it would be much friendlier if it was cleaned up. This needs to be done.

As for advertising sites in China, too many of the startup ideas are content- and front-end related. This is because most of the westerners and westernized Chinese in China are content people. But content is not enough; the Internet is really about data and sorting and filtering very large amounts of data to capture insights for advertisers.

This is where the next generation of online advertising startups in China will add value. This will require REAL technology, and will be filled with terms like Hadoop, MapReduce, etc. This will replace terms like branding, China strategy, market entry, etc. In other words, the emphasis will move from the front-end to the back-end, where the real technology always is.

Google is the world’s most successful advertising company, and it is a backend data-driven business. Its front-end services are just there to drive traffic to the backend, where it is processed into useful data which generate profits.

That is something most people just don’t get.

It’s about time they did.

I wonder who will be the new VCs in this space?

I welcome your comments.

IAB Greater China: Lessons and Developments

November 9th, 2008

I have mentioned earlier that I have spent the past few months working on setting up an IAB (Interactive Advertising Bureau) Greater China. Recently, there have been some major developments. But before I get into those, I would like to talk about what I have learned.

IAB is set up as a non-profit business association for the digital advertising industry in each country market. Its mission is to enhance revenue growth by working with advertisers, ad agencies and media by reducing business friction. It does this by promoting standards and practices which make it easier to push out campaigns, measure results, and to optimize campaigns. Sometimes, IAB also plays a role as an industry advocate with the various governments and organizations (such as the European Union).

In China’s case, the most important issues in the near term have to do with standards for ad formats. The market is fragmented, which means that advertisers and ad agencies have to deal with multiple ad sizes, formats and naming conventions. This makes it that much more difficult for media planners and buyers and advertisers to get meaningful results from their interactive campaigns. Human energy and attention span, which are always in short supply, have to deal with mundane instead of more important practical issues.

The way IAB deals with these issues is to set up task forces and committees so that industry players can talk about, then propose standards to resolve these issues. Companies which are competitors in the marketplace first recognize the problem, then work on proposals for common standards to resolve these issues. After review and approval, they become IAB standards.

An important part of the value proposition for an IAB Greater China is to bring in a process of open discussion about standards, proposals and review for this industry. My discussions have shown to me that this is something Chinese companies would very much welcome, just as much as western companies.

In China, it’s always important to have the relevant government agencies in the loop, and I’m happy to say that after explaining what IAB does, they understand and even support its goals.

So let the process begin!

Major Developments

There has been major progress on bringing in some major players as board members and members of IAB Greater China. The paperwork has not been finished yet, so I am not free to say more, but it would be safe to say that there will be important announcements coming out soon.

November is going to be a busy month.

Event on 11/5/08: About IAB In China (Beijing)

November 3rd, 2008

For the past five months, I have been researching about the feasibility of setting up an IAB (Interactive Advertising Bureau) in China. The IAB as a trade association was founded in the US in 1997, and has since spread to all major markets in North America and Europe where it helps to coordinate discussion and implementation of Internet advertising production standards and measurement standards for web analytics.

I have been invited as a guest of Web Analytics Wednesday to speak on the subject on Nov. 5 in Beijing. I plan to talk about what I have learned from talking to many digital companies and ad agencies, and about the progress which has been made so far. I also plan to include my own assessment of what is needed to make IAB successful in China.

If you are interested in this subject and have the time, I look forward to meeting you at the event.

UPDATE For those of you who are having trouble getting to the above link, it will be at 8PM Wednesday at Club Camp. You can get directions to Club Camp here.

Event: Your Digital Day in Hong Kong

October 15th, 2008

ADMA (Asian Digital Marketing Association) is hosting an event on Thursday October 16 at Hong Kong’s Cyberport called Your Digital Day.

I will be participating in a panel talking about advertising trends and standards in China and Asia, and how they are developing. The moderator of the panel will be David Ketchum. The panel will start at 4:45PM.

If you are in Hong Kong and can make it to the event, please stop by and say hello to me. I look forward to seeing you.

The Value of Independent Statistics for Online Media in China

August 8th, 2008

Victor Koo, CEO of Youku, recently wrote an article, Internet Measurement in China: How to Get Out of the Dark Ages, where he highlighted the major challenge for Internet companies in China: the lack of reliable metrics for performance measurement.

In the article he talks about how even some VCs in China still rely on Alexa for very basic measurement stats, when in fact, Alexa is not considered reliable.

Many American service providers do not measure audiences from Internet cafes, which as I have pointed out, are a major source of traffic from China. Since American software companies are not familiar with the audience profiles of what is now the largest national audience in the world, they do not break out Internet cafes into a separate category, which underlines how American software providers are out of touch with this very important market. (This Internet cafe trend may change as broadband becomes more available in households, but it definitely should be counted as a major separate category in any report which claims to cover the Chinese market.)

The situation is not helped by government-supported “big picture” reports by CNNIC which give too broad numbers on a national basis and support a government agenda, but do not provide any business insights. They are great grist for press releases and the politically-charged Chinese and western media, but that is about the only value they have.

What Victor Koo does not mention is that the lack of reliable independent statistics has a very real debilitating effect on the healthy growth of the Internet as a sector in China, and the revenue outlook for Internet startups. This is because independent metrics, statistics, standards and definitions are requirements for the global media business. In order for media buyers to make good media buys for their advertising clients, they need standard definitions and metrics on the quantitative side so that they can make better overall qualitative recommendations and decisions.

It’s a testament to the robustness and attraction of China’s economy that the Internet has been able to grow as fast and as far as it has without these independent numbers and stats, but it is also a tragedy that many dollars have not made it to China because of the comparative opacity of the market.

If this systemic bottleneck problem can be addressed, the volume of ad money which would go to Chinese online publishers would go up dramatically.

Chinese Ecommerce And The Chinese Hockey Stick

July 18th, 2008

In an earlier post, I talked about a phenomenon called the Chinese hockey stick. The concept of the Chinese hockey stick is fairly simple: it takes a while for investment in a new sector to show results in China, but when it does, it takes off, going almost straight up like a hockey stick.

So far, the prevailing wisdom re ecommerce in China is that while the potential numbers are impressive, it’s going to be a while before the upside of the hockey stick becomes apparent. There are some reasons for this: low trust, fear of fraud, etc. So far, the only place where online commerce has performed well has been in online gaming with companies such as Shanda and Giant Interactive leading the way. The trouble with the demographics for online gamers is that it includes early adopters with low incomes who spend a considerable amount of time in China’s Internet cafes. These are people who are using the Internet for cheap entertainment, and are not likely to spend too much money on products sold in in-game ads.

Now, a new report released by the Research Institute Data Center of China Internet claims that online spending has increased to 37.5B US dollars for the first six months YOY, an increase of 58.2 percent over the same period in 2007. This is very good news, and suggests that we are beginning to see traction after many years of investment in the sector. In short, we are beginning to see the upside of the hockey stick, since according to the report, Chinese spend an average of 211.9 yuan on products/services on a monthly basis. If the trend continues there will be a double boost: the number of new spenders online will grow, and the monetary amounts spent by those already in will also go up.

This suggests that many upwardly-mobile Chinese are losing resistance to ecommerce and are overcoming fears to spending online. I believe that this represents the beginning of a secular uptrend for this sector. Within this field, companies which have a successful track record in fields such as Chinese online education will perform well. If Chinese consumers are convinced of the quality of these online companies’ products and services, it would be safe to assume that interactive advertising and Internet word of mouth will also gain greater traction.

The PR Problem for Chinese Online Public Relations Firms

June 17th, 2008

Several days ago, Sam Flemming of CIC, a Shanghai-based online reputation management company pointed me to a news article on Business Week called “Inside The War Against China’s Blogs”.

The article specifically highlighted a company called Daqi.com (in Chinese the name means “Big Flag” which has a certain nationalistic appeal), and cited a case in which it helped Toyota satisfy a customer who had not received his car after three months. According to the company’s CEO, her company, an Internet online reputation management company, helps its customers, mostly western multinationals, to monitor their online reputations and help put out fires with users in China.

Out of curiosity, I then entered Daqi.com into my browser address bar so that I could visit the site and learn more about the company and what they do.

What I found, and what I did not find, were very interesting.

First of all, I thought I was going to find an online reputation management company, or public relations company, or whatever buzzwords they are using now to lure in corporate business.

But I found nothing of the kind. Instead, I was confronted with what I would call a typical Chinese portal website, complete with channels for “Homepage”, “Society”, “Military”, “Strange and Curious”, “Autos”, “Digital”, “Women’s Makeup”, “Pictures”, and “Reputations” (in beta).

(I have uploaded the screenshots of the pages mentioned below to Picasa and you can access them here.)

Aha, I thought to myself, I’ll click on “Reputations” and see what I find. When I went there, I found that it was full of forums divided into the categories “Cars”, “Cameras”, “Notebooks”, “Digital Cameras”, “MP3″, and “MP4″. The page is very long, and like most Chinese pages, scrolls on quite a distance with recommended products in each product category. This page, like the rest of the website, was designed very much to lure Chinese visitors. To visit the page, you can go to http://exp.daqi.com/

My next question was whether they took advertising? The only banner advertising I saw was for Dell, which ran on the two pages I visited. But it would be foolish to think that their only revenue came from banner advertising. Looking at how the page was designed, and the way some of the products were given larger photos and highlighted, it was easy to see that some makers were paying for higher rankings for higher visibility.

But nowhere did I see anything about their online reputation management services. So I thought to myself, “Surely the person who wrote the Business Week story, Dexter Roberts, could point to a website where Daqi offered their online reputation management services, in either Chinese or English.”

I could find nothing of the kind.

Daqi claims that it regularly searches 500,000 forums daily for its corporate clients. I’m sure that it works on many sites which are not related to Daqi. However, it also raises the very uncomfortable possibility that it may actually manipulate online reputations by starting flame wars over product reputation, then charging their corporate clients money to put them out. (I’m not claiming that Daqi does, but the very fact that they run their own portal under their own company name and URI means that they have very little respect for their non-Chinese corporate clients and western journalists’ capability to conduct online research in Chinese.)

The clash of interests which arises from revenue from makers for higher rankings on their own portal site, and then revenue from non-Chinese corporate clients for “research insights” and “firefighting services” into Chinese online behavior is obvious to anyone. The temptation to use their own forums to “seed” opinions must be very great. These seeded opinions would then quickly proliferate to other sites.

There is a simple way to find out, and that is to check timestamps of postings. All forum software includes a posting timestamp, and it’s easy to check the timestamps on a subject to push it back in time to where and when a rumor started. What is harder to find out is the identity of the poster, but this can sometimes be done by checking the IP address of the poster if IP cloaking is not used. Different online identities sharing the same IP would most likely be the same poster.

I wonder how many corporate clients do this kind of checking?

I find the whole practice of hiring Chinese and paying them to post favorable comments on a per posting basis to be an unethical PR practice. According to the BW article, this is a common practice. A Beijing-based PR professional, William Moss, talks about this in more detail.

Online public relations firms will have to draw up and aggressively publicize clear guidelines on what they do, and what they don’t do when it comes to monitoring online behavior in China. Playing multiple roles as player and referee doesn’t make it in my book. I have talked about some of the skills needed in a previous posting.

This is part of the problem which actually slows down Internet growth in China. In spite of it all, there are healthy groups for product discussions.

Of course, each corporate client will have to make its own call as to what it is most comfortable with. And so will their VC backers. (I wonder if they read Chinese?)

But if someone does do an article on a Chinese company, at the very least, the URI mentioned should include, in either Chinese or English, the business they are in which is mentioned in the article.

Nobody likes bait and switch tactics, and I’m no exception.

Is that too much to ask for?

China’s Telecom Shakeup And What It Means

May 28th, 2008

Several days ago, a different kind of earthquake happened in China in the telecoms field. Unlike the Sichuan earthquake which took so many lives and caused so much damage, this shakeup was not unexpected. It’s ramifications will be large, if not huge, and it’s worth going into some depth to get a deeper understanding of how this change will affect the development of mobile usage of the Internet in China.

Before leaving the Sichuan earthquake as a subject, I would like to point you to this excellent slideshow by CIC Data (h/t to Tangos Chan) which shows how China’s grassroots social media has helped in the disaster rescue and recovery process.

China’s New Telecom Landscape

The main points of the new joint interagency government announcement by the MII (Ministry of Information Industry), NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission) and Ministry of Finance (MOF) are phrased as an opinion and encouragement. (Note: When you get two government ministries and one super-ministry “encouraging” you this way, you do what you are encouraged to do, even if you are China Mobile and have the largest single-country number of subscribers in the world. After all, this is China, not the US, where big corporations tell Congress and the executive through lobbyists and lawyers what they want and are willing to do, and then sell it to the American people through the media as “being in the best interests of the people”.)

The main points are:

  • China Telecom is “encouraged” to acquire the CDMA business of China Unicom
  • China Unicom and China Netcom are encouraged to merge
  • The basic telecom service of China Satellite should be merged into China Telecom
  • China Tietong (part of the railways infrastructure and the third fixed line operator after China Unicom and China Netcom) is to become a wholly-owned subsidiary of China Mobile

All six operators (China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, China Netcom, China Satellite and China Tietong) have been asked to separately submit their implementation plans to the relevant ministries where they will be encouraged (again) to reconcile their different plans and agree on a schedule. Once this is completed, the Chinese government will then announce the granting of the three 3G licenses and which operators they will go to.

Following the reorganization, there will be three companies left, which meshes perfectly with the number of 3G licenses to be granted by the government. There will be one license granted for each of the new 3G technologies: TD-SCDMA (China’s natively-developed standard), CDMA2000 and WCDMA. Current opinion is that China Mobile will get the TD-SCDMA license, with China Unicom and China Telecom getting the other two foreign technology licenses.

Reaction

The immediate reaction on the HKSE, where China Mobile, China Unicom, China Netcom and China Telecom are listed was unfavorable to China Mobile, the giant in the mobile sector in China. Goldman Sachs issued a sell rating on China Mobile.

You can bet that the six companies will be burning the midnight oil to complete and submit their implementation plans so that they can get the 3G licenses as soon as possible, which should be sometime within the next 3-6 months. Most likely it will not happen before the Beijing Olympics, even though the network infrastructure is there, simply because there is a lot of training and testing to be done.

My Take

This change marks the end of the first stage of the rollout of mobile phone services in China. While China has the largest single-country number of mobile subscribers, most people use mobile overwhelmingly only for voice and SMS services. From a business standpoint, China’s telecom industry has been in a wait-and-see mode for the past two years.

This second generation, or next stage of mobile services will be about a renewed rollout and introduction of more data services, and the more important metric for the operators will be ARPU (average revenue per user) instead of number of subscribers. So please, let’s stop talking about number of subscribers, and let’s talk about ARPU instead from now on.

ARPU will be the real metric to measure the performance of the three operators. I say “It’s about time!”

This change opens crack and opportunities for investment and new players, and gives more choices to Chinese consumers. China Mobile, the industry leader in mobile services, has continued to expand the number of subscribers, having the world’s largest number of subscribers in one country, with more than 500M. China Unicom has been playing catchup because it started as a CDMA service provider (as opposed to China Mobile’s GSM) and although it also later entered the GSM field. The small independent mobile operators such as Tom.com, Linktone and KongZhong have all languished because China Mobile was seen as the dominant player which wanted to completely dominate the platform and application-level services. While it would be a real challenge for those companies to claw their way back to health, venture capital and private equity firms can now look more favorably at the next generation of mobile services, which will no longer be as dependent on a single mobile provider, since there are now three choices available, and they will differentiate on the basis of how they cooperate with service providers and services they offer to Chinese consumers.

In order for Chinese startups to survive and prosper, they will increasingly differentiate themselves on their business and execution skills instead of just technology. Good management will be key.

It goes without saying that Apple’s iPhone will be the most high-profile beneficiary of the change, since it will have two other mobile operators to talk to besides just China Mobile. Instead of just having a loyal base of hacked iPhone users in China, Apple will have a chance to test its vision of the mobile Internet with Chinese users.

The major handset makers such as Nokia, Sony-Ericsson and Samsung will also want to test their application services among Chinese users, and will have greater chance of reaching them.

There are many opportunities in search and display advertising, and subscription-based services. Most of these opportunities are not infrastructure-related, but service- and tool-related. I will talk about some of these opportunities in the future.

While this is a short-term setback for China Mobile, it will ultimately help the company because instead of becoming a lazy monopolist offering bad services, it will have to compete on service. This will make the company more competitive when China starts planning seriously for 4G.

I give the plan an enthusiastic “thumbs-up”!

This is a good example of central planning working to help competitiveness, and in favor of consumers.

It would be nice if, ahem, other countries with large consumer markets, took a closer look at this move and how it helps competitiveness.

What’s Wrong with C2C?

May 2nd, 2008

Yesterday, Twitterdom in China was on fire with the news, first published on TechCrunch, that Facebook clone Xiaonei had raised US$430M from Softbank, which is huge, even by current Web 2.0 bubble standards. Immediately on Twitter, there was almost an uproar, especially from users in Taiwan, who said that it was ridiculous that a Facebook clone would have such a high valuation. Does Oak Pacific Interactive and Softbank know something which we don’t? (My answer to that is a simple “Obviously yes”.)

But before delving into that, let’s talk about the pluses and minuses of C2C, or “copy to China”, a term which I believe was first used by Tangos Chan, publisher of China Web 2.0 review. I believe that when an entrepreneur does not have a clear idea about what he is going to do, starting with a copy of a currently popular application is a good way to go. After all, if it got funded by VCs in the US, it is highly likely that given the team’s experience, they will also be able to get funded in China.

What is important is what happens after it gets initial funding. Where many startups lose direction is that they look too closely at their competitors, and don’t look at the challenges for many users whom they want to reach. Most ask the wrong questions: They are too focused on their platform and applications, and don’t study the problems their users have in their daily lives.

There are a few simple questions startup founders need to find answers to:

  • What are the most important tasks for a person in any given day? (These are always changing according to age, situation, etc.)
  • Where do they encounter the most frustration?
  • Can you offer a solution to this?

I have a simple way of looking at this: If the need is urgent, then you can charge a fee or subscription for it. If you can help people make more money, you can charge a fee or subscription for it. If it is a hardware solution which simplifies and clarifies life and makes the user more efficient, you can sell it (as is the case with the iPhone).

If it does not do any of the above things, but still offers some informative or entertainment value, then your most likely source of revenue is advertising.

Back to C2C. When OICQ was launched in early 1999, it was nothing except a Chinese-language clone of ICQ. It had an advantage in that there was tremendous need among Chinese for easy convenient communications across the computer and the then-new mobile phone platforms. The management saw this need, offered the services, collected fees all along the way, evolving into QQ along the way, and the company is now worth more than US$11B.

Tencent, the parent company for QQ, saw a social wave in China, copied something which worked overseas, fulfilled the need, and evolved it into something tremendously popular and successful in China. Instead of looking iinwards and worrying about their technology and UI, they looked out, and saw the opportunity in users’ needs and frustrations.

Now the company has more than 500M registered user accounts. It has achieved brand lock-in among most younger Chinese users.

That is why I say that when anyone only compares UI features, they are not thinking deep enough.

Now, the question is whether Xiaonei or any of the Chinese Facebook clones can evolve into something successful. The China of 2008 is vastly different from the China of 1999, and there are all kinds of communications solutions competing for users. The dynamics has changed to favor the user, who now has almost too may choices.

Add to that my feeling that SNS (social networking solutions) are a solution to a problem which is not that urgent for most people (hence the reliance on advertising as a revenue source instead of fee or subscription).

Of course, if depending on income was the only way to make money in this business, then I’m sure that Xiaonei would not have received such a high investment. An article in Plus8star talks about possible strategy scenarios in the move (h/t to Kaiser Kuo).

More on China Mobile and Baidu

April 29th, 2008

This article is a follow-up posting to my previous article about why China Mobile should buy Baidu.

One of the rules for mergers and acquisitions is that if one company wants to be acquired by another company, they have to be moving in generally the same directions. This way, less management attention needs to be spent on changing direction and redirecting resources.

If we take a look at China Mobile, they are a Chinese company which has been looking aggressively outside of China. With 500M+ mobile phone subscribers in China, it has the user base and cash flow to be truly a world-class company. China Mobile is proposing to set up a development lab with Vodafone and Softbank to work on widgets and others services to offer China Mobile and Vodafone subscribers. From the surface, it appears that these two leading carriers are trying to wrestle some of their technology dominance back from Apple’s iPhone, which will offer its own Apple App Store, selling mobile apps directly to Apple iPhone users beginning in June.

Interestingly, Vodafone is helping to bring Apple’s iPhone into the Indian market. According to a recent article, Apple may be discussing launching the iPhone officially in China with China Unicom. (Note: I disagree the author’s tone about Apple not getting it right in selling in China, I think that Steve Jobs knows very well what he is doing, and is biding his time until the 3G iPhone comes out in June. China is another piece on his chessboard, albeit a very important one.)

On the business side, China Mobile has been most agressive in Pakistan, following on its purchase of Paktel in 2007, and has just launched its Mobile Zone in the country. This looks like a test learning market for China Mobile. There are not many companies which can afford to “test” in a country with a population of 180M, China Mobile is one of them.

Based on this, it would be fair to say that China Mobile is leaning forward into overseas markets. It has enough money in its coffers to expand more quickly, but the most serious barrier is lack of international management talent who can execute in non-Chinese markets.

In contrast, Baidu is much more focused on the Chinese domestic market, where it continues to grow and pull ahead of Google. Everything suggests that the Baidu management believes that there is much more room for revenue growth domestically in China. The only tentative step Baidu has taken outside of the China market is with Baidu Japan (baidu.jp), which has only 0.3% of the Japanese search market.

Compared to Google, Baidu still continues to go after the easy money in China. Google continuously introduces and refines it search algorithms which are the secret sauce of its success. In comparison, Baidu relies less on search algorithms, instead using human search to assist in search results.

Baidu’s search results are also fundamentally different from Google’s. While Google’s search results strictly differentiate between unpaid organic search and PPC advertising, Baidu makes no such differentiation. The end result is that unpaid search results are pushed further back in position on the search results pages.

If there is one challenge in Baidu’s reliance on human-assisted search (as opposed to automated search algorithms as Google uses) and giving preference to paid advertising over unpaid in search results, it is that while it boosts revenue in the short-term, it is not extensible outside China, except for some of the other East Asian markets (Naver.com in South Korea is one such example. It would be nearly impossible for Baidu to oust Naver.com from its leading position as the home-grown leader in that very nationalistic market.)

Here lies the challenge: China Mobile is looking outside of China now, and Baidu is still looking to grow revenue on the domestic market, while nearly ignoring the overseas market.

Is there room to narrow the gap and create a new company for mobile search advertising and location services, first in China and then which can be extended overseas?

That is the challenge.